


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28 JUNE 1988



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Arms Control

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Arms Control

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U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks Viewed

GUOJI WENTI YANJIU View
HK1606102088 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese No 2, 13 Apr 88 pp 1-7

[Article by Zhuang Qubing (8369 0637 4016): "The U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks and Their Impact on Detente"—the first two paragraphs are GUOJI WENTI YANJIU introduction]

[Text] Arms control talks are a supplementary means to realize a given military strategy. Both sides want to strengthen their own position and weaken the other side through negotiation. With a change in nuclear strategy, the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear talks are different from what they were before. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have problems, and want to come to terms. The Soviet Union has bigger problems and is making more concessions to the United States. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is mindful of using strategy. It shows relative flexibility and tries to gain a breakthrough in one item after another. On the other hand, the United States shows a relatively rigid attitude.

If after the INF treaty both sides again reach agreement on strategic nuclear weapons, there will be greater detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. This new period of detente is likely to be longer than that in the 1970's. Despite this, the arms control talks play only a limited role. They will help in improving the relations between the two countries, but cannot prevent a new development of the arms race between both sides—a change from quantity to quality and their contending for power in various areas. Confrontation is still the essence of the relations between the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union will in future live with each other in the midst of fierce competition.

Last December, Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty in Washington to eliminate intermediate guided missiles. Like a small, smooth ball hitting in succession other small balls on a billiard table, it touched off a chain reaction. As the guided missiles to be eliminated account for only 3 percent to 4 percent of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is really like "throwing away a little knife." But this marks an unprecedented first move, or real desire by the two superpowers in 40-plus years after the war to reduce nuclear weapons. This allows a breakthrough in arms control talks, with momentum created for the development in depth and breadth of the whole talks. The result is a switchover from strained confrontation to detente in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

A Change in U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and Its Policies on Nuclear Talks

Arms control talks are basically a supplementary means to realize a given military strategy, and a need dictated by the strategy of the security of the whole nation. Judging by history, military strategy changes constantly with the development of military tactics. After the birth of nuclear weapons in the 1940's, both the United States and the Soviet Union formulated nuclear strategies. With the continuous upgrading of nuclear techniques and a large accumulation of nuclear weapons, both countries have in the 1980's witnessed a quantitative surplus of nuclear weapons and a continuous qualitative improvement, with the start of what the West calls a "post-nuclear" period. Meanwhile, conventional weapons have also been improved continuously, with space weapons in their initial stage of development. Space weapons carry great significance in future wars. The Pentagon holds the view that U.S. military strength and military strategy will, to a very large degree, be determined by the ability to enter space, and the space defense system. Soviet leader Sergey Sokolov has also preached the theme that "the control of space is still a prerequisite for winning victory."

U.S. nuclear strategy in the 1950's was "large-scale retaliation." It was replaced in the 1960's by "mutual assured destruction," that is, an emphasis on relying upon the deterrent role of a nuclear counterattack. This was followed for many years. In the latter period of the 1970's, Soviet strategic nuclear forces showed increasing strength, leaving the United States behind in some respects. To change the status quo fundamentally, the Reagan Administration in 1983 announced the introduction of the "Star Wars" program (that is, the Strategic Defense Initiative) in an attempt to gradually replace the counterattack strategy of "mutual assured destruction" with a new strategy that combines what is both offensive and defensive. Washington considered that only in this way could it have a strategically offensive and defensive "dual deterrent" force and a capacity for fighting various kinds of wars, and recapture the edge over the Soviet Union in the military field. Moreover, such an edge could be relied upon to increase political power. In line with the new strategy, the U.S. Administration has adopted the following policies in nuclear talks.

1. There must be agreement on a "wide-ranging, in-depth and balanced" reduction in offensive nuclear weapons. There is especially a need to strive for a cutback in the Soviet Union's heavy multihead guided missiles. A large reduction in the level of strategic nuclear weapons can weaken the other side's offensive and is also needed to safeguard a capacity for strategic defense. According to authoritative reports from the U.S. (Fletcher) Commission, the Congressional Technology Appraisal Bureau, and so forth, unless there are restraints on Soviet offensive nuclear forces, the future U.S. strategic defense system cannot be very effective.

2. There must be a guarantee for the continuous progress of plans for the study of antimissile strategic defense systems. Once it is proved that a strategic defense system allowing "high efficiency, a capacity for survival, and a good cost-effect ratio" (Footnote 1) can be established, proper arrangements should begin.

3. The upgrading of nuclear weapons on the list of those to be reduced must be maintained, including long-range missiles, short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and so forth. Certain compromises may be made concerning the problem of nuclear tests. But a complete halt to tests is not planned. This is because nuclear tests are necessary for the development of nuclear weapons or space weapons.

4. Attention must be paid to guaranteeing the observation of verification measures in the treaty to prevent cheating.

The above policies were first reflected in the program of "transition to defense" formulated by Nitze, special adviser to Reagan on arms control, in January 1985.

Concerning disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, what kind of policy should eventually be adopted? The U.S. Administration once had some minor differences within its ranks. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle, and others, who advocated a tough policy toward the Soviet Union, considered that the United States should take advantage of the multiple difficulties facing the Soviet Union to establish a stronger military force and thus force concessions from the Soviet Union. It would be inappropriate to rely on the means of negotiation. No breathing space should be given Gorbachev. Therefore, Weinberger not only urged the interpretation of the antimissile treaty in "a broad sense" but also was the first to advocate starting the deployment of the strategic defense system ahead of time around 1994. Secretary of State Shultz, and others opposed running the risk of worsening U.S.-Soviet relations. He advocated taking advantage of a change in the Soviet policy to strive for compromises under favorable conditions and for steady progress in strengthening the U.S. position to hold off the other side. Many Congressmen, such as Senator Nunn, and others, were inclined toward opinions of this kind, advocating a relatively realistic attitude in negotiating with the Soviet Union. Apart from the heavy burden of military spending and huge budget and foreign trade deficits, there came in succession the Irangate incident, the Persian Gulf crisis, and the stock market crash. All these, combined with Gorbachev's strong diplomatic offensive, made the U.S. administration and people advocate actively participating in negotiations. Forces favoring detente in U.S.-Soviet relations became increasingly strong. Therefore, during Reagan's second term of office, more of the ideas of Shultz and others were adopted. Negotiations were finally enabled to continue without interruption. The INF treaty was concluded. Weinberger, Perle, Adelman (director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency), and so forth resigned successively. Despite this, on the whole, Washington's attitude in its negotiations was still stronger than Moscow's. Reagan himself was especially firm in his original stand on the "Star Wars."

Changes in Soviet Nuclear Strategy, and Its Policies on Nuclear Talks

In 1987, Gorbachev put forward the idea of "having reasonable and adequate strength." This marked major changes in Soviet military strategic thinking, including nuclear strategy. The beginnings of a change in nuclear strategic thinking may be traced to the end of the 1970's. But Brezhnev's Tula speech in 1977 had already said that the idea of winning victory in a nuclear war was a "dangerous fantasy." The Soviet Union only needed "adequate" nuclear forces to make the United States afraid of using nuclear weapons. In his report at the 27th National Party Congress, Gorbachev clearly advocated putting Soviet military strength "within the limits of rational adequacy." Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov's explanation was that "reasonable and adequate strength means military strength enough to guarantee defense needs but not the strength or the means to provoke an attack." In his newly written article this year "On Military Strength Balance and Missile Nuclear Equilibrium," he also stressed: The degree of adequacy of strategic nuclear forces means "being able, under any circumstances and even under the most unfavorable circumstances, to disallow any nuclear attack on our country that carries no penalty." (Footnote 2) Judging from this, the Soviet Union should, where nuclear forces are concerned, demand only the preservation of a nuclear retaliation capacity and not the level of "a first strike." This was a far cry from Soviet military thinking of the past that a nuclear war could be fought and won. It was close to the strategy of "mutual assured destruction" that Reagan had wanted to replace. Actually, the Soviet Union has not relaxed preparations for a nuclear war. It is still striving to improve various kinds of nuclear weapons, exploring various techniques for a strategic defense system, and even making preparations for a long period of nuclear war. But it considers that a nuclear war is unlikely, while the outbreak of a conventional war is more likely. This train of thought naturally affects its policy on nuclear talks.

Like that of the United States, the Soviet nuclear arsenal has reached a saturation point, even a surplus. Moreover, nuclear warheads are becoming obsolete and need to be taken care of. Assistant Secretary Robert Baker of the Department of Defense revealed that nuclear weapons mostly have a life of only 20 years. The average age of 27 kinds of U.S. nuclear warheads in operation has reached 12.79 years. Only one-third of them are less than 5 years old. Conditions in the Soviet Union are generally the same.

What is more important is that the Soviet Union badly feels the need to concentrate forces on accelerating the development of the national economy. Otherwise, its

comprehensive natural resources will not match those of the United States, and a gap will develop. Its position as a superpower will also be threatened. The Soviet GNP is about half that of the United States, while military spending accounts for more than 15 percent. Its burden is heavier than that of the United States (with military spending representing about 7 percent). This explains why Gorbachev said that the arms race is "one of the greatest problems" facing the Soviet Union in economic development. In an internal report last year, (Ma-si-luo-fu) [7456 2448 3157 1133], member of the CPSU Central Committee, admitted that the Soviet Union was going through a crisis. He said that in the West, an economic reform on an extensive scale takes place every 4 or 5 years. In the Soviet Union, it only takes place once every 20 years. Eighty-two percent of U.S. capital investment goes to technical transformation, compared with only 33 percent in the Soviet Union. This proportion will be raised to 66 percent, as planned. But if the Soviet Union hopes to catch up with the United States or Japan in 15 years, it is still wishful thinking. Unless the modernization of science and technology is fundamentally realized quickly, the Soviet Union in 5 or 7 years will slip behind in its military balance with the United States. Therefore, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze openly pointed out that the Soviet foreign policy should "create conditions" for taking care of "the tasks inside the state." One main point was not to "spend too much" on maintaining a given military capacity and on upholding the "interests of foreign countries." This was to say that "we should find a way to restrict and slow down the armaments race and eliminate any factor of confrontation in our relations with other countries."

Since the start of the Geneva talks in three fields in 1985, the Soviet policy on nuclear talks has chiefly found expression in the following:

1. A desire to upset and thwart the realization of the U.S. "Star Wars" program; otherwise, the Soviet Union will soon lose its military superiority to the United States. In addition, the space weapons race is highly unfavorable to the Soviet Union. The deployment of a multilayered defense system could cost as much as \$1,000 billion. Moreover, space weapons technology lags behind that of the United States. What is more worrying is that once advanced antimissile defense technology extends to conventional weapons, the Soviet Union may lose its superiority in conventional forces. Even if the Soviet Union does not deploy reciprocal defenses and instead takes various cheaper countermeasures, there will also be a great increase in military spending. This is because the U.S. means of defense will be continuously upgraded, with the strengthening of measures.

2. A striving for a big reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, to bring them to a relatively low level. A 50-percent or more cut in strategic nuclear weapons still may not affect Soviet strategic balance with the United States. A semiofficial Soviet research report even said that given no deployment of a strategic defense system

by both sides, with just 600 intercontinental missiles each side can maintain the stability of the strategic situation. (Footnote 3) The U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Ikle said to reporters in January 1988: Actually, the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union since the peak of nuclear weapons in the 1960's had exceeded the 50 percent now being negotiated. (Also, according to an estimate by Heisbourg, director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, an 80-percent reduction in the existing strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, which means a retention of 1,200 to 1,500 nuclear warheads by each side, would not affect the balance of mutual deterrence.) The Soviet Union must not only allay United States' worries about its long-range nuclear weapons but also reduce and limit U.S. cruise missiles, and other weapons that the Soviet Union considers as the biggest threat.

3. Doing everything possible to squeeze U.S. nuclear weapons out of Europe to make Europe gradually "nuclear-free." Thus not only can there be increased security for the Soviet Union but also the whole strategic situation involving the United States and the Soviet Union can be improved, given a weakening in U.S. military strength in Europe and deepening contradictions between the United States and Western Europe. With intermediate-range missiles eliminated, the elimination of short-range missiles will be strived for.

4. Attention to the use of strategy. The Soviet Union is to get around obstacles and seek a breakthrough, from item to item. Given no damage to its important interests, a flexible attitude can be quickly adopted. Various concessions are made to avoid a deadlock on the problem of strategic defense. With a breakthrough successfully achieved in intermediate-range missiles, now efforts are being made to continue getting around difficulties to bring about a breakthrough in strategic nuclear weapons. In talks on intermediate-range missiles, no reciprocal reduction is sought. On the spot verification is agreed upon, with a precedent also set for other subsequent talks.

People can see that since the United States and the Soviet Union resumed arms control talks in 1985, each side has gained advantages in the trial of strength. But on the whole, the Soviet Union has taken the initiative. This is first because, relatively speaking, the Soviet Union can, with the political direction as a major factor in mind, make decisions on arms control and even unhesitatingly depart sharply from its past stand. Second, the Soviet Union needs an agreement more than the United States does, with more concessions made. Furthermore, in the Kremlin making decisions, there is no restraint from something like the U.S. Congress. Policy also shows relative continuity. U.S. policy decisions are often affected by unexpected factors at home. In addition, the Soviet Union often exploits the tough U.S. attitude toward arms control talks to win international sympathy.

It keeps launching diplomatic offensives and keeps making new suggestions and taking new actions, from a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests to inviting the other side to visit nuclear stations. The Kremlin also tries to take advantage of the contradictions between the United States and its allies and between the U.S. administration and Congress.

Despite more concessions from the Soviet Union, it is a matter of "losing at sunset and gaining at sunrise," with every effort made to bring things generally in line with the principle of "equal security." Therefore, concessions in given areas sometimes seem to be very substantial. Actually, they allow achieving the aim of using retreat as a way to get ahead. For example, when the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union discussed the INF treaty in February, the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, explaining the advantages and disadvantages to the Soviet Union, said: The Soviet Union will destroy 826 intermediate-range missiles, and the United States 689. But as far as modern missiles are concerned, the Soviet Union will destroy 650, and the United States 689. Moreover, what the United States destroys are missiles deployed in Europe that can quickly reach Soviet territory. (Footnote 4) This is just looking at things from a military point of view. In the political field, needless to say, contradictions between Western Europe and the United States are deepening.

A New Trial of Strength: Strategic Nuclear Weapons Halved

In 1987, the U.S. and Soviet heads of state signed a treaty in Washington to eliminate intermediate-range missiles. Negotiation of a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons was also progressing continuously. The deadlock over the problem of strategic defense has not been broken. But both sides avoid making it an obstacle in negotiating a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. It is also expected that this treaty on a 50-percent reduction will be signed in Moscow in the first half of this year. Can a timely agreement on these talks that have far greater influence than the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty be reached? There is still no telling this with certainty. Judging from things in various respects, talks are very complicated and arduous. But the chances of a compromise are not small. Whether a final agreement can be reached and to what degree things will be agreed upon will be determined by the following problems.

1. Can a compromise be made on concrete conditions for a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons?

At present, strategic nuclear forces are evenly matched. U.S. superiority lies in the total number of nuclear missiles, submarine-launched warheads, bombers, and cruise missiles and in accuracy with which targets are hit. Soviet superiority lies in the total number of carriage vehicles, the total number of land-based intercontinental missile warheads, the total weight of what is hurled or

thrown [zong touzhi liang 4920 2121 2367 6852], and the total equivalent. Both sides are still devoting efforts to raising the capabilities of various kinds of strategic nuclear weapons in regard to strike force, prevention of surprise attack, and the capacity for survival. Before the Washington conference, both sides had agreed on the number of strategic nuclear weapons being reduced by each to not more than 1,600 and the total number of warheads to not more than 6,000, with heavy intercontinental missiles cut in half (reduced to 154 missiles and 1,540 warheads). The conference further agreed on reducing intercontinental missiles and submarine-launched missiles to 4,900. The number of long-range missiles to be reduced by the Soviet Union is slightly higher than 50 percent. The reduction in carriage vehicles is also more than that of the United States. The total number of nuclear warheads to be slashed by the United States will be more than that of the Soviet Union. Despite these developments, many items remain to be solved. The total number of air-launched cruise missiles is not included in the quota of 6,000 submarine-launched cruise missiles, and has to do with the process of verification.

2. Are strategic nuclear weapons linked to space weapons? A joint communique of the Washington conference was vague on this, as common ground was sought with the shelving of differences. Now both sides cling to their own views. When the Soviet Union put forward the draft of a treaty to reduce strategic weapons on 19 January, it also reiterated what such a reduction means, stressing "strict observance" of "organic links" between antimissile treaties. It seems that the Soviet Union would not give up "links." But for the sake of a breakthrough in strategic nuclear weapons talks, the state of seeking common ground with the shelving of differences may be continuously maintained.

3. How should the 1972 antimissile treaty be interpreted? The most important part of the problem is whether outfield tests of installations of space-based antimissile defenses can be conducted. Such tests must precede future deployment. The Reagan Administration in 1985 called for interpretation "in a broad sense" in an attempt to legalize space tests. The Soviet Union considered that interpretation should be put on a strict basis. Unless there are other agreements by both sides, all the above tests could only be confined to ground laboratories, antimissile testing grounds, and factories. The Soviet Union later no longer insisted on banning all space tests. In 1987, the Soviet Union in a turnaround suggested that both sides jointly agree on a list with the names of installations for which the above tests were allowed, their parameters, and their performance records included therein. The same year, it was additionally suggested that "strict observance" of the antimissile treaty replace the list of items that could be tested. Gorbachev said to reporters that the Soviet Union was "willing to reduce 50 percent (of intercontinental missiles) in the first stage, given strict observance of the antimissile treaty. The United States can act to the

extent that the antimissile treaty is not violated. Suit your own convenience! It is all right so long as there is no violation of this treaty." (Footnote 5) How should we interpret things about "non-violation." Soviet officials did not put things in concrete terms. Disarmament adviser to the U.S. President Nitze considered that the joint communique of the Washington conference said: Both sides would "work on research, development and testing according to conditions permitted by the antimissile treaty." This line has given the United States the green light. Based on this, the United States can go its own way carrying out strategic defense program-related research, development and testing. He held the optimistic view that at the Washington conference, the Soviet Union had agreed to the U.S. view. This means that "unless both sides achieve consensus in other respects, each side can freely decide its own action guideline." This maintained the right of the United States in deploying a strategic defense system. (Footnote 6) The Soviet Union put things in a different way. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said firmly at the conclusion of his visit to the United States in March: "If the antimissile defense treaty is not observed, at least in the period of unanimity through consultation, then there would be no treaty on a 50-percent reduction in offensive strategic weapons."

4. What will be the time limit for observing the antimissile treaty? The Soviet Union called for no backing out of the treaty in 10 years. The United States suggested 7 years as the time limit.

There is possible relaxation by the United States where the problem of strategic defense is concerned. U.S. newspapers and magazines revealed this year that both the U.S. State Department and the Strategic Defense Office of the Department of Defense considered that the restrictions demanded by the Soviet Union involved only a few of the several tens of items scheduled to be tested before 1995, with no serious effect on the whole plan. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also considered that the Soviet suggestion was worth serious consideration. Observance of the treaty for 7 years was in line with the pre-schedule time (around 1994) for deployment originally advocated by Weinberger. Now things show that the pre-schedule deployment of a strategic defense system with low antimissile efficiency is difficult to bring about, because of strong domestic opposition. Even if it should be deployed, this, according to Director of the Office of Strategic Defense Abrahamson, must be postponed 2 years, because of a budget cut. Therefore, U.S. officials recently revealed that the U.S. side might possibly suggest 8 years as the time limit for observance of the treaty. It was said that according to Soviet official estimates, the United States would deploy a really technically advanced strategic defense system by 2000 at the latest. Moreover, what will after all be future action remains to be seen. (Footnote 7) It seems that this is one of the reasons why Moscow is not in a hurry to force the United States to show its hand.

From the above, we can see that if the talks on a 50-percent reduction in nuclear weapons are not linked to the problem of strategic defense, or are supposedly related but actually not, then, given certain compromises by both sides on cruise missiles, and other problems, the possibility of the United States and the Soviet Union reaching agreement in June this year is relatively great. Otherwise, the possibility is relatively small. Second, talks on a reduction of strategic nuclear weapons are in themselves unusually complicated. It may be impossible to come to terms on all the details in just a few months. Therefore, it is also not impossible for the United States and the Soviet Union to first sign a tentative agreement, or to continue talks and strive for agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons before the end of the year in the absence of a tentative agreement.

A Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces

Once an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is reached, the next round of talks will naturally be on conventional weapons, with short-range nuclear weapons included therein.

Microelectronics and remote-control technology are touching off a revolution in conventional weapons. The degree of accuracy in hitting given targets has been raised to an unprecedented height, enabling the might of "refined weapons" to compare with nuclear weapons. Cruise missiles carrying conventional warheads may replace intercontinental missiles in destroying the other side's missiles at the silo. Given the appearance of guided missiles and airplanes of the "stealth" type, the enemy will find it almost impossible to defend himself. Tank and anti-tank technologies are also being improved on. The United States and the Soviet Union have in recent years made a reassessment of the role of conventional warfare. Soviet leader (Ao-er-jia-ke-fu) [1159 1422 0502 4430 1133] first suggested in the country that "At the outbreak of a world war and for a period of time after the outbreak, only conventional weapons may be used." Later, Soviet military circles contended that "under given conditions and in a given period of time, a world war may also likely be conventional warfare." In the European region with the greatest concentration of conventional weapons in the world, the Warsaw Treaty Organization is planning extensive warfare and large-scale encirclement. NATO, on the other hand, is prepared to carry out fighting to deal an in-depth blow that combines "ground and air as a single entity." How to reduce conventional armaments after the elimination of intermediate-range guided missiles has become an increasingly noteworthy problem.

According to an estimate by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, (Footnote 8) comparisons between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO show the following: 68,300 versus 30,500 tanks; 64,000 versus 34,100 guns; 9,566 versus 7,438 airplanes; 268 versus 199 army divisions. Moreover, the Soviet Union

is increasingly narrowing its technical gap with the West. To relieve Western worries, Gorbachev expressed willingness to discuss the phenomenon of "an imbalance" in "a realistic and constructive manner" and to reach an agreement. He said: Conventional forces should "be reduced to a level just needed for defense, or a level not enough to take offensive action." He also said: The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons "must be combined with a reduction in conventional weapons." It was hinted that what the West calls the "three-zero point" program was included therein. (Footnote 9)

Nothing has come out of 14 years of talks on arms reduction in Central Europe. At present, the general situation has changed. Things favor the development of negotiations on conventional arms. But it is still very difficult to reach agreement.

Some indications show that the U.S. side may set very high demands in the future. In the past, talks focused on a reduction in the strength of army units. The focus in future will shift onto the offensive capacity. Kissinger considered that given a short period of warning, NATO had only 5 days notice for troop mobilization. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, for its part, had 10 days. Therefore, the main subject of the talks is not the number of troops but "the capacity for concentrating troops in important areas." A statement released by a NATO conference of heads of state on 3 March pointed out that in talks, first consideration should be given to "eliminating the capacity for launching a surprise attack and taking action in connection with a large-scale attack." To this end, the Warsaw Treaty Organization "must make much bigger reductions," especially in regard to tanks and guns. The statement stressed that NATO's nuclear strength could in no way be eliminated. "A deterrent force in the foreseeable future" still calls for a joint unit with "sufficient strength" combining conventional and nuclear forces. Due to differences in distance between the United States and the Soviet Union where Western Europe is concerned, a research report of the U.S. Rand Company considered that the ratio of arms reduced between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO must be 5 to 1. Given a reduction of 18-24 divisions by the former, NATO should make a reduction of 3-4 divisions. Otherwise, a balance could not be maintained. (Footnote 10)

The reason why a reduction in conventional forces is a complicated matter is that apart from the United States and the Soviet Union, many countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO are involved. There may also be a conflict of interests within the two big groups. This is especially clear in the case of Western Europe and the United States. Generally speaking, West European countries consider that the maintenance of a low level of nuclear weapons is relatively favorable to them. The INF treaty is a source of both delight and worry to Western Europe. It is delighted, because of a big reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe, with a relaxation in East-West relations. The worry is the fear of the

phenomenon of a "landslide." This is to say that after the first and second "zero point programs," there would appear the third zero-point program. This would result in Western Europe being "nuclear-free," with NATO's "flexible response" strategy rendered ineffective. Western Europe would be exposed to the threat of Soviet superiority in conventional forces. U.S. troops would even be made to withdraw from Western Europe. There are also differences among West European countries. For example, West Germany has a deep fear that it may become the battlefield for tactical nuclear weapons. It hopes for an early agreement to dismantle short-range missiles in Europe. But it is unwilling to carry out the plan for the modernization of short-range missiles decided upon by NATO in 1983. Britain and France, on the other hand, resolutely oppose a further reduction in U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe prior to an agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical and conventional weapons. The U.S. Administration that seeks an upgrading of short-range missiles resolutely opposes West Germany's idea. Secretary of Defense Carlucci even threatened the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Europe. (Footnote 11)

The United States and the Soviet Union have recently made some progress in the field of chemical weapons. It is not impossible that the key to success in the talks to prohibit chemical weapons lies in the matter of verification. Experts of both sides last year exchanged visits where military chemical equipment was concerned. But to strengthen its position in negotiations, the United States last year began production of binary chemical weapons.

Arms Control Talks and New Detente

If the United States and the Soviet Union can reach agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, new detente and its momentum starting with the INF treaty will increase. Even if a full agreement has not been reached, the state of tension between both countries has already been relieved. This will also have an effect on the whole international atmosphere. For example, there has been a drop in the temperature of "the hot points" of some areas. Economic and cultural exchanges between East and West have increased. Relations between some countries have taken a turn for the better. There has been a louder voice in the international demand for disarmament and peace. In spite of this, the role of arms control talks in the matter of detente is after all limited.

U.S. and Soviet contention for power spans a whole historical period. After World War II, the relations between the two countries were full of confrontations, contests, clashes between national interests, and contradictions between systems and ideologies. A long period of hostile sentiment was at the root of this. Both superpowers demonstrated reliance on their great military strength to promote national policy. Moreover, indirect wars were often entered into through their "agents." But

because of the fear of a major war and especially of the consequences of a nuclear war, they have all along avoided direct involvement in a clash of armed forces. When both sides are evenly matched in strength and when domestic and international situations urgently call for an alleviation of the tense situation, there appears a state of detente. Therefore, for 40 years or so, U.S.-Soviet relations have, on the whole, gone through four major stages—a confrontation in "cold war," detente of the 1970's, confrontation in the larger part of the 1980's, and the present period of new detente. What is worth noting is that detente has always started with an arms control agreement. The same is true of the 1972 treaty to limit strategic nuclear weapons and the 1987 treaty to eliminate intermediate-range missiles. Yet whether in the 1970's or at present, even given detente, the relations between the two superpowers are essentially still those of confrontation.

Arms control talks have played a limited role in detente, because they are a supplementary means to promote military strategy. They provide rules for the arms race to prevent loss of control and the start of war, but cannot do away with the race. So long as military techniques continue to develop, the policy of confrontation and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain, with no end to the arms race. The entire elimination of intermediate-range missiles and a large reduction in long-range nuclear weapons cannot change the future trend of an arms race between the two countries, from quantity to quality, and from nuclear and conventional weapons to space weapons. An arms control agreement can lessen the hostile sentiment between them and improve the atmosphere of relations between the two countries, but cannot end their contention in various areas. Local contention has all along been an important aspect of the conflict or antagonism between the two countries. In the trend toward detente in the relations between the two countries, some "hot points" may show a reduced temperature, and individual "hot points" may even be eliminated. But the elimination of all "hot points" is impossible.

The role of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks being as mentioned as above, then how are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet detente? People now can see that factors, both favorable and unfavorable to detente, exist at the same time. Generally speaking, any progress in arms control talks does not mean the stability of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The basis for such detente is not firm. Detente may gather momentum for a time, but actually will not remain stable for long. There will be ups and downs. Detente and the need for coexistence cannot take the place of the essence of confrontation and competition. Yet it is not impossible for the current period of detente to last a bit longer than that in the 1970's.

In the 1970's, Soviet strength grew. The United States, plagued by the Vietnam war, wanted very much to relieve its strained relations with the Soviet Union. The

Soviet Union took advantage of detente to vigorously expand its military strength. From Angola to the horn of Africa, it ended up sending troops into Afghanistan, with detente dissolved. Now both countries are in a plight. The Soviet Union seeks a breathing space more eagerly than the United States does. Therefore, it reduces expansion and makes more concessions to the United States. Moreover, the last period of detente with nuclear weapons limited but not reduced had relatively little effect on both countries. This time there will be actual reduction in nuclear weapons, with a relatively great effect on both countries. The pressure of the international demand for further disarmament and peace will also increase. Experiences and lessons over many years have made both sides realize that it is relatively advantageous to use more political and economic means and less military means in a trial of strength. In addition, both sides feel that in a world with international political and economic forces more inclined toward multipolarization, if comprehensive national resources are not strengthened, they really cannot adapt to the future situation of pluralistic competition. Gorbachev's remarks on "new thinking," the recent report by the U.S. "Comprehensive Long-Term Strategy Committee," and so forth all showed that the two superpowers deeply felt the need to face up to new realities. (Footnote 12)

Another aspect of the matter is that there are undoubtedly many factors that will play a role in increasing antagonism and competition between the two countries. First, it is difficult to dispel doubts and a deep-seated feeling of distrust between both sides. The U.S. Administration's "National Security Strategy Report" also stressed that "the biggest threat to the interests of U.S. national security is still the Soviet challenge to the whole world." Gorbachev's new style based on his policy of "new thinking" is a "new, continued, and more complicated challenge." The Kremlin stressed the need to maintain "balanced interests and equal security," with no tolerance whatsoever for U.S. military superiority. Second, in the foreseeable future, upgraded nuclear weapons by both sides will also be deployed. With the INF treaty yet to be enforced, NATO has already discussed the adoption of "compensatory" measures to strengthen its nuclear forces around Europe. To acquire a space combat capacity and an ability to provide space-based support for naval, land and air forces, space arms systems of various kinds will keep appearing. Conventional weapons may benefit from high-tech skills, including space arms technology, to become more refined. As such a new arms race develops to a certain degree, new tensions will inevitably arise in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Especially if the strategic defense system is deployed, the consequences are predictable. Furthermore, the frequency of regional conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America may give rise to new "hot points" contested by the United States and the Soviet Union. It is still unavoidable that both countries may intervene by adopting various means.

The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union in comprehensive national resources is also of quite a serious nature. The economic and trade relations between the two countries will be on a limited scale for various reasons. The United States is still joining forces with various countries in a strong bid to ban the flow of high technology into the Soviet Union. To strengthen such a contest in national resources, the United States has recently officially introduced a so-called "competition strategy" as one of the "four pillars" of national defenses. This means throwing the strengths of the United States against the weaknesses of the Soviet Union. The study of "stealth" bombers, the development of an anti-submarine capacity, and the introduction of a strategic defense initiative program are all countermeasures adopted to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. This makes large previous investments in the military field lose their effectiveness. (Footnote 13) The Soviet Union is not to be outdone. Gorbachev has come out with the proud statement that it is "not prepared to lose its lead in the field of space development." In addition, can Gorbachev's policy be carried out on a long-term basis? What will the U.S. Administration's policy be after Reagan? It is still difficult to make any such prediction.

In sum, the United States and the Soviet Union as two superpowers will live with each other amidst keen competition. There will be ups and downs in the relations between the two countries. Such a situation will inevitably bring not only renewed detente in the increasingly multipolarized world but also some new problems. Changes in various international relations will be caused, leading to new readjustments in the policies of many countries.

Footnotes

1. Meaning that the costs of building the U.S. strategic defense system are lower than the costs to the Soviet Union in upgrading the strategic offense system.
2. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.
3. See the report entitled "Strategic Stability, Given a Large Reduction in Nuclear Arms," circulated by the Soviet Union in Moscow in 1987.
4. TASS report from Moscow, 19 February 1988.
5. Gorbachev's speech to ABC reporters, TASS dispatch from Moscow, 1 December 1987.
6. Speech given by Nitze at the Washington National News Club, 15 December 1987.
7. A top-ranking Soviet official's talk with Soviet reporters stationed abroad on 25 February 1988; see a REUTER dispatch from Moscow the same day.
8. "A Balance of Military Strength" 1987-1988, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the autumn of 1987, p 231.
9. Gorbachev's talk with Strauss of West Germany in December 1987, TASS dispatch from Moscow, 29 December 1987. On his visit to West Germany in January 1988, the Soviet Foreign Minister purposely avoided mentioning the "three zero-point" program, but

suggested that carriage vehicles with nuclear and conventional "dual capabilities" should be discussed at the same time as conventional weapons. Thus, short-range missiles, airplanes, and anti-aircraft guns are all included, with the actual contents being the same.

10. Gorbachev's talk with Strauss of West Germany in December 1987, TASS dispatch from Moscow, 29 December 1987. On his visit to West Germany in January 1988, the Soviet Foreign Minister purposely avoided mentioning the "three zero-point" program, but suggested that carriage vehicles with nuclear and conventional "dual capabilities" should be discussed at the same time as conventional weapons. Thus, short-range missiles, airplanes, and anti-aircraft guns are all included, with the actual contents being the same.

11. Carlucci speech at an international symposium in West Germany, 7 February 1988, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 February, 1988.

12. The research report entitled "Impose Deterrents with Differentiation" presented in January 1988 to the President by the "Comprehensive Long-term Strategy Committee" organized by the U.S. Department of Defense made a concrete analysis of suggestions on long-term U.S. security environments and military strategy, which aroused quite a lot of international attention. The report was commissioned by Under Secretary of Defense Ikle and defense expert (wo-er-si-tai-de) [3087 1422 2448 3141 1795]. The participants totalled 13, including Kissinger, Brzezinski, (Heng-ting-dun) [0077 0080 7319], (Gu-de—pa-si-te [0657 1795 1584 2448 3676], and so forth) This is how things stand, as far as one aspect of the matter is concerned.

13. See the 1988 U.S. "National Defense Report." Therein, the "competition strategy," strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, and arms control were listed as "four pillars" of national defenses.

JIEFANGJUN BAO 'Commentary'

HK1706143888 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese
4 Jun 88 p 4

[“Weekly Commentary” by Dongfang Tie (2639 2455 6993): “Why Is It So Difficult To Get the Right Key?”]

[Text] At the U.S.-Soviet Moscow summit, arms control was still the most important topic for discussion. U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev exchanged official documents ratifying the INF treaty, which, however, was signed half a year ago. A U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction, which people have been longing for, is still "steps heard but not people actually seen." In the words of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two sides "have not cut the key to settling the problems concerning this."

Why is it so difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union to have the "key" fit?

A common saying goes: "Ice 3 feet thick takes much more than 3 cold days to form." The United States' and the Soviet Union's colossal strategic nuclear arsenals are

a product of their longtime antagonism and arms race. Although now both the United States and the Soviet Union intend to reduce their hyper-saturated nuclear arsenals, the basis of their antagonism and arms race still exists and their fundamental interests are still in conflict. Therefore, their strategic arms reduction talks are nothing but some bargaining focused on the relative growth and decline of their strength and aimed at improving their own strategic positions. According to foreign news agencies, the United States and the Soviet Union have over 1,200 differences over the reduction of strategic arms. Half of these differences are technical and the other half are related to their positions. One cannot judge the importance of these difference by quantity because "differences related to their positions" are strategic differences, and "technical differences" are subordinate to strategies.

Judging by the U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies, one can say that a change has taken place since the early 1980's. They gradually abandoned purely offensive strategies and replaced them with mixed nuclear strategies that are both offensive and defensive. An indicator of this is that both the United States and the Soviet Union have announced they are developing strategic defense systems. One can say that both the U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies are undergoing a transition from destructive attacks toward emphasis on both "nuclear spears" and "space shields." This transition has made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their "nuclear spears" without affecting their strength. On the other, since their "space shields" have not been deployed and since the quality of their "nuclear spears" is being steadily improved, the United States and the Soviet Union therefore go about reducing their "nuclear spears" very cautiously, in order not to give the other an edge. This is fully reflected in the question of the INF treaty. Intermediate-range guided missiles constitute only 4 percent of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. However, even this treaty, which has almost no affect on U.S.-Soviet confrontation, was not smoothly approved. It was not until Reagan had started his Soviet visit that Baker, chief of staff of the White House Office, hurriedly sent over the documents ratifying the treaty. Speaking at the Moscow Airport on arms control talks and other issues, Reagan cited the following Russian saying: "It was born. It wasn't rushed." Toward the end of the summit, Reagan said that he was not sure whether a Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic arms reduction could be signed before the end of his term of office. Recently, a Soviet vice foreign minister also said that a treaty on strategic arms reduction "involves the most central aspects of the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union....and even the most minute detail has to be carefully examined." All this shows that both the United States and the Soviet Union are "as cautious as if they are walking on the edge of a cliff or on thin ice" in holding bilateral negotiations.

Given the U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies, it is difficult for them to compromise on some crucial matters. The most controversial issues include the questions of

how to keep track of and count air-based long-range cruise missiles, how to limit and keep track of sea-based long-range cruise missiles fit with nuclear warheads, and whether land-based mobile missiles should be banned. Both the United States and the Soviet Union regard mobile missiles as their national treasure and refuse to make any concessions regarding them because these missiles have greater mobility and better surviving power. Deployed or launched, they are not easily tracked. They can be used in either the first or the second strike. They have become the pillars of the United States and the Soviet Union's deterrent capabilities during the transition of their nuclear systems. How can the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their treasured possessions or easily allow each other to "examine" them?

Now, more and more people among Western strategic experts are talking of a "post-nuclear era." Their discussion is centered on the changes that would take place in the traditional three-in-one nuclear systems of the United States and the Soviet Union, the new combinations of strategic offense systems and strategic defense systems, and a picture of the relative strength of various nuclear countries after a massive strategic arms reduction. However, the experts share the views that in the future, the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals may not shrink, but may undergo changes, and their nuclear relations may become even more complicated. The lack of confidence regarding the control of these complicated circumstances in future is also one reason why decisions are so difficult to make at the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

However, in spite of all this, it is still possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to furnish the key to the problems concerning strategic arms reduction. One reason is that they have the need. A second reason is the tremendous pressure from the world's forces for peace. The UN General Assembly's third special session on disarmament was held simultaneously with the U.S.-Soviet summit. At the session, various countries stressed that it is the special duty of the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the world's largest nuclear and conventional arsenals, to end the arms race and reduce arms and that they should take the lead in large-scale disarmament. The calls of justice are like thunder. No one can afford to ignore them.

China On Soviet Stance on Arms Race, Disarmament

*HK1606100688 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 11, 1 Jun 88 pp 14-15*

[Article by Xie Wenqing [6200 2429 1987]: "The New Soviet Concept on Security and Readjustment on Its Military Policies"]

[Text] Today, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the international community, when talking about the Soviet Union, people almost invariably mention Gorbachev's "new concept." The "new concept" has become a

key to people's understanding and analysis of Soviet problems. The "new concept" is an ideological line which Gorbachev put forward for the Soviet Union in the new period. Broadly speaking, it is reflected in domestic and international issues. On the international issue, he has put forward a new concept and a new theory on security and defense.

To sum up, the basic idea of his "new concept" on security and defense is: Given major changes in the world situation, particularly given a new situation whereby nuclear weapons threaten the security and survival of mankind, "it is impossible for nuclear war to be a means to achieve any political, economic, or ideological aims" and the two major social systems should "coexist peacefully" and engage in a "peaceful competition." To this end, the Soviet Union favors adopting a policy of "defense" and "rational and sufficient strength" and reducing the level of military confrontation through disarmament so as to strive for a relatively relaxed and stable international environment. Thus, the Soviet Union has begun readjusting some of its military policies.

These readjustments find specific expression in the following ways:

First, in military theory, the Soviet Union no longer stresses a vigorous offensive, declares that it will never be the first to take military actions against any country, and stresses the political settlement of international disputes.

In the past, the Soviet Union had always considered offensive strategy the basis of its actions and advocated "taking preventive measures and staging surprise attacks" on the enemy. In recent years, however, Soviet leaders have shifted to stressing the "defensive character" of Soviet military theory, namely, it has "a unitary defensive purpose." In May last year, a document approved by the meeting of the Warsaw Political Consultative Committee openly stated: As long as the Warsaw Pact countries do not become the target of a military offensive, they will never under any circumstances take military actions against any country or alliance of countries; they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union also said: Security is "general and mutual" and international disputes should be solved through peaceful channels and political methods.

Second, on its estimate of war, the Soviet Union has changed its previous views that it can win a nuclear war and stated that a total nuclear war means the destruction of mankind and for this reason it pays more attention to making preparations for conventional warfare.

In the period of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union held that the rocket nuclear war would be the only form of war in the future. In the early period of Leonid Brezhnev's tenure of office, the Soviet Union was still prepared mainly for a nuclear war, holding that it could

win such a war. In the later Brezhnev period, particularly since Gorbachev took office, there has been a marked change in the Soviet appraisal of nuclear war. Gorbachev declared: In the nuclear era, the old concept that war is an instrument for the realization of political aims is already out of date, since a nuclear war will erase mankind from the surface of the earth; a limited war or theater nuclear war will inevitably extend into an all-out war and lead to the use of the total nuclear arsenals of both parties.

At the same time, however, the Soviet Union has attached more importance to conventional warfare. In its view, "when a world war breaks out and some time after the war breaks out, only conventional weapons will probably be used." It even holds that "under a certain condition and within a certain period, the world war will also probably be a conventional one." Based on this idea, over the past few years, the Soviet armed forces have vigorously stepped up preparations for conventional warfare in various fields, such as weapon development, campaign strategy, structure, and establishment.

Third, regarding the arms race, the Soviet Union holds that neither side can gain superiority and stresses strategic equilibrium between the Soviet Union and the United States, setting forth the concept of "rational and sufficient strength."

In the mid-1970's, for a time the Soviet Union had sought military superiority over the United States. By the early 1980's, beset with its own difficulties, the Soviet Union began to stress that neither side can gain superiority. Since Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union has begun checking the growth of its military expenditures instead of stressing the policy of giving priority to the development of military power. At present, although the Soviet Union still favors preserving military equilibrium between the two countries, there has been new changes in its formulations. For example, the Soviet Union holds that both the Soviet Union and the United States should maintain a minimum level of strategic equilibrium; publicizes the idea that the Soviet Union does not plan to surpass the United States in all military plans and all military systems; and sets forth the theory of "rational and sufficient strength," putting the Soviet armed forces "within the limits of sufficiently defending and launching counteroffensives against possible aggression."

Fourth, on disarmament talks, the Soviet Union is now changing its rigid position, advocating large reductions of nuclear weapons and making new concessions. In the past 3 years, the Soviet Union has put forward a series of proposals on all disarmament fields and declared that the Soviet Union has made nuclear weapons reductions "a central task" in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the United States have reached agreement on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and

are now negotiating a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev has even proposed total elimination of all nuclear weapons the world over by the end of the century.

Fifth, on military deployment, while the Soviet Union still maintains fighting capability on both the European and Asian fronts, it has begun some retrenchment with a view to reducing the chance of military confrontation with surrounding countries. Over the past decade and more, the Soviet Union has stepped up its troop deployment in three strategic directions, west, east, and south. Although this has markedly improved the Soviet Union's strategic position in contending with the United States, it has also imposed a heavy burden on the Soviet Union and made many enemies. In a effort to speed up its development strategy, since coming into office, Gorbachev has reassessed the world situation and the international security, holding that "national security and international security are inseparable" and that, "if we do not consider the security of the other countries, it will be impossible to ensure our own security." To this end, the Soviet Union has begun some readjustments and retrenchments of its military deployment. Beginning May 15, the Soviet Union will withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan within a 9-month period. Beginning last June, it began withdrawing some of the troops stationed in Mongolia. In June 1986, the Soviet Union also proposed in the name of the Warsaw Pact that the Warsaw Pact and NATO military blocks each reduce 100,000 to 150,000 troops over 1 or 2 years, and that each reduce troop levels by half a million troops by the early 1990's. The Soviet Union is prepared to be the first to withdraw several divisions from the East European countries as a token of its sincerity.

There are profound international and domestic backgrounds to Gorbachev's readjustments of Soviet guiding ideology for security and military policies. They reflect a new understanding and rationale by the Soviet Union concerning its own position and the world situation. They find concentrated expression in the following ways:

First, it is possible for the two social systems, socialism and capitalism, to coexist peacefully. Due to the internationalization of the world's economic links, the rapid development of scientific and technological revolution, and the global ecological crisis, the world has become an interdependent totality and the class interests of one social system have "mingled" with the interests of the whole of mankind. Faced with the rapid development of the scientific and technological revolution in the Western world, the Soviet Union holds that, capitalism, instead of being "absolutely stagnant," has entered "a new stage of scientific and technological revolution" and still has a very strong adaptability and vitality. Gorbachev has also broken with the "outdated ideological conventions" and given new explanations of various traditional concepts, such as the lifeline of imperialism. He declared that not only will it be impossible for the war among imperialism to break out but it is possible to

establish a system of all-round peace and international security between imperialist and socialist countries, and that the confrontation between socialism and capitalism "can proceed only through the methods of peaceful contest and peaceful competition."

Second, human survival is seriously threatened by excessively saturated nuclear weapons. Since World War II, the Soviet Union and the United States have vied with each other to develop nuclear weapons, constantly enhancing their quantities and quality. The two countries now possess more than 50,000 nuclear warheads with an explosion equivalent of 13-16 billion tons, accounting for about 97 percent of the total number of nuclear weapons in the world. According to some scientists, these nuclear weapons are enough to wipe out mankind 20 times over. The Soviet Union has begun to realize that the manufacture and accumulation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles outside the rational scale will "make it technically possible for man to end its own survival"; and that Clausewitz's motto on war being the continuation of politics by other means is "outdated" in the nuclear era. Everyone is now in the same boat and "can either live or die together."

Third, military competition has drained off huge amounts of the Soviet Union's financial and material resources, placing a heavy burden on its economy. For a long time, the Soviet Union consistently placed the development of national defense in a priority position and maintained the most massive military forces in the world. The Soviet Union uses one-third of its total government expenditure for military purposes, causing lop-sided industrial structure and economic imbalance and seriously affecting economic development and people's livelihood. Some Soviet experts on international affairs have pointed out that the international struggle is "further shifting toward the economy," that the scientific and technological factor is "exerting an enormous influence" on the world situation as a whole, and that, in every symmetrical military competition initiated by the United States in the past, the Soviet Union has just fallen into the "traps of the United States to weaken the Soviet Union through economic means."

Fourth, the Soviet expansionist policy by means of military power has led to international tensions and has been strongly opposed by the international community. In December 1979, by dispatching troops to occupy Afghanistan the Soviet Union pushed its expansionist activities to a new height, subjecting itself to strong denunciation by world public opinion. This act has also placed a heavy economic burden on the Soviet Union and landed it in a predicament of being beset with difficulties at home and abroad. In his "new concept," Gorbachev has made a new appraisal of the political and economic situations in Third World countries and recognized that the revolution in a certain country is its own internal affair and that "it is useless and impermissible to forcibly promote a revolution from outside, especially to promote a revolution by military means."

Although the Soviet Union has set forth a series of new ideas and concepts on major issues, such as war and peace, arms race and arms control, and military policies, many international analysts hold that on the whole the strategic goals and military policies of the Soviet Union have not changed fundamentally. In fact, the Soviet Union is still vigorously researching and deploying a new generation of strategic missiles, developing new types of conventional weapons, and maintaining its current military establishment and system. Although it stresses that a nuclear war should not be fought and advocates using diplomatic and economic means to solve security issues, the Soviet Union, as a military superpower, still uses its military power as a powerful backing for its foreign policies. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union will not cease its arms race with the United States and the possibility of the Soviet Union getting itself re-involved in regional conflicts cannot be completely ruled out. Gorbachev stated: As long as the danger of war still exists and as long as social retaliation still serves as a nucleus for Western strategy and militarism, the Soviet Union will, in the future, "still make all necessary efforts to maintain its defensive capability on the level of eliminating the superiority of imperialism over socialism." From this we can see that, conditioned by various factors at home and abroad, the readjustments of Soviet military policies will be a long and complicated process.

Coverage of Disarmament, INF Talks
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in Chinese 4 Jun 88 p 4

[“Roundup” by GUANGMING RIBAO reporter Gao Fengyi (7559 7364 0308): “Without a Series of Climaxes and Astonishing Moves—Comments on Soviet-U.S. Moscow Summit”]

[Text] The curtain fell on the Soviet-U.S. Moscow summit on 2 June. It had lasted 5 days without crescendos or astonishing moves.

The recent Moscow summit was a continuation of the Geneva summit talks in 1985. On four occasions, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan have talked on human rights, disarmament, regional confrontations, and bilateral relations. Active talks have gone on separately between the foreign ministers and defense ministers of both sides on the abovementioned issues. As the specific results of the talks the leaders exchanged documents ratifying the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and initialled several accords on cooperation in the areas of communications, fishery, and culture. Regarding the regional confrontation and human rights issues, both sides confined themselves to explaining where they stood and to general discussions. On strategic arms reduction, a question of universal concern, no significant progress was made though the leaders have focused on its discussion. The two sides have eliminated major differences on the issue of mobile land-based ballistic missiles, and narrowed the gap in their positions on airborne cruise missiles, but the gap

between them remains over the issue of restricting sea-borne cruise missiles. On the key issue of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the United States insisted that the Star Wars Project was not on the agenda, while the Soviet Union insisted that the antiballistic missile treaty should not be violated. As a result, the target of initialing a treaty as determined between the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington in December 1987 has failed to be fulfilled. Commenting on the results of the recent summit observers here pointed out that, as a continuation of Soviet-U.S. talks, it has served as a link between the past and the future, but in the embodiment of specific accomplishments, the effects of the recent summit are rather limited.

The recent summit will inevitably affect Soviet-U.S. relations. The joint statement issued after the summit stated that it had made an important stride toward laying a steadier foundation for Soviet-U.S. relations and greater accomplishments. Since 1985, intense contention and haggling have been a part of the process of Soviet-U.S. talks. The talks on intermediate-range missiles and strategic weapons have, on many occasions, reached an impasse. The questions on regional confrontations have failed to reach solution despite talks on many occasions, while the disputes have been great over the human rights issue. Even so, the Soviet Union and the United States have always persisted in talking. There have been four summits over the past 3 years, and around 30 rounds of face-to-face diplomatic engagements. The frequency of high-ranking contacts has topped the record in the post-war history of Soviet-U.S. relations. The abovementioned facts show that on the one hand the pattern whereby the Soviet Union and the United States are opposed to each other remains unchanged. As long-standing acutely antagonistic superpowers, the contradictions in interests between the Soviet Union and the United States are deep-rooted, and their antagonism and contention over issues of major interest is inevitable. On the other hand grave economic difficulties have made both the Soviet Union and the United States incapable of bearing the heavy burden of infinite arms expansion. Besides, the single arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States has now changed into a competition in comprehensive national strength in economy, science and technology, and culture and education. The world trend of multipolarization has become all the more marked. The voice for peace and detente in public opinion in Eastern and Western Europe and various nations has become increasingly stronger with each passing day, urging the Soviet Union and the United States to seek talks, to reduce arms, to relax tension, and to improve their relations. The coexistence between dialogues and antagonism will be the chief characteristic in the Soviet-U.S. relations from now on. The Soviet-U.S. joint statement laid special stress on the importance of continuing talks, and stated that although serious differences remain over important issues, talks are helpful in overcoming them, and will lay down constructive groundwork for the solution to problems of today and tomorrow. It is

estimated that Soviet-U.S. confrontations will take place in the political, economic, and diplomatic areas, whereas the military coloring will be markedly reduced from now on. Soviet-U.S. relations are likely to enter a relatively stable period of limited detente.

The relaxation in Soviet-U.S. relations will promote improvement of all East-West relations, pushing them forward to develop toward relaxation. The Soviet Union will make good use of the opportunity from the Soviet-U.S. talks to actively develop diplomatic activities in Western Europe. The relations between Eastern Europe and Western Europe will also enter a period of bustling activity. While continuing to step up START talks with the United States, the Soviet Union will pay greater attention to the talks on European conventional disarmament, and there is the possibility of a change in the long-standing deadlock in the Central European disarmament talks. The relaxation in the political atmosphere will create a gradual increase in East-West economic relations. However, bilateral economic relations will continue to come under the restrictions of their political relations, especially so in the area of advanced technology and equipment.

'Roundup' on UN Disarmament Session
*HK1906014488 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
16 Jun 88 p 6*

[“Roundup” by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Liu Kaichen (0491 7030 1368): “Make Joint Efforts to Stop the Arms Race—Notes on the General Debates of the Third UNGA Special Session on Disarmament”]

[Text] United Nations, 14, Jun (RENMIN RIBAO)—The general debates of the third UNGA [UN General Assembly] special session on disarmament ended today. Representatives from 130 countries, including their state and government heads and foreign ministers, have delivered speeches. At this session, people were more eager to speak than at the previous two sessions and representatives from these countries discussed disarmament and all related issues. Their discussion was more comprehensive and had greater depth than that at the previous two sessions.

During the 2-week debates, disarmament by the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was the issue that received the most attention from the representatives. They took the U.S.-Soviet summit very seriously, suggesting that the ratification of the INF treaty by the congresses of the two countries and the signing of an agreement by their governments on jointly monitoring underground nuclear tests and an agreement on advance notification of launching of ICBMs and sea-based ballistic guided missiles were the actual progress they had made in disarmament and that this progress had put an end to the stalemate reached at the disarmament talks. The representatives generally welcomed this, praising it as the first step in nuclear disarmament. However, they still maintained that even

if this step is fully put into practice, the United States and the Soviet Union still possess 95 percent of the nuclear arms in the world, which seriously threaten the existence of mankind. Therefore, they expressed the hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will sign a treaty on strategic nuclear arms reduction before the end of this year and will continue to reduce nuclear arms in the future.

In their speeches, some representative emphatically pointed out two problems concerning the current U.S.-Soviet arms race which merit attention. First, on the one hand, the two superpowers are reducing their arms quantitatively in their arms race. However, on the other, they are trying to improve their quality and are developing newer types of lethal weapons by applying advanced science and technology. This practice of improving the quality of arms also jeopardizes world peace and security and warrants vigilance. Second, the two superpowers have more mass destruction weapons than other countries. Thus, there is an imbalance in military power between these countries on the one hand and the superpowers on the other and the majority of countries feel unsafe. Therefore, from the angle of world peace and security, it is very necessary for the two superpowers to take the lead in massive arms reduction.

The representatives were worried by the fact that the two superpowers are expanding their arms race into outer space by developing outer space weapons that are both offensive and defensive in nature. They generally called for an end to the outer space arms race, so that outer space, which belongs to the human race as a whole, can be developed and used for peaceful ends.

In addition to calling on the superpowers to take the lead in massive arms reduction, the representative also suggested that various countries maintain a minimum amount of conventional military equipment and use them for defense purposes, but not use them to invade other countries or to threaten their security. They also suggested that the use of chemical weapons by belligerent countries be completely banned.

The relationship between disarmament and development was a new topic introduced at this UNGA special session on disarmament. Many representatives held that military spendings in the world, which total about \$1,000 billion, are very excessive. On the other hand, the developing countries are inadequately developed [as published] and they have great economic difficulties. The total amount of their foreign debts now exceeds \$1,000 billion. All this is threatening international peace and security. Developed countries should use the resources saved from disarmament for their own development and to help the developing countries develop their economies.

With a view toward upholding world peace, the representatives also discussed the question of regional conflict. They were for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Afghanistan, pointing out that the political settlement of the Afghanistan issue would contribute to the relaxation of the situation in that part of the world and suggesting that regional conflict, such as the Cambodian issue, the South African issue, and the Central American issue should also be settled politically as soon as possible.

Although the international situation has relaxed somewhat now, the arms race has not ended and world peace and security remain threatened. The representatives were fully aware of this. they suggested that all the countries in the world should make joint efforts to stop the arms race and continue to fight for world peace.

HONG KONG

Commentary on Disarmament Position

HK1306120688 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 23, 6 Jun 88 p 28

[Article by Wei Ping (5898 1627): "China's Position and Actions on Disarmament"]

[Text] On 30 May, the third special session of the UN Assembly on disarmament opened in the UN headquarters in New York. This is a major event in the world's disarmament history and will promote disarmament in the future.

Since the second special session of the UN Assembly on disarmament in 1982, some new changes have occurred in the field of international disarmament. Many countries and peoples have made unremitting efforts for disarmament. However, we cannot neglect the fact that the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has not come to an end yet; instead, they continue to enhance the quality of their weapons and extend their arms race to some new fields. Regional conflicts have always been continuing. The danger of war still exists. Therefore, checking the arms race and realizing disarmament is a long-term task for all people in the world.

Disarmament is a major means for maintaining world peace and promoting economic development. The Chinese Government always attaches great importance to disarmament. In 1964, the Chinese Government solemnly announced that China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances. Later, China pledged not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear regions and countries without nuclear weapons. In 1973 and 1986, China signed the relevant additional protocols of the "Treaty on the Latin American Nonnuclear Zone" and the "Treaty on the South Pacific Nonnuclear Zone." In 1986, China officially announced that it will not carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere any more.

Since China participated in the Geneva disarmament talks in 1980, China has put forth her own work documents on the issues of preventing nuclear war, realizing nuclear disarmament, preventing the arms race in the outer space, and prohibiting chemical weapons in an all-around way, thus making positive contributions to the disarmament talks. In recent years, China also put forth motions on nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament in the UN General Assembly, and these motions were carried unanimously. China also joined other countries in putting forth a motion on preventing the arms race in the outer space, and the motion was also adopted by the UN General Assembly. These motions have become international documents adopted by the UN General Assembly as its resolutions, and have attracted attention and respects in the international community.

The Chinese Government has put forth its disarmament position and proposals many times, and has fully expressed the Chinese people's sincere desire for disarmament. China's disarmament position can be summarized into the following points: The ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament is to completely prohibit and thoroughly destroy all nuclear weapons; conventional disarmament should also be reduced substantially; China is opposed to any arms race in the outer space; and China calls for the conclusion of an international treaty on completely prohibiting and thoroughly destroying all chemical weapons at an earlier date.

China also holds that disarmament is related to the security interests of all countries, so all countries in the world should have an equal right to participate in the discussion on disarmament and the settlement of the disarmament issues. Bilateral disarmament talks and multilateral disarmament talks should complement each other. Disarmament agreements should include the stipulations on necessary and effective verification measures.

By cherishing the sincere desire to maintain world peace, China has adopted a series of measures to reduce the armaments and to promote economic development in light of China's actual needs in her economic construction.

Reducing 1 million troops. In 1985, the Chinese Government made a major strategic policy decision cutting down on the size of the Army by reducing 1 million troops. The work of reducing the troops was smoothly completed in 1987. Through the force reduction, a large number of soldiers have now become civilians and have begun to work at various posts of economic construction.

Retrenching the military expenditure. China accounts for a very small proportion of the world's military expenditure. While the world's military expenditure continued to rise, China retrenched its military expenditure for many years. China's military expenditure decreased from 22.27 billion yuan in 1979 to 16.8 billion yuan in 1981. In recent years, because the Army had to help a large number of demobilized personnel settle down and faced the general price rises, the military expenditure was slightly increased, but it still stands below the level of 1979. In 1987, China's military expenditure was 20.97 billion yuan, or more than \$5 billion. This figure was lower than the military expenditures of many countries. The proportion of the military expenditures in China's government budget also obviously reduced from 17.5 percent in 1979 to 8.2 percent in 1987.

Shifting some military facilities into civilian use. In 1984, the Chinese Government decided to shift some military airports, harbors, warehouses, and other facilities into civilian use or military-civilian use so that they can play a role in economic construction. The air force

also dispatched planes to assist civilian cargo transportation and mitigated the strained condition in air transport. Now, the Army has opened 15 military piers for civilian use, and half of the special military railway lines are also open for civilian use. To meet the needs in attracting foreign investment and developing tourism, the Army has also taken the initiative in reducing the area of military forbidden zones so as to make more places available to tourists and construction. Now, all Army hospitals are opened to civilians. In the last 3 years, nearly 1 million patients were admitted to the Army hospitals every year, and more than 14 million people received out-patient treatment at these hospitals every year.

Training talented people for both military and civilian purposes. The Army has been training the soldiers into talented people for both military and civilian purposes, and this has been taken as a strategic task of the Army. Now, soldiers not only receive military training, but also learn various civilian skills. The Army has now built many systematical and multitiered networks for such dual training. There are many special training bases and special training courses. Many soldiers have mastered various professional knowledge and skills, and have become experts in raising animals, planting crops, doing construction jobs, repairing machines and vehicles, driving, and in various processing trades.

Assisting economic construction. The Army has been assisting the country's economic construction in various forms. In 1987, the Army contributed more than 20 million workdays, and dispatched more than 910,000 vehicles and machines to civilian construction. Since 1981, the Army has assisted the construction of more than 50,000 projects on various scales. In some priority state projects, such as the building of the canal to link Luanhe River with Tianjin's water supply works, the expansion projects of the Shengli Oil Field, the building of the Beicanggang Railway Line, and the building of Huolinhe Coal Mine, the Army played an important role. The troops stationed in the countryside

also assisted local economic construction in various forms. The Army has also participated in public welfare projects and taken an active part in the rescue actions.

A large number of war industrial enterprises have been converted to produce civilian products. Since 1979, the war industrial enterprises have been actively developing the production of civilian goods by giving play to their advantages in technology and equipment. In recent years, more than 400 civilian production lines have been set up in the war industrial enterprises to produce more than 10,000 kinds of civilian goods in more than 100 categories. In 1987, the total output value of civilian goods produced by war industrial enterprises reached 10.8 billion yuan, and they earned \$300 million of foreign exchange through exporting their goods. The military industrial departments have undertaken major tasks for developing key technology and equipment for the state's priority projects, and have provided some key technology and equipment for the transformation projects in the light industrial, textile, and food processing trades. At present, civilian goods account for over 50 percent of the total output value produced by the war industrial enterprises. At the same time, the war industrial system has transferred a large number of technologies to civilian departments, and has provided technological consulting services for the research projects in the military academies and research institutes.

Developing agricultural and sideline production. The Army is running farms and small factories and mines. This not only strengthens the supplies for the Army itself, but also lightens the economic burdens of the state. In addition, the Army also takes an active part in forest building.

The disarmament measures of the Chinese Government and the Army's actions to participate in economic construction show that the Chinese Government and people sincerely desire the realization of disarmament and have full confidence in the maintenance of world peace and the development of the world economy.

INTRABLOC

Pact Foreign Ministers Attend UN Session

Varkonyi Speaks

LD0706110288 Budapest MTI in English
1010 GMT 7 Jun 88

[Text] Budapest, June 7 (MTI)—The Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Varkonyi delivered an address in the general political debate of the third special session on disarmament of the UN's General Assembly. Among others he expounded that the improvement in the Soviet-U.S. relations, the related bilateral disarmament accords, the progress in the settlement of regional conflicts and the favourable trends in the general international relations provide expedient atmosphere to the work of the session.

Of the latest results in disarmament Varkonyi referred to the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles as an event of outstanding importance. The agreement not only stipulates the genuine dismantling of nuclear weapons for the first time, but also revolutionizes previous concepts on verification. It sets conditions for verification with an earlier unimaginable severity and extent.

Among others the Hungarian foreign minister underlined the importance of reaching an agreement between the Soviet Union and USA on the 50 per cent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons, observing the agreement on the anti-missile systems reached in 1972 for a specified time. Varkonyi said that existing bilateral agreements and those in the offing will make an impact on the work of the multilateral disarmament forums. These two are in close interrelation. According to Varkonyi it is of fundamental importance that the special session should prove the viability of multilateral disarmament beyond doubt. To this end it should proclaim that no country can claim exclusive right to security, for security is equal, universal and indivisible for all.

'Both in its bilateral relations and in the international forums, the Hungarian People's Republic seeks to contribute to the improvement of international atmosphere. (...) [punctuation as received] The Hungarian Government consistently strived for the maintenance of dialogue between the states and the settlement of problems by political means through negotiations. Our standpoint has not changed since then, because it has stood the test of hard times, and it has been justified by the latest positive developments,' emphasized the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs.

Varkonyi expounded that the ban on nuclear tests is pivotal to putting an end to arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Hungary calls for a comprehensive ban on tests, but it does not exclude the opportunity that this objective can be reached step by step through continuous talks.

According to the Hungarian foreign minister there is only one field in the present multilateral disarmament talks that can produce at least partial results: it is the draft agreement on the complete ban on chemical weapons. An agreement can be reached as several issues, which earlier seemed to be impossible to tackle, including details of on-site verification, have been solved over the past years.

Peter Varkonyi reminded that with regard to its chemical weapon-free status the Hungarian People's Republic proclaimed several important confidence building measures at the disarmament conference in Geneva last February. Subsequently, on a voluntary basis, Hungary enclosed data on its chemical industry. These measures, he added, 'derived from our conviction that this kind of openness contributes to building confidence, and thus facilitates the soonest possible elaboration of an agreement.'

Varkonyi underlined that in addition to the reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments and weapons of mass destruction, it is pressing to reach progress in the issues of conventional disarmament, confidence building and security strengthening. The necessity of reducing conventional armaments and the offensive ability, and the elimination of military structures is imperative in Europe.

The Hungarian foreign minister underlined: Since the Budapest appeal on the reduction of conventional armaments, the Hungarian diplomacy has been actively working to assist the coordination of concepts on the issues of military detente and encourage their realization both in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the process of European security and cooperation.

Talking about the tasks facing the special session Peter Varkonyi emphasized: 'In the interest of concluding the conference with results we have to concentrate on the tasks with the necessary sense of reality and constructive intention. (...) We have to find the issues where the signs of an accord can already be seen in the form of concessions.'

Orzechowski Address

AU0906133188 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
7 Jun 88 p 7

[Speech by Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski at the 6 June session of the United Nations in New York]

[Text] Esteemed Mr Chairman, Poland regards the third special UN session on disarmament as an important event.

The development of the world has produced an unprecedented blossoming of civilization, but has also brought mankind face-to-face with unprecedented dangers, the

biggest of which is the unceasing, exhausting, and all-embracing arms race. To halt this race is the primary task of the international community.

The all-embracing nature of the challenges and dangers under conditions in which states and nations continue to increasingly depend on one another is an incentive to reach a most extensive international understanding. We are in favor of embodying this understanding in a general system of international peace and political, military, economic, humanitarian, and ecological security. The United Nations is the best place to do this. All states, no matter what their potentials and influence, can articulate their initiatives here and develop activities aimed at building a world that is permanently safe and free from destructive weapons, a world of general and total disarmament.

Jointly solving the present difficulties calls for the democratization of international relations, for increasing confidence, and for a search for compromises that make allowances for the interests of all. We know from practice that it is very difficult to reach a position that everyone is able to accept. There is no other way to do this except through dialogue and patient negotiations. Confrontation, domination, hostility, and mistrust harm everyone.

The first special session on disarmament was held 10 years ago, and the intervening years have shown us that the program drawn up by the session continues to be valid and important.

One of the most crucial values of the first session is the established conviction of nations that in the nuclear area it is impossible to ensure security by stocking arsenals with increasingly modern and deadly weapons. The only alternative to the specter of armaments is international security, achieved through disarmament—through gradually but actively lowering the level of armaments. The present session should fully confirm this key concept, the correctness of which has been proven by the past years.

The socialist states have greatly contributed to the conviction that it is necessary to strengthen security through disarmament. They have collectively and individually presented many peace and disarmament proposals out of the profound conviction that the democratic dialogue about disarmament—a dialogue that is free of confrontation and is conducted in line with the principle that one's security is no danger to the security of others—is not only necessary, but possible as well.

The international climate has been considerably improved recently. The main reason for the positive features in international relations is the increasing realism and pragmatism shown by parliaments, governments, parties, and political organizations; the spread of new thinking; and the growing militancy of social groups in many countries in favor of peace, detente, and disarmament.

The Washington accord initiated the era of genuine nuclear disarmament. As confirmed by the fourth summit in Moscow, the intensive and productive Soviet-U.S. dialogue continues to blaze the trail to a permanent improvement in the international situation. Agreement on the 50-percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons has become more feasible.

We do not indulge in excessive optimism when viewing world problems. There is nothing automatic about disarmament. It calls for unceasing political activity, new incentives and efforts, and constant public pressure.

Successive disarmament measures are a necessity. This third special session should resolutely advocate the continuity, universality, and irreversibility of the process of disarmament. Bilateral and multilateral disarmament measures should strengthen and complement each other.

It is especially necessary to totally ban nuclear tests. This is the only effective barrier against modernizing and creating new types of nuclear weapons. We must have guarantees preventing the reproduction of nuclear weapons in new forms.

We are keenly watching the course of this session, which, I think, makes it possible to state that every objective analysis of the present situation proves that, regardless of what the philosophy and methodology of this analysis may be, the problems that harass mankind can be solved only under conditions of peace and equal security. Rejecting the maxim "si vis pacem, para bellum" and confirming the will of nations to build a world that is always safe through efforts to strengthen the instruments of peace and not war, this third session may become a significant step in creating the foundations of a long-term and concrete disarmament program.

The international community in Europe and the world has reached a turning point. Mankind's fate will be determined by whither we go from here. The Polish people and their highest authorities are profoundly convinced of this. Polish foreign policy's humanitarian and peaceful intentions are best expressed by the message sent to this session by State Council Chairman Wojciech Jaruzelski.

Mr Chairman, the most vital interests of Poland, a country situated in the center of Europe and at the crossroads of Eastern and Western influence and civilization, were, are, and will be indissolubly linked to peace, security, and the stability of the territorial and political order in Europe.

The successful Soviet-U.S. dialogue and the present trends in East-West relations continue to create many favorable opportunities for Europe. Exploiting these opportunities is the common task of all European states and nations. The PPR will traditionally continue its efforts to help strengthen European security, dialogue, disarmament, and peaceful cooperation.

Present political, economic, and cultural relations and unceasing progress in the CSCE process do not justify the maintenance of the present high level of military potentials and readiness and, consequently, the risk of confrontation.

This fact is the reason why Poland continues its consistent efforts to evolve Europe's political-military situation in such a way as to ensure undiminished and equal security for all states at a much lower level of armed forces and armaments.

Because of the size and nature of its military potential, Poland is especially interested in switching over to conventional disarmament in central Europe and in the area between the Atlantic and the Urals.

We are for military detente, increased confidence, the comprehensive elimination of all asymmetries and disproportions, and maximally curbing any threat of armed conflict, especially of sudden aggression.

We are justly disturbed by the aversion of some states to promoting constructive negotiations and by their efforts to enforce new NATO armament concepts described as "compensation" or "modernization." The realization of such concepts would waste the political capital created by the ratification of the Washington accord. We cannot overlook the fact that the new generations of conventional weapons of greatly increased power and accuracy are in many cases as destructive as tactical nuclear weapons. In this context, the issue of the so-called dual capable systems acquires special significance. Generally recognized as conventional weapons, they may be used to carry nuclear warheads. Aside from large artillery pieces and strike aircraft, this category of weapons can also include missiles capable of carrying conventional warheads. If the so-called dual capable systems are taken out of negotiations, it might not be possible to remove the present disproportions.

We must impart a specific meaning to the recommendations of the final document of the first special session with regard to conventional weapons. It is our wish that this third session includes this issue among disarmament priorities.

The CSCE meeting in Vienna should come to an end as soon as possible and foreign ministers should sign a balanced final document.

It is high time for Europe to become really an area of truly peaceful cooperation and not of aggravated ideopolitical confrontation. Only through joint efforts will we be able to bring divided Europe closer together and to restore the feeling that the old continent is a single entity. Only partner-like Europe, which engages in peaceful cooperation, and which is united in meeting challenges and defying dangers, deserves the name of a common European home for all its inhabitants.

Mr Chairman, the basic problems is: either advance in disarmament and live in a safer world, or continue the arms race and face the prospect of annihilation.

Disarmament is not an end in itself. It is a means of maintaining peace and strengthening international security. This idea has continued to win increasing recognition in the past few years and has been expressed by the message sent to this session by John Paul II, a message full of humanism and concern for the world's future. The message contains many important ideas that jibe with Poland's stance and that stem from the overriding conviction that peace is mankind's supreme good.

In recent years disarmament has ceased to be the exclusive preserve of politicians and the military. The voice of broad sections of the international community has given it a new dimension. This has brought forth the humanist, ethical, and moral aspects of disarmament. It has provided those who support peace with new inspiration and new arguments. Disarmament also means releasing resources for development purposes, which could be used in line with the program of action that was adopted at last year's international conference on the interdependence of disarmament and development. Disarmament also means overcoming hostility, bringing peoples closer together, and increasing the flow of information and ideas.

This is precisely the broad background against which we view the third special session. We are pleased that the efforts of the nonaligned states are following a similar direction. Important disarmament postulates are, in particular, contained in the communique that was issued after the meeting of foreign ministers of the states belonging to the Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Movement, which ended in Havana a few days ago.

In line with our understanding of the responsibility and role of heads of states and governments, we attach great importance to their personal involvement in disarmament. We give our full recognition to and welcome the Stockholm declaration that was adopted at the third summit meeting of the heads of states or governments of the six nation initiative. The content of the declaration, which displays great concern for freeing the world from nuclear weapons and all forms of force, and has the support of the moral authority of outstanding leaders, is an important factor stimulating and strengthening disarmament dialogue.

Traditionally, we accord attention and support to all regional disarmament initiatives, especially those aimed at creating nuclear-free zones in Europe, northeast Asia, and other critical regions of the world.

Mr Chairman, Poland, which does not produce or possess chemical weapons, has been actively involved in work aimed at their elimination for many years. It is our

goal to bring about a ban on chemical weapons in all their forms, in all countries, and for all times. We will do everything in our power to bring this about as quickly as possible.

We are keenly interested in the rapid conclusion of work on a convention banning chemical weapons. This is attested to by the high level of activity performed by the Polish delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference. A convention on chemical weapons is almost within reach. The only thing needed for work to be completed is the necessary political will on the part of all participants in the negotiations, without exception. It would be a good thing if the special session was to use its power and authority to support efforts to bring about the conclusion of a convention as soon as possible. This was pointed out by many of the speakers who preceded me.

We propose that the session renew the call that states involved in the preparation of a convention do not take any kind of action that might complicate, delay, or even prevent the completion of work on a draft convention. A call of this kind is of particular importance at a time when chemical weapons are being used on the battlefield once again, and decisions to produce binary weapons are being made.

The prevention of an arms race in space is still the burning issue that it has been for many years now. It is particularly important in view of the need to protect such an important area of mankind's common heritage from weapons and from the threat of highly destabilizing consequences leading to competition in reckless expansion of offensive nuclear systems and supposed defense systems. This kind of competition might result in existing disarmament agreements being dismantled. The first victim would undoubtedly be the 1972 ABM Treaty.

It is time for the disarmament conference to make use of the significant fund of knowledge and ideas that has been accumulated during a comprehensive review of these issues, and to begin work as soon as possible on a single, general agreement or a series of partial agreements that would prohibit the militarization of space. We hope that the current session will adopt concrete recommendations aimed at achieving progress in this area.

The disarmament mechanisms mapped out at the first special session were on the level of those contained in the final document. These mechanisms have essentially retained their relevance to this day. The passage of time and the course of events makes it necessary to review their structures and effectiveness. Poland views the question of disarmament mechanisms in a constructive and open-minded way. We are ready to give careful consideration to any new proposals. However, we believe that every such proposal should satisfy two basic criteria. First, it should guarantee that effectiveness will really be raised, because the very fact that mechanisms

are changed does not mean that the intended goals will be attained. Second, disarmament proposals should strengthen the role of the United Nations organization.

We are keenly interested in increasing the role of UN disarmament organs. What we particularly have in mind is the Geneva disarmament conference—the leading forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. In connection with this, we wish to reiterate the proposals contained in the document entitled "On Increasing the Effectiveness of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament," which was adopted last year at the Prague meeting of the committee of foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact member states.

In particular, we are ready to lend support to the idea of transforming the conference on disarmament into a standing, universal negotiating body that is permanently in session, and most of whose time is devoted to the work of its working parties.

We also see a need for the current session to consider ways in which the United Nations organization can increase its role in the disarmament process by including the organization in the monitoring of compliance with multilateral arms limitation agreements and treaties regulating conflict situations.

Esteemed Mr Chairman, the results produced by the current session not only depend on good intentions, and an awareness of the exceptional importance of the tasks facing us, but also on our common resolve to reach agreement and to act effectively on all key issues that are the subject of disarmament talks. Apart from our common resolve, what is also needed for the attainment of this goal is a new approach and strong commitment on the part of all delegations involved in the negotiating process. We appeal for a comprehensive effort to reach agreement. The Polish delegation will strive to attain this goal.

The political climate surrounding the third special session makes it possible to nurture the hope that we will achieve results that will stimulate the arms limitation and disarmament process, and will clearly set out tasks for the international community with a view to creating a more secure world. So, let us exploit these circumstances that can assist us in the attainment of our goals.

The success of the session will be our joint contribution to the great cause of ensuring that mankind has a secure future and that the threat of its general destruction will be eliminated. We believe that a strong sense of responsibility, goodwill, and a readiness to reach compromises will once again unite the United Nations.

ALBANIA

Kapllani Warns UN on U.S.-Soviet Contacts
AU1106155788 Tirana ATA in English
0800 GMT 11 Jun 88

[“The PSR of Albania Denounces the Frenzied Armament Race and Hits Main Protagonists—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, June 11 (ATA)—At the 3rd extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, which is holding its proceedings in New York on June 9, the floor was taken also by the head of the delegation of the PSR of Albania, Muhamet Kapllani, who said among others:

In spite of the fuss made on disarmament in and out the UNO, the world not only did not see any disarmament but the armament race has continued at faster rates assuming qualitatively new proportions. The main protagonists of this frenzied armament race are the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which, together with their military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, cover about 800 billion dollars of the world military expenditure.

The PSR of Albania more than once, has voiced its resolute stand against the policy of blocs, which are the main factor of the confrontation and the colossal arms arsenal existing in Europe, which has aroused that spirit of hostility and lack of confidence among the European countries. Recently, we are witnesses of different evaluations sometimes even euphoric ones on the Soviet-American agreement on euromissiles, which even when realized will eliminate only a very small part of the gigantic nuclear arsenal the superpowers have in Europe and around it. It would have taken real values [as received] if it was followed with other important and efficient steps toward disarmament. There is no reason to show enthusiasm also for the latest ideas of the superpowers for allegedly great reductions of the arsenal of their strategic weapons. It seems we have to do more with a delayed step to eliminate the superstocks of these weapons. This measure too, in essence, aims at preserving the equilibrium of force which implies a kind of security for themselves, whereas for the others, the permanent threat of mass annihilation stands as a Damocles' sword.

Actually there is much talk on the contacts and negotiations between the two superpowers. Frequently they are presented as the only hope to avoid the war and save peace. We think that the institutionalization of the meetings between the superpowers in a forum, which can take compulsory decisions for others, too, is dangerous and must not be accepted.

After he spoke on the development of the events in different regions of the world, the representative of the PSR of Albania said:

The PSR of Albania estimates as a realistic stand and in compliance with their peoples' interests, the decision

adopted by some countries not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories or for the prohibition of anchoring in their ports of the warships of the superpowers equipped with nuclear weapons.

As a European and Mediterranean country, Albania follows with special attention every development that impairs the interests of peace and security on our continent and region. We, just as many other states of this basin, cannot fail to point out the danger that the constant presence and growth of the navies of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean poses. In more than one case this presence has menaced the freedom and independence of the Mediterranean countries, peace in the region. The interests of the Mediterranean peoples and of the peace and stability in the region and broader, require the withdrawal of the fleets of the superpowers from the Mediterranean.

In conclusion, Comrade Muhamet Kapllani said:

The PSR of Albania is a tiny country which has no foreign base or soldier. This is also sanctioned in its constitution. There is no doubt that this serves its freedom and independence and at the same time is also a concrete contribution to the cause of the preservation of peace and security in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and broader.

BULGARIA

Ganev Comments on CSCE
AU1106153988 Sofia BTA in English
1948 GMT 10 Jun 88

[“On the CSCE Process”—BTA headline]

[Text] Potsdam, June 10 (BTA correspondent)—Addressing yesterday's plenary session of the annual conference of the American Institute on East-West Security, Mr Ivan Ganev, Bulgaria's deputy minister of foreign affairs, emphasized that new political realities call for new thinking, for a new approach to safeguarding peace and security.

The continent will be in a position to meet the challenges of the 21st century only if it combines into mutually advantageous cooperation the socialist countries' economic restructuring and Western Europe's integration processes, he said. Mr Ivan Ganev expressed the hope that the initialing of the agreement on the establishment of formal relations between CMEA and the EC will make it possible to liberalize and ease bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the member states of the two economic organisations. Discussing the added importance which the human dimension of East-West relations is now acquiring, he stressed the common interest in turning the humanitarian sphere from a field of confrontation into a field of cooperation.

The efforts to build peace and security, to promote cooperation and good-neighbourliness in the Balkans, project the idea of the common European home at the subregional level, the Bulgarian official emphasized. This home should be built on the foundation of a desire to look for what brings us together rather than for what sets us apart, Mr Ivan Ganev said. The legitimate interests of all countries should be respected, and understanding and peaceful coexistence should be earnestly sought instead of imposing alien views and convictions on the partners.

Mladenov Addresses UN Disarmament Session
AU1306144188 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 11 Jun 88 p 5

[Speech by Petur Mladenov, member of the BCP Central Committee, Politburo member and Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs, read on 10 June at the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament, entitled "Protection of Peace Requires Common Efforts"]

[Text] New York, 10 June (BTA correspondent). Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, spoke today at the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament. He said:

Comrade Chairman,

Please allow me to cordially greet you and wish you success in implementing your responsible tasks. Your election to this distinguished post is a new confirmation of GDR authority and its contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament.

I would also like to greet Mr Perez de Cuellar, UN secretary-general, whose tireless activity for the cause of security and understanding evokes sincere respect and enjoys our total support.

Comrade Chairman, for the third time in the last 10 years the UN member countries are holding a special session devoted to disarmament. The international public has always attributed a special importance to this issue. However, today it acquires a qualitatively new dimension against the background of the realities of the nuclear-space century.

We know very well what I mean by this. Security can no longer be guaranteed by military means when great arsenals of nuclear weapons exist. A continuation of the arms race will logically lead us toward a nuclear disaster. The solution is in reaching a political settlement, renouncing the suicidal weapons, demilitarizing international relations, and constructing a nuclear-free world without violence.

The new political thinking answers this pressing need. It implements a real conceptual and psychological breakthrough and evokes mankind's sense of self-preservation. The results which have been achieved in this direction are obvious. The present session is taking place in a new atmosphere. The growing understanding of peaceful coexistence not only as a wish but as an objective necessity is the great truth of today's world. According to the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, we should all now better understand how much we depend on each other, sense that we are living in a mutually dependent world, and that we are all inseparable parts of the uniform modern civilization.

The USSR-U.S. dialogue is an undoubtedly and exceptionally important stimulus for positive change. The Bulgarian Government is greeting this dialogue as a major manifestation of statesmanlike wisdom and responsibility.

The INF Treaty, which was ratified a few days ago, has a great historical importance. The treaty eliminates two classes of the most modern weapons, and thus truly decreases the acuteness of the military-strategic confrontation. From a political point of view, the tension has significantly decreased, suspicion has subsided, and mutual confidence has strengthened. The world is becoming convinced that the possibility exists of successfully solving even the most complex contradictions in the sphere of the states' military-political security.

The most recent Moscow agreements have an important consolidating role in this respect. The Moscow summit made an important contribution to working out a common fundamental attitude toward the issue of disarmament. It demonstrated the great potential of realism in international politics. As Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, points out in his greetings message to the present session, the results of the Moscow talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan once more confirmed that in world politics even the greatest obstacles and prejudices can be overcome by common sense and goodwill. The new political thinking is making headway in interstate relations. The concern about universal human values is increasingly prevailing over narrow class and national interests.

The concrete steps toward real disarmament, which are being implemented, are convincingly confirming the correctness of the concept of security through disarmament, whose foundations have been incorporated in the concluding document of the first UN General Assembly special session on disarmament. The soberly-thinking forces of all continents and countries, the states of the two basic military-political alliances, the Nonaligned Movement, and the Delhi Six are partners in the change which has taken place. Millions of people throughout the world stand united in the struggle against the nuclear threat.

We see the present session as the most representative forum of the states on the entire range of disarmament issues. We hope that it will generate even more fruitful ideas, aimed at achieving progress in this area. It is vitally important to mark practical ways and approaches toward removing the military structures and strengthening the foundations of world peace and security. Therefore, we hope that the session adopts an essential document, which could adequately reflect the wishes of our time.

We are convinced that the proposal to create a comprehensive system of peace and international security within the UN framework represents a broad, and simultaneously flexible, platform of restructuring international relations on a peaceful, humane, and democratic foundation.

Naturally, we understand that real sources of military threat exist. The negative power stereotypes have great momentum. It is necessary that all countries refrain from actions which could aggravate the disarmament process. We think that it would be beneficial if the session tries to define a principle on the inadmissibility of the attempts to obtain military advantage under the pretext of compensation and modernization. It is impossible to achieve security and stability if at the expense of disarmament in one area or geographic region, the arms race develops in another area or world region.

The failure in turning the peace process into an irreversible process was the Achilles' heel in the area of detente and the attempts to reach disarmament in past years. Today we must unite our efforts in turning this process into a constant and steady one. This is the task of all states—whether big or small, nuclear states, or states which possess no nuclear weapons.

The past is a source of lessons. We can all learn from the lessons of history. We have all made mistakes. Everyone must travel his part of the road toward achieving a mutually acceptable solution to the problems which are still dividing our small world. If we do not want to repeat our past mistakes we must expand and strengthen our dialogue. We must not confine it only to a bilateral or regional framework. In this respect there will be little gain in unjustifiably protracting talks, playing a "game of numbers," raising excessive noise around secondary issues, or feigning an ostensible disarmament activity. The thoughts—if somebody is still entertaining them—that only certain countries are interested in disarmament, and that other states have the "privilege" to pose conditions or remain as a passive observer, are simply harmful.

I think that my colleague, Mr Genscher, was totally correct in saying recently that it is necessary to conduct a real peaceful attack against prejudices, flamboyance, and thoughtlessness.

Comrade Chairman,

As we know, a meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Pact Member

States took place in March 1988 in Sofia. That meeting produced many ideas, which clarified our views on the basic aspects of security and disarmament in Europe and the world. An appeal to the CSCE participating states was adopted in this respect. It expressed the conviction that along with the INF Treaty, it is now especially important to reach an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of U.S. and USSR strategic-strike weapons, while strictly observing the ABM Treaty. This accomplishment would create a comprehensive atmosphere of successfully solving the complex of disarmament issues, and more specifically, issues relating to nuclear disarmament.

The establishment of lasting peace through disarmament requires a really fundamental approach on the part of all participants in the international dialogue. In order to achieve substantial results the states must be guided not by the obsolete theory of "intimidation," but by a qualitatively new approach toward the nuclear factor. This is being dictated by the global interest to remove not only the impending threat, but also the potential for annihilating mankind. Such an approach, the only one that offers a solution, presupposes a joint action on the part of all nuclear countries, aimed toward the gradual, and ultimately, total liquidation of the most terrible weapons of mass destruction.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that a conference of the five nuclear states on discussing and adopting principles on mutual relations, which would minimize the chance of a nuclear war, would play a great stabilizing role even without achieving a total consensus on military-strategic philosophy.

Preventing the arms race in space must become an integral part of world peace and security. This is a very important task of the international community. For this purpose it is necessary to conclude a treaty on banning space-strike weapons, banning antitank systems, and ensuring the nonviolability of space objects. It is necessary to create an international system of control with a view toward preventing the deployment of any weapons in space.

As an active participant in conquering space, whose second cosmonaut is orbiting the earth during the present session, Bulgaria is especially interested in preserving space for exclusively peaceful activities and cooperation among states.

The problem of stopping nuclear weapons experiments and the correlation of the various tendencies and interests related to this issue is an original barometer of the climate in the area of disarmament. Our position on this issue is well known. We have consistently advocated a total and general ban on these experiments. We greet the position of the USSR and the United States at the Moscow summit, and view it as a part of the gradual

approach toward reaching this goal. The achievement of an agreement between the two countries to eventually minimize these experiments would be reliable proof of their readiness to steadily march forward along the road of disarmament.

The contribution of the present session to quickly concluding a convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons could be especially significant. At the end of 1987 our country appealed to all states participating in the disarmament conference to demonstrate political will and intensify their activity related to technically developing such a document. Despite the existing disagreement, we think that the difficulties can be overcome. As far as Bulgaria is concerned, it recently declared its rejection of chemical weapons in any form, and its readiness to cooperate in quickly preparing the convention on that matter.

The situation in Europe is an important aspect of the global issue of removing the military threat. The issue of reducing armed forces and arms, whose concentration in Europe is the highest in the world, has existed for many years. I mean the armies of millions of soldiers, who are facing each other, and who have at their disposal tens of thousands of modern tanks and military aircraft, nuclear missiles systems, and thousands of nuclear warheads.

We support the quick coordination of a mandate on talks related to reducing armed troops and arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. We hope that these talks will be conducted in a businesslike atmosphere, and that they will quickly lead to implementing a substantial reduction. For this purpose the Warsaw Pact member states proposed to exchange in the near future information on armed troops and conventional weapons, and turn this into the basis for beginning real disarmament, by first removing the existing imbalance and asymmetry.

The ambiguity about the intentions of the other side has repeatedly been pointed out as an example of an unfavorable factor. We think that in order to strengthen confidence it is necessary to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances and base them on a clearly defensive attitude.

The approach of the People's Republic of Bulgaria toward European security envisages the development and expansion of the existing measures of building confidence and the qualitative development of new measures. It must be stressed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the other weapons of mass destruction, most ominously affects the psychological and strategic situation in separate regions and in the world as a whole. Our initiatives in the Balkans, including the initiative to turn the region into a nuclear-free zone, has met with a positive international response. The Bulgarian-Romanian proposal to create a zone free of chemical weapons in the Balkans, as a step toward the comprehensive ban on and elimination of these weapons, is well-known.

At the Belgrade meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan States, Bulgaria proposed many new steps aimed at military detente. Indeed, almost all participants in the meeting proposed useful initiatives related to improving the political climate in the region, which was known in the past as the "powderkeg" of Europe.

The problem of limiting military maritime activity has become a pressing issue. Therefore, the socialist countries propose to begin talks with the participation of the great naval states, especially those who possess nuclear weapons, as well as with other interested countries.

If the present session adopts a more specific attitude toward this issue, it would bring to the attention of the world public a dangerous area of military confrontation, which has a destabilizing global influence.

We confirm our conviction that military confrontation could significantly decrease if the foreign military bases would be removed and foreign troops withdrawn from the territory of the countries in which they are presently deployed.

The gradual, complex, and diversified approach toward disarmament also includes the new vision of the issue of verification. We think that in order to achieve agreements in the priority areas of disarmament it is especially important to ensure glasnost and predictability in the military sphere. For this purpose it is necessary to establish a uniform verification system. It must be a comprehensive system and contain reliable guarantees of equal security and unity between words and deeds, and strengthen the moral element in relations between partners.

The present session must devote the appropriate attention to implementing the recommendations of the international conference on issues of mutual relations between disarmament and development. The decisions of the conference undoubtedly represent a good basis for developing a comprehensive common concept on this issue. Now it is necessary to coordinate specific and practical measures in this area. The review of this issue at the highest level by the UN Security Council would be a timely and important step toward solving this exceptionally important issue of world security.

Everything is in the hands of the people, the hands of man. We attribute great importance to the mobilization of world public opinion in favor of disarmament. The evolution toward a qualitatively new state of international relations cannot be implemented only "from the top." It would be unthinkable without relying on the broadest public forces, with their diversified and picturesque character, and without prompting the human tendency to search for peaceful ways and solutions. The world disarmament campaign, which is a noble UN

action, has a great role in this respect. Bulgaria has made a modest contribution to the implementation of this action. It will make further efforts to implement the goals of this action.

Disarmament is at the stage where increased demands are being posed to the existing mechanism of discussing and solving this issue. This especially applies to the disarmament conference. Led by the attempts to increase the efficiency of the Geneva forum, the Warsaw Pact member states adopted a document in the fall of 1987, which in our opinion contains realistic and timely proposals. We are ready to discuss other opinions aimed at the same goal.

The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on all these and other topical and priority aspects of disarmament has been presented in the memorandum of the Warsaw Pact member states entitled "Security Through Disarmament." We hope that this document will contribute to further clarifying the positions, bringing them closer together, and searching for common denominators in the most pressing issues, which move the heart and brain of contemporary man.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The strongest impression of this session, which we will take with us, is the common striving by the states to reach a turning point toward real disarmament. This striving is incorporated in many valuable proposals and ideas voiced by the representatives of countries with different social systems. They create a broad basis of deliberation and practical conclusions. Their common denominator is the supreme universal interest—safeguarding peace and saving mankind.

The present session has the opportunity to enrich the intellectual climate in which the most important issues of peace and disarmament are being solved. It has the possibility to create global political conditions, which could facilitate the detonation of the huge military machine, which has been created throughout the decades. The peoples are expecting that this session will ensure an even more reliable path of conducting dialogue on disarmament, and will give a new and powerful impetus to the talks.

Thank you for your attention!

Pact Arms Reduction Group Meets in Sofia
AU1706161488 Sofia BTA in English
1513 GMT 17 Jun 88

[“Warsaw Treaty Working Group Meets”—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, June 17 (BTA)—The Warsaw Treaty member states' working group of experts on armed forces and conventional arms reduction met in a regular session in Sofia on June 16 and 17. They considered questions

concerning the preparations for the second stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Chnoupek Addresses UN General Assembly
AU1006100288 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
8 Jun 88 pp 1, 7

[Report on speech by Bohuslav Chnoupek, CSSR minister of foreign affairs, delivered at the special session of the UN General Assembly in New York on 7 June: "The Czechoslovak Initiative—A Contribution to Security and Disarmament; From B. Chnoupek's Speech at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly." Passages in boldface as published]

[Text] New York (CTK Correspondent)—"The proposal to establish a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighboringly relations on the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, submitted by Milos Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee general secretary, on 24 February, is our contribution to further deepening the process of all-European security."

This was stressed by the head of the CSSR delegation, **Bohuslav Chnoupek**, minister of foreign affairs, in his speech on Tuesday [7 June] as part of the general debate at the UN General Assembly third special session on disarmament. He noted that the aforementioned proposal proceeds from the exposed location of our country in the heart of Europe, on the divide between two systems and their military-political groupings.

On this theme, he further said that the CSSR intends, in the very near future, to submit concrete suggestions for the individual spheres covered by the initiative. These should then become the subject of joint deliberations. Regarding the military sphere, considered could be, among other things, the establishment of a zone from which the most dangerous offensive weapons would be excluded.

B. Chnoupek recalled in his speech the feeling of the triumph of common sense following the conclusion of the historic Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles at the Soviet-American summit in Washington last December, and its recent ratification.

"The CSSR, for its part, did all it could for the successful conclusion of the talks, and to hasten the realization of the treaty," B. Chnoupek stressed. "We have committed ourselves to accept verification measures on our territory. Even before the treaty's ratification, the Soviet operational-tactical missiles with an enhanced range, that had been stationed since the end of 1983, were withdrawn from our territory. We will continue to contribute to the acceleration of the disarmament process."

The Czechoslovak minister further spoke about the need to set in motion a comprehensive system of international peace and security, which is being urged in the form of a proposal by the socialist countries for arranging international relations in the military-political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian spheres, and submitted to the UN General Assembly. He also noted the interest of the Warsaw Pact member countries in opening significant talks on a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—and in speeding up the advance toward a total and general ban on tests of nuclear weapons. He also mentioned the need to conclude a treaty banning and eliminating chemical weapons, which the CSSR neither owns nor produces, and achieving mutually acceptable, non-confrontational solutions in the entire disarmament sphere.

"Czechoslovakia is determined—with its allies and friends—to do everything for the fastest possible development of a worldwide disarmament process, in all regions, while maintaining strategic stability. Our proposals and the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries encompass the entire register of contemporary disarmament problems. We are submitting them in a constructive spirit, with an effort to take into consideration the views of our partners across the negotiating table as much as possible," Minister Chnoupek said.

In the closing part of his speech, he voiced the conviction that practical progress in the worldwide dialogue on disarmament and on the military dimension of comprehensive security will be made at this session. He said that progress would be hastened by a final, truly action-oriented document, which this session should work out and approve. "Czechoslovakia, for its part, will do everything for our common work to proceed precisely in that direction and, has already helped to create an atmosphere worthy of the new millennium."

Spokesman Supports Soviet Stance on Summit
AU1006100888 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
8 Jun 88 p 1

[Miroslav Fladr report: "On the Course of Inspections"]

[Text] Prague—The stands expressed at the Soviet-American summit in Moscow also express our views, and we fully support them, Dusan Rovensky, spokesman for the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at his meeting with journalists in Prague on Tuesday [7 June].

He added that the results of the Moscow talks prove that Mikhail Gorbachev's program of 15 January 1986, calling for a world without nuclear weapons by the year 2000, is realistic. He emphasized, in particular, the exchange of ratification papers for the Soviet and American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which immediately affects us.

The tripartite agreement between the CSSR, the USSR, and the GDR on inspections, as well as the Czechoslovak-American agreement on inspections, came into force simultaneously with that ratification. Czechoslovakia is ready to fully comply with its obligations arising from these agreements and to actively assist in their implementation, the spokesman stressed.

In June, within 30 days of the coming into force of the Soviet-American treaty (1 June 1988), the Soviet Union and the United States will exchange and assess the list of inspectors and members of air crews, and Czechoslovakia has the right to deliver its opinion on the list. The CSSR will grant permanent [trvala] visas (valid for 24 months) to the approved inspectors and members of aircrews. Within 25 days of the coming into force of the agreement, it will issue a permanent authorization for U.S. aircraft to fly over and land in Czechoslovakia while carrying inspectors to and from the country. In the period between the 30th and the 90th day of the validity of the treaty, some sort of a "stocktaking" of missiles and missile bases will take place. As is known, in Czechoslovakia there is only the base near Hranice in Moravia that is subject to inspection. All 39 Soviet missiles that had been stationed there have already been withdrawn and taken to the place of their liquidation in Sary Ozek in Kazakhstan. In this connection, D. Rovensky said that the base has been transferred to the administration of the Czechoslovak People's Army.

As to the modalities of inspections: The American side is obliged to announce its intention to carry out an inspection 16 hours in advance at the latest. The point of entry is the Prague-Ruzyně international airport. Following the passport and visa procedures upon arrival, the Americans' equipment and materials will be inspected (with Czechoslovak agencies attending the check along with Soviet representatives). The Czechoslovak state will provide overall care for the American inspectors (transportation, accommodation, permanent communication with the U.S. Embassy in Prague). The inspection will last 24 hours, but it can be extended by an additional 8 hours.

The spokesman for the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spoke about the forthcoming international conference on nuclear-free zones, which will open in Berlin on 20 June. He said that we highly value the initiative of Erich Honecker to convene this conference, which could give a boost to the dialogue on setting up nuclear-free zones, not only in Europe, but all over the world. D. Rovensky stressed that such zones contribute to the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to trust among states in general and appreciated in this connection the promulgation of the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone.

Commentary on Chnoupek UN Address

*LD0906180088 Prague CTK in English
1510 GMT 9 Jun 88*

[“CTK Comment on Czechoslovak Foreign Minister’s Address”—CTK headline]

[Text] Prague June 9 (CTK)—Tuesday’s speech of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek in the general debate at the special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament contained a deep analysis of the present international situation in which a favourable change has taken place thanks to four Soviet-U.S. summits and dialogue between the two superpowers in the last three years.

It listed the tasks of the world community in the effort to preserve peace and informed participants in the UN General Assembly session of the role Czechoslovakia intends to play in this process.

Czechoslovakia regards the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and the exchange of ratification documents to the treaty in Moscow as the start on the road to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Czechoslovakia can say that it has done all for the successful completion of the talks and the ratification of the treaty.

The agreements on inspections between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the GDR and between Czechoslovakia and the United States came into force with the ratification of the treaty and Czechoslovakia is fully prepared to fulfil its contractual obligations and actively help implement these agreements.

One of Czechoslovakia’s major contributions to the promotion of all-European security, which was also expounded by Foreign Minister Chnoupek, is to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The proposal was made by Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes on February 24.

The proposal is a natural continuation of earlier Czechoslovak initiatives aimed at establishing a nuclear-free corridor and a zone without chemical weapons in central Europe, which were presented by Czechoslovakia together with the GDR to the West German Government. All these proposals proceed from the need to reduce confrontation, consolidate stability and strengthen confidence precisely in the area overcharged with weapons.

The Czechoslovak proposals are comprehensive, based on reality, and concern all spheres of mutual relations. They are focused not only on the military sphere but also on the creation of a mechanism of efficient political dialogue, strengthening of the contractual character of

relations, extension of the spectrum of mutually advantageous cooperation in the economic and ecological spheres, in humanitarian, cultural, scientific, educational and health affairs.

The minister listed other Czechoslovak initiatives aimed at strengthening European and world security. He indicated that another major proposal will be added to them soon providing for the creation of a zone from which the most dangerous types of offensive weapons would be excluded.

All this is convincing evidence that Czechoslovakia and other Warsaw Treaty member states seek to conclude new agreements leading to arms cuts and at the same time to the liquidation of military potentials which could make possible sudden attack. It is proof that Czechoslovakia strives for military balance at an ever lower level, at the level of a sufficiency necessary for defence and not threatening anyone.

This is why Czechoslovakia focuses attention on the task to start talks on substantial cuts in armed forces and conventional armament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It believes that it is realistic at present to specify the subject of these talks within the framework of the Vienna follow-up meeting, take advantage of the opportunity and agree finally on the mandate of the talks.

Chnoupek Meets With Foreign Ministers, Cypriot Leader

Chnoupek, Shevardnadze Meet

*LD1006191688 Prague CTK in English
1833 GMT 10 Jun 88*

[Text] New York June 10 (CTK correspondent)—Foreign Ministers Bohuslav Chnoupek of Czechoslovakia and Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union met here today to discuss some international topics.

They stated that the Soviet-U.S. summit has favourably influenced the present international situation, and underlined the significance of the fact that both sides confirmed their readiness to finalize work on a treaty on 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons of the two countries, to reach progress in the sphere of limitation of and ban on nuclear weapons tests, conventional disarmament, and a complete ban on and liquidation of chemical weapons.

The two officials underlined the significance of the 3rd special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament which is taking place in a favourable atmosphere, being characterized by effort for a constructive solution of disarmament issues, support for the continuation of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue and search for ways to strengthen confidence. In this connection the ministers

pointed out the importance of the memorandum "security through disarmament" submitted to the session by Warsaw Treaty member states.

Bohuslav Chnoupek and Eduard Shevardnadze also exchanged views on bilateral relations in view of the implementation of the conclusions of talks between Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and of the visit to the Soviet Union by Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak.

Chnoupek, Orzechowski Talk
*LD0906102188 Prague CTK in English
1731 GMT 8 Jun 88*

[Text] New York June 8 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, currently attending the 3rd special session of the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament, met here today with his Polish colleague Marian Orzechowski.

They discussed international topics in the light of the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit in Moscow and in connection with the General Assembly session. Also discussed during their meeting was further all-round extension of relations between the two countries.

Chnoupek, Cypriot Leader Meet
*LD0906212688 Prague CTK in English
1850 GMT 9 Jun 88*

[Text] New York June 9 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek was received here today by Cypriot President Yeoryios Vassiliou.

Bohuslav Chnoupek informed him of the Czechoslovak initiative to create a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states and of the response to this proposal in the world.

Yeoryios Vassiliou and Bohuslav Chnoupek paid attention to the development of the European process, prospects for a successful culmination of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the states—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the situation in central Europe and the Mediterranean.

They discussed the possibilities of further development of relations between the two countries and some issues of the present international situation.

Johanes Addresses Conference
*LD1106223088 Prague CTK in English
1550 GMT 11 Jun 88*

[Text] Potsdam June 11 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanes welcomed the strengthening of positive tendencies in East-West relations in his address at a three-day international conference on new ways towards East-West security in Potsdam today.

He said the task of Czechoslovak foreign policy was to help build a secure and prosperous world and a common European house. The future of Europe requires to carry on and intensify the all-European process of disarmament and detente and to consistently fulfil the final act of the Helsinki conference. Speaking about the prospects for closer East-West economic cooperation he recalled the Czechoslovak proposal submitted to the Vienna follow-up meeting to call an economic forum to Prague.

Johanes said that Czechoslovakia wants to make a concrete contribution to the creation of a zone of confidence, cooperation and good-neighbour relations—the initiative submitted by Milos Jakes which is linked with the plan of Wojciech Jaruzelski to limit armament and strengthen confidence in central Europe and the initiative of Erich Honecker to call an international meeting on nuclear-free zones.

The Czechoslovak representative underlined the topical nature of the proposals of the GDR's SED party, the West German Social Democratic Party SPD and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to create a nuclear-and chemical-weapon-free corridor in central Europe. Johanes rejected the concept of security based on nuclear weapons and the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Axen Interviewed on Nuclear-Free Zones Meeting
AU0906135688 East Berlin HORIZONT in German No 6, 1988 p 3

[Interview with Hermann Axen, Politburo member, SED Central Committee secretary, and secretary of the National Preparatory Committee for the Berlin meeting: "20-22 June 1988—International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones"—date and place not given]

[Text]

HORIZONT: How does the Berlin International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones fit into the international efforts of our time to preserve peace?

Hermann Axen: The idea of holding an International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones in Berlin, the city of peace, this year, was—as is known—presented and substantiated by Comrade Erich Honecker at the conference

of 178 parties and organizations in Moscow on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, on 4 November 1987.

The worldwide support for our initiative proves that it is no exaggeration to note that such a meeting is topical for international politics and valuable for the cause of peace. Now that nuclear disarmament has been started with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, now that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan agreed on the drawing up of a treaty on the 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, the people's efforts are aimed at doing everything possible so that these achievements are not negated because of renewed armament in other countries or of other weapons systems. Our planet, and in particular Europe, is crammed full of nuclear weapons, which can destroy mankind and nature. "The fear of the bomb" still dominates the life of the people on earth to an unbearable degree. The demand to have the first disarmament steps followed by others, not at some future time but in direct continuation of the results of Washington and Moscow, is characteristic of the striving for peace of the peoples in East and West, and in North and South.

The disarmament process must not pause or stagnate as is desired by the forces that oppose detente and are obsessed with armament. Any path leading to a nuclear-free, peaceful world must be followed. The establishment of nuclear-free areas, zones, and corridors takes us all a huge step closer to the bold vision of entering the year 2000 without the nuclear tools of the devil.

The idea of nuclear-free zones, which was already developed in the Europe of the 1950's as an alternative to the deployment of nuclear weapons on the continent at that time, has gained vitality and reality over all those past years. Agreements and treaties, such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco on the ban of nuclear weapons in Latin America, or the Treaty of Rarotonga on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, stress the willingness of the people to free the world of nuclear arms.

No matter which region of the earth the political observer looks at—whether it is Europe, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, Africa, or the Atlantic—everywhere the peoples and states are starting varied initiatives for nuclear-free zones. These are favorable conditions for a network covering the whole earth, which would doubtlessly encourage the nuclear powers to make progress in nuclear disarmament.

To promote dialogue, understanding, and energetic work by the forces that are interested in peace in this important issue, regardless of political, social, religious, and ideological difference, is the concern of the International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones in our capital city this June.

HORIZONT: In your speech at the second session of the GDR National Preparatory Committee you characterized the Berlin meeting as a "new kind of world forum for peace dialogue." Why did you make this assessment?

Hermann Axen: What is new in this world forum for a peace dialogue is, first of all, the group of participants. High-ranking state representatives; parliamentary presidents; government and opposition politicians; party chairmen and general secretaries; leaders of national democratic liberation movements; representatives of trade unions, youth and women organizations, and various religious communities; peace researchers; outstanding scientists, poets, and artists; and renowned physicians have agreed to participate in the meeting. In other words, the broadest range of people and states to date will be represented.

This alone creates totally new, more comprehensive possibilities for political dialogue on preserving peace on earth and in space. The meeting is open to any proposal, any suggestion from the participants that relates to the topic of nuclear-free zones.

Of course, we will also welcome to the meeting political forces that have reservations concerning the usefulness and necessity of nuclear-free zones and want to make use of this opportunity to explain their standpoints. This is part of a free, open dialogue as it has to be pursued today. If all the world already agreed on the establishment of nuclear-free zones, such a meeting would be superfluous.

All in all, one can say that a broad international discussion on the meeting's concern is under way.

HORIZONT: A large number of reports by international news agencies gives evidence every day to the worldwide response to this initiative. Even though it is still almost 3 weeks until the opening of this meeting, could you already give us an overview of the current state of preparations and the acceptances you have already received?

Hermann Axen: The applications for participation which we have received up to now, and which are, of course, still incomplete, show that we have to expect participants from the great majority of all countries on earth.

Taking into consideration all thoughts and ideas that have been expressed to date, we submit the following suggestions:

—On 20 June, the first day of the meeting, a plenary session will take place. Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, the initiator of this world forum, will open the meeting. We have received applications from various renowned personalities from all over the world to take the floor at this forum and before the world public.

—On the second day, 21 June, nine committees on specific topics could hold their sessions. We have included corresponding proposals with our invitations. In the evening of this second conference day we have scheduled a panel discussion on the joint initiatives of the SED, SPD, and CPCZ on a nuclear-free corridor and a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe. In this way we fulfill many wishes to get more thoroughly acquainted with the details and prospects of these initiatives.

—On the third day of the conference, 22 June, we propose to conclude the discussions of the committees. In the afternoon, a concluding plenary session of the conference could take place, where the reports of the committees are made public. I would like to stress that all speeches—both at the plenary sessions and in the committees—are equally important.

HORIZONT: Numerous answers to the invitation to participate in the Berlin meeting express extraordinarily high appreciation for the GDR's peace policy. What are the reasons for this, in your opinion?

Hermann Axen: The founding fathers—antifascists and those who fought against World War II, which had been unleashed by German imperialism—raised the GDR as a socialist state, and thus as a state of peace, from its cradle.

Safeguarding peace is the GDR's foreign policy doctrine. As a member of the international community, we have always considered ourselves as sharing the responsibility for peace in the world and have acted correspondingly. The GDR has always acted in accordance with the principle that only peace, and never again war, must emanate from German soil.

If you ask about the reasons for the great appreciation for the GDR's peace policy, I would like to state the following:

In the GDR there is no political or social group in society that is interested in profits from armament and that is striving for hegemony in Europe and in the world. Socialism needs, creates, and protects peace. Lasting peace through disarmament and international security is the basic condition for the GDR to implement its great plans and prospects for the further shaping of the developed socialist society. In our country workers, cooperative peasants, intellectuals, and all citizens declare their workplace to be their combat station for peace and prove this with outstanding production results. They are acting in this way because they know that the stronger socialism is, the more secure peace is. Millions of young people commit themselves to the struggle for peace, because their lives today and in the future depend on this. Women in the GDR work for peace because they defend the lives they have given.

Scientists, physicians, artists, athletes, craftsmen, small businessmen, atheists, and believers of various religions are developing their own initiatives to safeguard a peaceful future for mankind.

Thus, since its founding, the GDR has engaged in a constructive dialogue with all forces of reason and realism and is making its own, active contribution to security and peace in the world.

Coverage of 'Institute for East-West Security'

Conference Convenes

*LD0906150588 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1324 GMT 9 Jun 88*

[Text] Potsdam, 9 Jun (ADN)—The seventh annual conference of the Institute for East-West Security Studies opened in Potsdam this afternoon. Institute president John Edwin Mroz welcomed the delegates, who came from almost all the CSCE signatory states. He expressed particular thanks to GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, the meeting's host.

Mroz expressed the conviction that the Potsdam session on the subject of "new ways to East-West security," as an event of worldwide significance, would contribute toward promoting understanding and cooperation between East and West.

Fischer Address

*LD0906163588 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1401 GMT 9 Jun 88*

[“From Oskar Fischer's speech at the opening of the seventh annual conference of the Institute for East-West Security Studies”—ADN headline]

[Text] Potsdam, 9 Jun (ADN)—This meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in historic Potsdam is taking place at a time of many new developments in international relations. We are obviously standing at the beginning of a new, better phase in East-West relations, GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer stated in his opening address. The speech went on:

The conference has chosen its subject well, and is therefore timely. It is important today to find new access—meaning new pathways—to cooperation among states with different social systems.

Changes of fundamental importance have been accomplished in our world. The enormous explosion of science and technology, which is also—or especially—expressed in the quantity and quality of the accumulated potential for mass destruction, has created a situation that is, historically, totally new. The attempt to seek to force decisions in international relations through war today would mean the certain destruction of all life. Security

today is, truly, attainable only together, along the road of peaceful cooperation and with resources which are released primarily through disarmament.

The approach to peace and security is, in any event, a political decision; it is, precisely, the preparedness to shape international relations in a new manner, and only peacefully. Security and stability must be understood and tackled in their mutual, indissoluble interrelationship. This is possible only along the road of political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian cooperation. Thus the military security precautions which have been set up against each country should be replaced with a wide range of joint, non-military security factors and guarantees. Only when we all feel secure and one's own political stability strengthens the other's at the same time, will we reach a peaceful world. We welcome all ideas for cooperative security structures and cooperative solutions.

Thinking, as Albert Einstein demanded for the nuclear and space age, has obviously begun throughout the world. This is promising.

A nuclear conflict, no matter between whom and where it might take place, would affect all states, and would cause the demise of aggressors as well as victims, those involved as well as those not involved. The realization of this entitles and obliges everyone to demand agreements for the restriction and elimination of nuclear threats. It entitles and obliges everyone to promote agreements to this effect. Survive together, or perish together—there is no third path.

The preservation of universal security makes it necessary to take the world as it is. The dispute between the two opposing systems, which from a historical point of view is certainly inevitable, can and must, however, only be conducted by peaceful means, ruling out military force. The two systems, which cannot be merged, will have to live alongside each other. Security of, and in, the East and West for this reason presupposes that the two sides should respect the other's right to existence, and not wish to convert or even outwit each other. Ideological contradictions neither need, nor should be permitted to affect interstate relations. To put it another way, a form of coexistence must be found which is acceptable to everyone.

It is heard again and again that disarmament does not create more security, and that without a continuation—albeit limited—of rearmament, peace cannot be guaranteed. The GDR does not share this view. To be sure, the military factor will determine the appropriate precautions by states and groups of states for the foreseeable future, because it will certainly be a long time before we have a world such as we all have in mind. However, this is our deep conviction: immediate, effective disarmament is necessary for the survival of mankind. The arms race is also bordering on what is economically bearable, in both the East and the West. The arms race and the

solving of global problems together exceed the economic capabilities of all states. Disarmament and the solving of global problems, instead of the arms race, is the only practicable alternative.

It is disputed by no one that East-West relations are by no means exhausted by the reduction of military confrontation. Peace and security are more than the mere absence of war. For human life, security is indivisible, it is—as I have already pointed out—of a political, military, economic, ecological, and humanitarian nature. This is why, in all these spheres, we strive for objective, mutually advantageous collaboration.

Another indispensable component of a future structure for international relations is world economic relations. These are of considerable importance for everyone. The oil and debt crisis in the seventies has made this very painfully clear. Without economic security, there can be no political security. Mutually advantageous economic and scientific-technological cooperation form the material basis for international detente and security. This once again presupposes that all states are guaranteed equal security for economic development, free from obstacles and restrictions.

East-West cooperation in humanitarian areas is part of the policy of socialist states. The exercising of human rights and basic freedoms in their totality must strengthen trust and understanding among the peoples. The first and fundamental human right, the right to life, is indisputable. Life requires peace. And because human existence is based on work, the right to work is also among the fundamental human rights. It is only work which makes possible the creative development of human capabilities and equal access to education and culture, regardless of social origin, wealth, ideology, and religion. I also believe that human rights include equal rights for women and basic rights for the young. The elimination of racism, apartheid, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism is a human right.

The meaning of all human rights is reversed when attempts are made to represent these rights one-sidedly or on a reduced scale, to make one's own social system, one's own view of life, and one's own values into the only yardstick for everything, to measure other states in accordance with them, or even to impose these views on them. We do not force our convictions on anybody, but we also expect the same attitude from others.

It is important to learn well how to get on with each other in a new way, to free oneself of prejudices, and to regard no state or people as an enemy, just as the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states declared to the world on behalf of the socialist side at their Berlin session in 1987.

A peaceful world is attainable. The course and the results of the fourth meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan which has just ended have

provided further proof of this. We welcome the fact that the positions are coming closer together on further disarmament measures. It is important, above all, to conclude a 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, with adherence to the ABM Treaty, in a binding accord. "Everything which was agreed upon in Moscow with the mandate of the allies of the Soviet Union or was set in motion for future accords on disarmament and detente, and for the amelioration of the international situation, makes peace more secure," Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, stated immediately after the conclusion of the summit meeting. For the citizens and the policy of the socialist German state, he noted: "Those are results which are not only useful for the USSR and the United States, but which benefit all peoples. They are eloquent evidence of what political dialogue can do, for all the differences of opinion. We in the GDR are strengthened by the Moscow results in our desire to do everything to reduce confrontation and mistrust, to develop mutually advantageous cooperation, and not to allow new tragedies of war."

All countries are called upon to push ahead with disarmament and to promote it—above all, those states which possess nuclear weapons. It is our objective to progress from zero option to zero option, right up to a nuclear-free world. Reason and realism require ever-greater efforts, but this is an objective toward which we should all work together. The first step and the first evidence of what is possible was the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The Warsaw Pact states are also ready for the most radical reductions in the conventional sphere, too. It is asserted again and again that the elimination of nuclear weapons allows the greater conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, and thus of the threat of conventional wars in Europe. I do not wish to polemicize about superiority, because the exchange of data proposed by the Warsaw Pact would make the truth evident.

At the Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Pact already mentioned, it was stressed that the socialist peace policy is directed at "permitting no war—waged either with nuclear or with conventional weapons."

The GDR welcomes the fact that at the CSCE meeting in Vienna, a mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament is being sought. Ultimately, this involves creating structures of armed forces and their disposition so as to give each side a guarantee against a surprise attack, and to rule out aggressive behavior completely. Note well: Each side must be involved, because defensive behavior cannot be realized unilaterally. Imbalances and asymmetries which have arisen historically in the case of individual arms systems or divisions of armed forces must be eliminated, but not by means of rearmament, "compensation," or modernization of remaining

weapons, but rather by means of disarmament by the side which is superior in the arms system concerned. We intend that these very complicated negotiations make speedy progress.

Mutual deterrence is a fact. Adherence to "nuclear deterrence" prevents progress along the path of disarmament. The Warsaw Pact states wish to surmount this obstacle. However, one cannot come to terms with the fact that the fate of mankind should hang on the thin thread of the continuing fear of nuclear "retaliation," which could be unleashed merely by chance. Fear has always been, and remains, a poor adviser, consistently encouraging panic. But we are principally opposed to this deterrence because it is supposed to justify the perpetuation of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the arms race.

The supporters of this doctrine bring up the fact that deterrence has ensured peace in Europe for more than 40 years. No one can prove the contrary. That would be impossible. Who should even do so? If Europe has experienced the longest period of peace, is it not then primarily due to the existence of nuclear weapons or to the balance of terror.

Forty-three years of peace in Europe have become a reality because, even in the most complex periods, responsible behavior prevailed, because in the end, dialogue and understanding won out against confrontation and entrenchment. Even the present debates, sometimes turbulent, about deterrence, make it clear: old systems of thought are no longer valid. A change in security policy is necessary. The Warsaw Pact states are ready to talk with the NATO states about this.

Since the beginning of the seventies, painstaking work has erected a solid foundation for security and collaboration in Europe. The Helsinki Final Acts, with all their baskets, and the equilibrium of the interests of the participating states, have by now proven to be viable for over 13 years, and have not merely withstood times of increased tensions and aggravated confrontation, but also contribute to equilibrium and calm.

The urgent lessons of history concerning the GDR's exposed geostrategic position determine the policy of the GDR in East-West relations. Calm and security on the borderline of the two most powerful alliances are of vital importance, or to be more precise, are essential to survival. This, and the stable, problem-free development of the GDR, are thus not only in the interest of the GDR, but also in the interest of Europe. The existence of two mutually independent German states, belonging to different alliances, has become a basic element of the power relation between East and West, and has become a cornerstone of European peace.

The GDR and the FRG are committed to their duty toward peace, and established their responsibility in the joint communique on the official visit to the FRG by

Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State. Only peace, and never again war, will emanate from German soil. It is in the particular interest of the GDR that nuclear disarmament in Europe should be extended without delay to other areas, and that tactical nuclear weapons systems should also be reduced and, eventually, eliminated completely. The GDR, like the FRG, is especially affected by these weapon systems. The view expressed on this subject, that "the shorter the range the more Germans killed," is indisputable. The government of the GDR wants to work with the government of the FRG for a reduction of these weapons systems, right up to a third zero option.

In order to gain more security in as many regions as possible and in as many spheres as possible, both global solutions and partial steps in arms limitation and disarmament are possible and necessary. The GDR and the CSSR submitted the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe in this spirit. They are thus taking up, in particular, the ideas of Olof Palme. Proposals such as that made by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, to set up a zone of trust and adopt the Jaruzelski Plan for arms reductions, are timely steps, too.

Following the double zero option, the GDR regards nuclear-free regions in highly-armed Europe, precisely at this time, as particularly significant. They are the key to separating, reducing, and finally eliminating the remaining tactical nuclear weapons. Quite apart from the political and moral effect, such a zone could promote the efforts for conventional arms reductions at the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in that dual-capability weapons would be included and the withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from a 150 km strip on each side of the dividing line between the alliances would be agreed upon.

It is in accordance with the fundamental concern of the GDR to promote the approach to East-West security and cooperation in a comprehensive manner by means of a diverse policy of dialogue. For this reason Erich Honecker, chairman of the GDR Council of State, has issued invitations to an international exchange of ideas on nuclear-free zones, from 20-22 June 1988 in Berlin, and for this reason the GDR is also a very willing host to this important Potsdam meeting. The two conferences are linked by the idea of creating trust, of stimulating the process of disarmament and arms limitation, and of setting all-around East-West cooperation on solid foundations.

Even in the absence of further comprehensive steps, nuclear-free zones would immediately slow down the nuclear arms race and would increasingly limit the nuclear threat. Such zones could surely encourage further steps. They could be relatively quickly agreed upon, and set up and monitored without complications. They also offer non-nuclear powers the chance to be active in a substantive way.

Partial steps and regional solutions do not bring about a general ban on nuclear weapons, and do not eliminate the global dangers of a nuclear catastrophe, but they can limit the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, particularly at the points of contact between the military blocs. No problem has ever been solved with a policy of "all or nothing". This is also how we see things when we support a chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe. Such a zone would be an important stimulus for the worldwide banning of these weapons. A sense of reality, an eye for what is viable, and taking into account the interests of all those involved, have been, are, and will in the future remain necessary preconditions for further progress in Europe and the world. No one is helped by complaining about the splitting, or "division," as it is also called, and demanding that it be overcome. The socialist states accept the realities as they are, and also expect this from all others. This "splitting" into mutually opposed political, economic, and military blocs was a logical conclusion and the consequence of World War II. Thinking for Europe must today be directed at a peaceful coexistence of the European peoples in a joint home, a home in which tenants with different concepts of life must live together peacefully.

New ways to achieve East-West security: This means tackling the feasible and the possible and gradually leading the problems in international relations, which have built up over decades, toward a solution. Patience, goodwill, and readiness and capability for compromises, are the precondition for this.

Frederick II, who is considered to have been an enlightened king of Prussia, held court here in Potsdam more than 200 years ago. The maxim "Let each man be happy in his own way" comes from him. This attitude to life, characterized by the spirit of humanism, tolerance, and respect for different views of life, has lost none of its topicality. Today, in a time of increasing mutual dependence of states and peoples, this philosophy is no longer enough.

Today responsibility for each other and for the world as a whole, with regard for the interests of all, is indispensable. More and more people are speaking of the "European home." And the contours of this house are already emerging:

—Its ground plan: from the Atlantic to the Urals. Turning to face the world, but not its center.

—Its house rules: the CSCE Final Act and its comprehensive, balanced implementation.

—Its moral code: Nobody feels that he alone possesses the truth.

—Its law: No inhabitant has sole rights over the house, but each person has rights over his own home.

—Its spirit: Good-neighborness and mutual readiness to give assistance determine life together.

—Its security: It is the affair of the household together, inwardly and outwardly.

The "common European home" should be a hospitable house, open to all who come with good intentions. It can and must be a link between the continents.

I declare the conference open in this spirit. I wish you all good, successful proceedings at the conference, and a pleasant stay in the GDR.

Nuclear-Free Corridor With FRG Advocated
*AU1306141388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Jun 88 p 2*

[Article by Professor Dr Heinz Kamnitzer, president of the GDR-PEN Center: "Two States—One Responsibility"]

[Text] European culture and European security are indivisible. Both require primarily nuclear disarmament. In this connection, on our continent the emphasis lies between the Rhine and the Oder. The essence of it is a nuclear-free corridor right and left of the River Elbe.

True, delivering a part of a territory from the work of the devil is not the same as delivering the whole world—but it is still better than nothing. Besides, the German states are united by their special interest in contributing to further nuclear disarmament on their soil.

Thus, the political neighborliness between the FRG and the GDR would improve immediately, and more leeway would be created for the fruitful area of cultural exchanges in art and science.

Fischer Addresses Potsdam East-West Conference
*AU1506123188 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Jun 88 p 10*

[Speech by Oskar Fischer, GDR minister of foreign affairs, at the opening of the Seventh Annual Conference of the New York Institute for East-West Security Studies in Potsdam on 9 June: "Security Can Only Be Achieved Jointly by Means of Peaceful Cooperation"]

[Text] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, esteemed friends:

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you on behalf of the GDR Government.

This meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in historic Potsdam is taking place at a time when much has begun moving in international relations. We are obviously standing at the beginning of a new, better stage in East-West relations. The conference has

chosen its subject well and therefore is topical. It is important today to find new access—meaning new approaches—to cooperation among states with different social systems.

Completely New Historic Situation in Today's World

Changes of fundamental importance have been accomplished in our world. The enormous explosion of science and technology, which is also—or especially—expressed in the quantity and quality of the accumulated potential for mass destruction has created a situation that is historically totally new.

It has become technically possible for mankind to destroy itself many times over. For centuries attempts have been made to solve conflicts between states by military force. Wars are the continuation of politics by different means, as Clausewitz pointed out. They only bring misery and destruction to the people. But they have never endangered the substance of human life. Even the vanquished had a chance to survive.

This was still the case after the last great war, World War II, with the results of which we are continuously faced here. But now for the first time weapons exist whose use would put an end to any kind of policy.

The attempt to seek to force decisions in international relations through war today would mean the assured destruction of all life.

Global Problems Have Immensely Exacerbated

Apart from the dangers that result from the arms race, we are also facing threats that result from the immense exacerbation of global, particularly economic and ecological problems. Every year the risk increases that entails from the fact that the poor are becoming poorer and the rich richer. Thus, making and keeping our planet habitable, and using our natural resources economically have become vital elements of international relations. Lasting peace and a secure world cannot be achieved without mastering this challenge through cooperation among states with different social systems. All states in the world are facing this problem today. As a matter of fact, it is a problem that can be solved, but in a different way from the times when every state tried to create security with its own means against others, which not only did not prevent war but made it inevitable; security today can only be achieved jointly through peaceful cooperation and by means that are released particularly through disarmament. The rapid pace of scientific-technological development opens up the way to meeting all human needs and to the pacification of the world. It is possible to provide sufficient food, accommodation, work, education, information, medical care, cultural experiences for all people—all that is needed is to comprehensively implement human rights.

Mankind Is at the Crossroads

It can either continue the arms buildup and transcend the borders to a point where the escalation of the arms race is uncontrollable. This is the road to death. Or it can pursue a policy of "approaching each other with good intentions," of patient negotiations, aimed at effective disarmament that would entail no disadvantages but only advantages for all and that would secure peace for them. Disarmament is no gift from one state to another, and no one can demand a "fee" for disarmament, because it has no price. As far as the socialist countries are concerned, they continue to be reliable and predictable partners in this respect.

The alarming and warning words of Albert Einstein, who lived and worked in Potsdam from 1929 until his emigration from Hitlerite fascism, that the atomic bomb has changed everything, not only human thinking, are well known. His conclusion resulted in the following question: "Does that not mean that all differences and quarrels...are of no significance in comparison with the danger that all of us are facing? Are we not to do everything we can in order to eliminate the danger that threatens all peoples in the same manner?"

The approach to peace and security is, in any event, a political decision; it is, precisely, the readiness to shape international relations in a new manner, and only peacefully.

Security and stability must be understood and tackled in their mutual indissoluble interrelationship. This is possible only along the road of political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian cooperation. And so the military security precautions which have been set up against each other should be replaced by a wide range of joint, nonmilitary security factors and guarantees. Only when we all feel secure and one's own political stability strengthens the other at the same time, will we achieve a peaceful world. We welcome all ideas for cooperative security structures and cooperative solutions.

Survive Together or Perish Together—There Is No Third Way

Thinking in the way Albert Einstein demanded for the nuclear space age has obviously begun throughout the world. This is promising.

A nuclear conflict, no matter between whom and where it might take place, would affect all states and mean the demise of aggressors as well as victims, those involved as well as those not involved. The realization of this entitles and obliges everyone to demand agreements for the restriction and elimination of nuclear threats. It entitles and obliges everyone to promote agreements to this effect. Survive together, or perish together—there is no third way.

Let us remember the consensus concerning Soviet-U.S. relations that has been existing for some time:

- A nuclear war must never be fought; and can never be won.
- Both sides are determined to prevent any kind of war, nuclear or conventional.
- Neither of the two sides aspires to military superiority.
- Despite existing differences of opinion on essential issues, both sides are aware of their responsibility for preventing confrontation and for promoting lasting and stable relations between their countries.
- It is imperative to activate political dialogue.

Settlement of Disputes Without Military Force

The preservation of universal security makes it necessary to take the world as it is. The dispute between the two opposing systems, which from a historical point of view is certainly inevitable, can and must however only be conducted by peaceful means, ruling out military force. The two systems, which cannot be merged, will have to live alongside each other. Security of, and in, the East and West for this reason presupposes that the two sides should respect each other. Ideological contradictions neither need, nor should be permitted to affect interstate relations. To put it in another way, a form of coexistence must be found which is acceptable to everyone.

It is heard again and again that disarmament does not create more security, and that without a continuation—albeit limited—of rearmanent, peace cannot be guaranteed. The GDR does not share this view. To be sure, the military factor will determine the appropriate precautions by states and groups of states for the foreseeable future, because it will certainly be a long time before we have a world such as we all have in mind. However, this is our deep conviction: Immediate, effective disarmament is necessary for the survival of mankind. The arms race is also bordering on what is economically bearable, in both the East and West. The arms race and the solving of global problems together exceed the economic capabilities of all states. Disarmament and the solving of global problems, instead of the arms race, are the only practicable alternative.

No one disputes that East-West relations are by no means exhausted by the reduction of military confrontation.

International Economic Relations are Important for Everybody

Peace and security are more than the absence of war. For human life, security is indivisible, it is—as I have already pointed out—of a political, military, economic, ecological, and humanitarian nature. This is why, in all these spheres, we strive for objective, mutually advantageous cooperation.

Another indispensable component of a future structure for international relations is international economic relations. These are of considerable importance for everyone. Without economic security, there can be no political security. Mutually advantageous economic and scientific-technological cooperation form the material basis for international detente and security. This once again presupposes that all states are guaranteed equal security for economic development, free from obstacles and restrictions.

East-West cooperation in humanitarian areas is part of the policy of socialist states. The exercising of human rights and basic freedoms in their totality must strengthen trust and understanding among the peoples. The first and fundamental human right, the right to life, is beyond dispute. Life requires peace. And because human existence is based on work, the right to work is also among the fundamental human rights. It is only work that makes possible the creative development of human capabilities and equal access to education and culture, regardless of social origin, wealth, ideology, and religion. I also believe that human rights include equal rights for women and basic rights for the young; the elimination of racism, apartheid, fascism, colonialism, and neocolonialism is a human right. The meaning of human rights is reversed when attempts are made to represent these rights one-sidedly or on a reduced scale, to make one's own social system, one's own view of life, and one's own values into the only yardstick for everything, to measure other states in accordance with them, or even to impose these views on them. We do not force our convictions on anybody, but we also expect the same attitude from others.

The Summit Meeting Shows: A Peaceful World Is Attainable

What is at stake is to learn well how to get on with each other in a new way, to free oneself of prejudices, and to regard no state or people as an enemy, just as the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states declared to the whole world on behalf of the socialist side at their Berlin session in 1987.

A peaceful world can be achieved. The progress and the results of the fourth meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, which has just ended, have provided further proof of this. We welcome the fact that the positions regarding further disarmament measures are coming closer together. Above all, it is important to conclude a binding accord on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, while adhering to the ABM Treaty.

"Everything that was agreed upon in Moscow with the mandate of the allies of the Soviet Union or was set in motion for future accords on disarmament and detente, and for the improvement of the international situation, makes peace more secure," Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman

of the GDR State Council, stated right after the conclusion of the summit meeting. For the citizens and the policy promoted by the socialist German state, he noted: "Those are results that are not only useful for the USSR and the United States, but that benefit all nations. They are telling proof of what political dialogue can achieve, despite all differences of opinion. The Moscow results have encouraged us in the GDR in our desire to do all we can to reduce confrontation and mistrust, to develop mutually advantageous cooperation, and not to allow new war tragedies to happen."

From Zero Option to Zero Option Right up to a Nuclear-Free World

As world powers with great economic, scientific-technical, cultural, and military potentials, and with a tremendous role in international relations, the USSR and the United States bear great responsibility for safeguarding peace and security in the world. The course that has now been adopted is sure and more precise. However, responsibility rests on all of us.

All countries are called upon to push ahead with disarmament and to promote it—above all those states that possess nuclear weapons. It is our goal to move from zero option to zero option right up to a nuclear-free world. This requires reason and realism, and ever greater efforts, but this is a goal toward which we should all work together. The first step and the first evidence of what is possible was the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Most esteemed audience, the Warsaw Pact states are also prepared for the most radical cuts in the area of conventional weapons. It has been repeatedly affirmed that the elimination of nuclear weapons increases the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, and thus the threat of conventional wars in Europe. I do not wish to engage in polemics about superiority, because the exchange of data proposed by the Warsaw Pact would make the truth become obvious.

Socialist Peace Policy Confirmed at the Berlin Meeting

At the aforementioned Berlin meeting of the Warsaw Pact it was stressed that the socialist peace policy is directed at "permitting no war—either with nuclear or with conventional weapons." If endorsed, the proposals made by E. Shevardnadze at the third UN special session would push us ahead. A conventional war at the risk of total destruction—at least in Europe—cannot be waged any more either. First, because the power of annihilation of conventional weapons is coming constantly closer to that of nuclear weapons. Second, because the economic-technological structure of modern industrial societies has become too vulnerable. In Europe alone there are some 200 nuclear power plant units and other technical

nuclear facilities, which are surely secure against various malfunctions, but not against war. To this we must add the extensive network of large chemical production units.

All this makes it evident that even a conventional war would turn densely populated and industrialized areas such as the European continent into a nuclear and chemically polluted desert. I do not need to speak about the multifaceted links and interdependence between Europe and the other continents, thus completely ruling out a strictly European war.

For Each Side Guarantees Against Attacks

The GDR welcomes that a mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament is being sought at the CSCE meeting in Vienna. What is ultimately at stake is to create such structures and deployment of armed forces as to secure for each side guarantees against a sudden attack, and to completely rule out any aggressive actions. *Nota bene:* Each side, because defensive behavior cannot be achieved unilaterally.

The historically determined imbalances and asymmetries in the case of individual arms systems or divisions of armed forces must be eliminated, but not by means of rearment, "compensation," or modernization of remaining weapons, but rather by means of disarmament by the side that is superior in the relevant arms system. It is our desire that these very complicated negotiations make speedy progress.

Mutual deterrence is a fact. Adherence to "nuclear deterrence" prevents progress along the path of disarmament.

The Warsaw Pact States wish to overcome this situation. One cannot come to terms with the fact that the fate of mankind should hang on the thin thread of the constant fear of nuclear "retaliation," that could be unleashed by mere chance. Fear has always been, and remains a poor adviser, consistently encouraging panic. We are particularly against deterrence, because it is supposed to justify the perpetuation of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the arms race.

Forty-Three Years of Peace Thanks to Dialogue and Understanding

The supporters of this doctrine claim that deterrence has ensured peace for Europe for more than 40 years now. No one can prove the contrary; that would be impossible. Who would do such a thing? The fact that Europe has experienced the longest period of peace is not primarily due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the "balance of terror." Forty-three years of peace in Europe

have become a reality because, even in the most complicated periods, responsible behavior prevailed because, in the final analysis, dialogue and understanding held their own against confrontation and the hardening of positions.

Even the current, partly hectic debates about deterrence make it clear: Old patterns of thought are no longer valid. A change in security policy is needed. The Warsaw Pact states are prepared to discuss this with the NATO states.

Since the advent of the seventies, painstaking work has erected a solid foundation for security and cooperation in Europe.

Quiet on the Dividing Line Between the Two Alliances Is of Vital Importance

The Helsinki Final Act with all its baskets and with the balance of the interests of all participating states has proven its viability for 13 years now, and it has not only withstood times of increased tension and sharpened confrontation, but has also contributed to conciliation and calm. The CSCE process proves that states with differing social systems are able to cooperate to the benefit of all and in the service of mutual security. The GDR hopes for a balanced document in Vienna and is prepared to cooperate in this respect.

Such impressive lessons of history as the GDR's exposed geographic location have determined the policy promoted by the GDR in East-West relations. Calm and security at the dividing line of the two most powerful alliances are of vital importance, or more precisely put, are essential for survival. Therefore, this and the stable and undisturbed development of the GDR are not only in the interest of the GDR, but also in the interest of Europe. The existence of two mutually independent German states belonging to different alliances has become a basic element of the balance of power between East and West and represents a cornerstone of European peace.

The GDR and FRG are committed to their duty toward peace and have laid down their responsibility in the joint communique on the official visit of Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, to the FRG. Never again can war emanate from German soil, but only peace. It is in the particular interest of the GDR that nuclear disarmament be extended, without delay, to other areas, and that tactical nuclear weapons also be reduced and finally eliminated altogether. Both the GDR and the FRG are particularly affected by these weapons systems. The view expressed on this subject, namely "the shorter the range the more Germans killed," is indisputable. The GDR Government wants to work together with the FRG Government to achieve a cut in these weapons systems, right up to a third zero option.

Nuclear-Free Zones—the Key to Disengagement

To achieve more security in as many regions and in as many areas as possible, both global solutions and partial steps in arms limitation and disarmament are possible and required.

In this sense, the GDR and the CSSR submitted the initiative aimed at establishing a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. Thus they are taking up particularly the ideas of Olof Palme.

Proposals such as those made by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, to set up a zone of trust, and the Jaruzelski plan for arms reduction are opportune as well.

Following the double zero option, the GDR views nuclear-free areas in highly-armed Europe, precisely at this time, as particularly significant since they are the key to disengagement, to reducing, and finally eliminating the remaining tactical nuclear weapons. Quite apart from the political and moral effect, such a zone could promote efforts for conventional arms reduction at the diving line between NATO and Warsaw Pact by including dual-capable systems and by agreeing on the withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from a 150 km strip on either side of the dividing line between the alliances.

The GDR Is Promoting East-West Cooperation in Many Ways

It is in accordance with the basic concern of the GDR to approach East-West security and cooperation in a comprehensive way and by means of a diverse policy of dialogue. For this reason, Erich Honecker, chairman of the GDR State Council, has called for an international exchange of ideas on nuclear-free zones from 20-22 June 1988 in Berlin, and for the same reason the GDR is also a very willing host to this important Potsdam meeting.

Both conferences are linked by the idea of creating trust, of giving an impetus to the process of disarmament and arms limitations, and of placing multifaceted cooperation between the East and West on solid foundations.

Even in the absence of further comprehensive steps, nuclear-free zones would, above all, slow down the nuclear arms race and would increasingly limit the nuclear threat. Such zones could surely encourage further steps. They could be relatively quickly agreed on, set up, and monitored without any complications. They offer non-nuclear powers also the opportunity to take concrete action.

Partial steps and regional solutions are not conducive to a general ban on nuclear weapons and do not eliminate the global threat of a nuclear catastrophe; however, they limit the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war, specifically at the points of contact between the military blocs. No problem has ever been solved through a policy of "all

or nothing." This is also how we see things when we support a chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe. The GDR does not possess chemical weapons and such weapons belonging to other states are not deployed on its territory. Neither does the GDR develop chemical weapons nor does it have facilities to produce them. Such zones would be an important incentive for a global ban on these weapons.

Further Progress Requires a Sense of Proportion and a Realistic Approach

A realistic approach, a sense of what is possible, and taking account of the interests of all those involved have been and will continue to be necessary preconditions for further progress in Europe and in the world. On the basis of the Helsinki Final Act, all-European cooperation has a future extending far into the next millennium.

It is of no help to complain about the split or "division," as it is also called, in Europe and to demand that it be overcome. The socialist states accept realities as they are and expect this from all other states as well. This "split" into mutually opposed political, economic, and military blocs is a logical conclusion and consequences of World War II. Thinking for the benefit of Europe today must be directed toward a peaceful coexistence of the European peoples in a common home, a home in which tenants with different concepts of life must live together peacefully.

New ways of achieving East-West security means tackling the feasible and the possible, and it means gradually solving problems in international relations, which have built up over tens of years. Patience, goodwill, and readiness and ability to compromise by all sides are preconditions for this.

Frederick II, who is considered to have been an enlightened king of Prussia, held court here in Potsdam more than 200 years ago. It is he who coined the phrase "Let each man be happy in his own fashion." This attitude to life, characterized by the spirit of humanism, tolerance, and respect for different views of life, has lost none of its topicality. Today, at a time of increasing mutual dependence of states and peoples, this philosophy is no longer satisfactory. Today responsibility for each other and for the world as a whole, while respecting the interests of all, is essential. More and more people are speaking about the "European home."

The Outline of the Common European Home Is Already Obvious

And here is the outline of this home:

—Its layout: From the Atlantic to the Urals. Open to the world, but not the center of it.
—Its house rules: The CSCE Final Act and its comprehensive and balanced implementation.

—Its ethics: Nobody believes himself the sole owner of truth.

—Its law: No inhabitant has sole rights over the house, each person has rights over his own home.

—Its spirit: Good-neighborness and the will to help one another determine life together.

—Its security: It is the common cause of the community—at home and abroad.

—The "common European home" should be a hospitable house, open to all those who come with good intentions; it can and must be a link between the continents.

In this spirit, I declare the conference open. To all of you I wish good, successful proceedings at the conference, and a pleasant stay in the GDR.

GDR, FRG Foreign Ministers Meet at Potsdam
*AU1606091788 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 13 Jun 88 p 2*

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—GDR and FRG Foreign Ministers Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher met for a talk in Potsdam on Saturday [11 June]. The exchange of experiences focused on issues that were intensively discussed at the meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, and on questions concerning the work of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting.

Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher said that they were encouraged by the increasing number of positive international tendencies, such as the entering into force of the INF Treaty and the other results of the Moscow summit. They emphasized the interest of their states in not permitting a pause in the efforts aimed at disarmament, and spoke in favor of the early conclusion of an agreement on the 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

Oskar Fischer pointed out the GDR's efforts to promote confidence, detente, and disarmament, and stressed its interest in proceeding from zero option to zero option concerning nuclear weapons.

Both ministers reaffirmed the interest of their states in a speedy and productive conclusion of the Vienna meeting. They concurred in assessing the proposal for a final document that was submitted by the Warsaw Pact states as a basis that can be negotiated.

At the end of their talk, Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed the possibility of conducting exchanges of experiences on a regular basis in order to reach better mutual understanding concerning their states' international positions. They agreed to continue this dialogue.

Honecker, Vranitzky Discuss Disarmament
*LD1506145288 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1205 GMT 15 Jun 88*

[Text] Berlin, 15 Jun (ADN)—Official talks began today in the State Council building in Berlin's Marx-Engels Square between Erich Honecker, SED Central Committee general secretary and GDR State Council chairman, and Dr Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor of the Austrian Republic.

In the presence of other representatives of the two countries, Erich Honecker and Dr Franz Vranitzky, in their exchange of views and information, first turned to current problems of world affairs and then discussed the state of and prospects for bilateral relations.

In their discussion of topical problems of the international situation, Erich Honecker and Dr Franz Vranitzky spoke of the importance of the Moscow summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, and welcomed its results. The coming into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles is an initial, concrete step toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The progress achieved at the summit on a 50 percent reduction in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons, on limiting nuclear weapons tests, and on a global chemical weapons ban, is encouraging for the continuing process of disarmament.

Now that a start has been made on nuclear disarmament, all the more importance must be attached to drastically reducing armed forces and arms in Europe, Erich Honecker stressed. The plan proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, which includes eliminating asymmetries and eventually reducing each armed force by 500,000 men, reflects the common standpoint of the Warsaw Pact and could be a feasible path to follow.

It is important to remember, they noted, that persistent efforts by all forces of reason and realism are required in order to complete the change for the better on a lasting and irreversible basis. No break can be allowed in the process of disarmament. The important role of smaller states was also stressed in this respect.

Erich Honecker expressed his conviction that the "International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones" to take place next week in Berlin will give fresh impetus to the disarmament process. Federal Chancellor Dr Vranitzky paid tribute to the GDR's initiative in convening such a meeting, and reaffirmed that a senior official will attend as representative of the Austrian Government, along with a representative of his party, the Socialist Party.

Erich Honecker and Dr Franz Vranitzky stressed the importance of Austria's continuing neutrality as a stabilizing factor in the European situation. They agreed in noting that the Helsinki Final Act and the CSCE process

are of special importance for the European policy of detente. Both sides spoke in favor of an early conclusion of the Vienna meeting with a substantial and balanced document.

Referring to bilateral relations, Erich Honecker and Dr Franz Vranitzky noted that over recent years, talks between the two states at a senior and top level have always led to important impulses for the development of goodneighborly relations. This good tradition of trusting dialogue should be continued in the future. Both sides endorsed the will of their states to develop further the high level of cooperation already achieved. The good, trusting relations are an example of the fruitfulness of the policy of peaceful coexistence, of cooperation between states with different social systems.

Economic cooperation has undergone a considerable surge during the past few years. Federal Chancellor Dr Vranitzky noted in this respect that Austria is watching with great admiration and respect how the GDR is pursuing economic and trade policies which encourage the development of a lively export business. This also reflects a political line of principle.

Erich Honecker described economic cooperation as a stable material foundation for overall relations. The principles laid down by treaty in the economic as well as scientific-technological fields have proved themselves and provided good prospects. Cultural exchange occupies an important place in bilateral relations. The wide network of international agreements existing between the GDR and the Republic of Austria lend their relations predictability and stability.

In conclusion, the attendant ministers of both sides were instructed to continue discussion of further questions of deepening cooperation.

Present at the talks were: on the GDR side, Dr Guenter Mittag, Politburo member and secretary of the SED Central Committee, and deputy chairman of the State Council; Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer; Foreign Trade Minister Dr Gerhard Beil; State Secretary Frank-Joachim Herrmann, head of the Chancery of the Chairman of the State Council; Klaus Wolf, GDR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Austrian Republic; Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt Nier; Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Christian Meyer; and Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, head of the Main Press Department in the Foreign Ministry.

Present on the Austrian side were Dr Rudolf Streicher, federal minister of transport and nationalized industries; Dr Franz Wunderbaldinger, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Austrian Republic to the GDR; Kommerzialrat Ingrid Tichy-Schreder, Bundestag deputy and vice president of the Federal Chamber of Industry; Ministerialrat Dr Josef Tschauch, section head in the Ministry of Economic Affairs; Oberrat Ulrich Stacher, head of section in the Federal Chancellor's

Office for the Coordination of Affairs; Dr Johann Sereinig, head of the federal chancellor's cabinet; Legate Dr Ernst Sucharipa, head of the East Department in the Federal Foreign Ministry; and Legate Dr Eva Nowotny, foreign policy advisor to the federal chancellor.

HUNGARY

Varkonyi Addresses UN Session

AU1006131888 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Jun 88 p 3

[MTI report on speech by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi at the UN special session on disarmament in New York on 6 June: "We Want To Actively Participate in the Disarmament Process—Peter Varkonyi Addresses UN Extraordinary Session"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi addressed the third extraordinary meeting of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in New York on 6 June. He pointed out that this meeting could be held under favorable conditions because the improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations, the subsequent bilateral disarmament agreements, the progress in settling regional crises, and the favorable trends in international relations in general provide an adequate atmosphere for the session's work.

"Among the recent disarmament achievements, the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles is particularly important because this agreement begins a new phase in the history of disarmament not only by being the first to stipulate nuclear disarmament measures, but also by revolutionizing the previous concepts on verification. It sets conditions for verification of a severity and extent previously unimaginable."

To Guarantee Mutual Security

"The mutual ratification of this agreement has opened up the way for its implementation, and thus, it has opened a new age of nuclear disarmament. We regard it as a progressive and confidence-strengthening step that even prior to the ratification of the agreement, the Soviet side had dismantled and destroyed the missiles affected by the agreement.

"We attribute great importance to the earliest possible conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons, observing for a specified time the agreement on anti-missile systems reached in 1972. It is our conviction that the existing bilateral agreements and further agreements currently in sight will also have an impact on multilateral disarmament forums. These forums influence each other, hinder or encourage each other, and also complement each other.

"One of the fundamentally important tasks of this meeting is to definitively prove the viability of multilateral disarmament through its efficiency and its specific guidelines. In addition to strengthening the spirit of the final document of the first special session on disarmament, the meeting can fulfill this task by generally proclaiming that no country can claim exclusive rights to security, for security is equal, universal, and indivisible, and that every country has the right and obligation to contribute to guaranteeing this mutual security."

"Both in its bilateral relations and at international forums, the Hungarian People's Republic is striving to actively contribute to the improvement of the international climate and to working out agreements that mutually guarantee security. Also, when the disarmament process was in decline and bilateral disarmament talks had reached their lowest point, the Hungarian Government continued to take a stand for maintaining dialogue between the states and for settling political problems through negotiations. Our stand has not changed."

International Forums Play an Important Role

"Disarmament forums, including the present forum, must pay special attention to nuclear disarmament issues. The past period has showed that the two leading great powers are ready to take the first steps on the road to nuclear disarmament. Following these subsequent bilateral steps, the other nuclear powers could join the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Multilateral disarmament forums can also usefully contribute to further promoting and perfecting the nuclear disarmament process."

"A ban on nuclear tests is essential for halting the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Hungary is calling for a comprehensive ban on tests, but it does not exclude the possibility of reaching this objective step-by-step through continuous negotiations. Therefore, the coordination of bilateral and multilateral efforts is important in this area too."

"Hungary considers avoiding the arms race to be one of the key issues of international security and disarmament. We are convinced that international disarmament diplomacy can make a great contribution to this, for example, by working out agreements that guarantee the integrity of various satellites orbiting the earth and the norms of peaceful activity in outer space, as well as by establishing an adequate system of international verification."

"There is only one area in the current multilateral disarmament talks that can show at least partial results: the draft agreement on a complete ban on chemical weapons. Agreements have been reached, or have been near conclusion in recent years on a number of issues that previously seemed to be impossible to tackle, like

the numerous details of on-site verification. At the same time, new problems have emerged, including the total separation of peaceful and military activities in all areas."

Peter Varkonyi then reminded his audience that he had made an important confidence-strengthening statement on behalf of the Hungarian People's Republic at the Geneva disarmament conference in February 1988 on the status of Hungary as a country free of chemical weapons. Later, on a voluntary basis, he also supplied data concerning the Hungarian chemical industry. "These steps were directed by our conviction that such openness, particularly among a wide range of countries, would considerably contribute to strengthening confidence, and to the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement," Varkonyi continued.

"In addition to the limitation, reduction, and elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, it has become increasingly urgent to make progress on conventional disarmament and the strengthening of confidence and security. A process has already begun in Europe, and we expect a lot from its successful development."

Let Us Reduce Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

"The creation of a military balance in Europe at a lower level of armament must, of course, include the elimination—through arms reduction—of disproportions that exist on both sides and which threaten stability. This is an indispensable condition for the success of the talks to be held on conventional disarmament. We are aware that all this requires time, political will, and modern forms of cooperation."

Among these elements, Peter Varkonyi stressed the time factor—the need to hurry, because technical progress and the development of weapons can easily render obsolete everything that seems a real possibility now. Therefore, Hungary considers it indispensable to start negotiations without any conditions as soon as possible, and believes that all the participants should make maximum efforts to achieve success.

"Following the Budapest appeal on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, Hungarian diplomacy has been actively engaged in helping coordinate concepts of military detente and encouraging their implementation both in the framework of the Warsaw Pact and as part of the process of security and cooperation in Europe."

Peter Varkonyi stressed that in order to successfully conclude this meeting, the participants should focus on the tasks ahead with a proper sense of reality and creative will, and should jointly search for solutions based on a balance of interests.

"The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic continues to consider it necessary to contribute with all means at its disposal to the formulation of multilateral disarmament solutions and modern security policy measures," Peter Varkonyi said. He then concluded: "At this meeting too, the Hungarian delegation is striving to contribute to successful work. Starting from the objective fact of mutual interdependence among various states in the current international situation, we consider it our major obligation to act, with a creative and active attitude, toward widening and deepening the disarmament process."

Kotai Addresses Potsdam Closing Session
LD1106224988 Budapest MTI in English
2021 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] Berlin/Potsdam, June 11 (MTI)—Several proposals were made for strengthening East-West political and economic relations and for mutual confidence-building at the international conference which ended in Potsdam on Saturday. Organized by the New York-based East-West Institute for Strategic Studies, [name as received] the three-day conference was attended by 180 politicians, scholars, businessmen and journalists from some 30 European countries and the United States. The participants exchanged views on the new roads leading to East-West security.

Addressing the closing plenary session, Geza Kotai, head of the Foreign Affairs Department at the HSWP Central Committee, regarded as promising the spreading recognition that several elements of East-West relations, first of all in Europe, do not comply with the interests of the states concerned. The military factor is still playing a primary role in maintaining East-West balance, he said. The conclusion and ratification of the INF Treaty should be followed by the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Europe. Hungary, like the other small and medium-size European states, could play in many respects a useful part in relieving the spasms related to the limitation and reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Europe. As Hungary is not located in the main strategic direction, it could be an appropriate 'experimental region' for making significant unilateral steps which expressly indicate the political will but do not threaten to upset the balance of power. Hungary is profoundly interested in belonging to the first countries where the armed forces are reduced in the wake of the agreements, said the head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the HSWP CC.

POLAND

Further Coverage of Meetings, Speeches at UN Session

Orzechowski Meets Shamir
LD1106083988 Warsaw PAP in English
0048 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] New York, June 10—Polish Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski, who was visiting New York to

attend the 3rd special U.N. General Assembly session on disarmament, met with Israeli Premier Yitzhaq Shamir. Referring to the course of celebrations of the 45th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, the two discussed the state of and trends in the development of bilateral contacts with regard to the current situation in the Middle East and prospects for the start of peace process.

Orzechowski also met with representatives of the President of the World Peace Council—observers at the debates of the special session. The Council's president Romesh Chandra briefed the Polish minister on the activity of the body and the stand on the session's agenda.

Orzechowski discussed the expanded version of the Jaruzelski Plan on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in central Europe. The sides underlined the great importance of the activeness of peace organizations and movements in mobilizing the international community for promoting the cause of disarmament, detente and peaceful cooperation.

Orzechowski on Disarmament
LD1106161688 Warsaw PAP in English
0043 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] New York, June 10—In an interview granted to PAP at the Polish U.N. mission here Polish Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski stressed the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and discussed Poland's relations with foreign countries, including the Vatican, the FRG and the U.S.A.

Disarmament is a set of measures leading to a lasting, universal and equal-for-all security, he said.

The feeling of such security is, in turn, an indispensable condition for creating a peaceful, cooperating, partnerly world which jointly solves problems facing it. It is against such broad background that the role of the United Nations, the most universal international organization of the present time, should be viewed.

One can venture to say that the session will end bringing better results than were expected. We expect a substantial final document to be adopted, a document stressing the United Nations' growing role in the process of disarmament, the forum of the disarmament conference in Geneva included.

I can state with full conviction that what is taking place in the General Assembly's hall, and to a still greater degree in the lobby, is a very sensitive barometer of all that is happening in relations on the Moscow-Washington line. It can be easily observed how this relations are reflected in the attitudes of delegates, their moods and declarations—from a kind of political depression and hopelessness to moments of euphoria. This is just

like that also now, after the Moscow summit. The general feeling is that the summit signifies a clear improvement in the international climate. An era of nuclear disarmament has started. The dialogue of the two superpowers is intensifying regardless of all the existing problems.

And yet another thing. Here, in the U.N., in forum of a universal organization of states, the fact can be felt almost physically that the quality of relations USSR-USA has a direct bearing on the role of small and medium-sized states throughout the world. It is no coincidence that the 3rd session is manifesting a real explosion of various kinds of regional initiatives concerning disarmament. A definite regularity is thus confirmed once again that in conditions of detente, growing confidence, political dialogue and diplomatic negotiations there exists a demand, greater than ever before, for true initiatives of small and medium-sized states. These initiatives cease to be solely an expression of good intentions or good will. Chances for their realization, chances for taking a place in the great work of consolidating peace and in the process of disarmament are growing tangibly.

The Jaruzelski Plan met with big interest in various parts of the world and in various states—not only in Europe. First of all there are two reasons for this:

The Plan is very well "historically timed". For a long time all people have realized the fact that Europe is the biggest arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons. At present—after the withdrawal of intermediate and shorter range missiles—the following question is emerging: What next, how should the future of disarmament look like. The answer to this question is just the expanded version of the Polish initiative.

The Plan is comprehensive, very concrete, and at the same time open to partners' suggestions. And that is why it has been regarded that it can become the focus of discussion and negotiations.

Orzechowski Interviewed on Jaruzelski Plan
*LD1406115288 Warsaw Television Service in Polish
1730 GMT 12 Jun 88*

[Studio interview with Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski by Grzegorz Wozniak; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Wozniak] We have the pleasure of having Minister Marian Orzechowski in our studio, just hours after his return from New York to Warsaw. Minister, I have a few questions. First, how has the Polish plan, General Jaruzelski's plan, been received?

Orzechowski The Jaruzelski Plan on arms reduction in central Europe and on increasing confidence, and to be precise, its developed version after numerous consultations, has been received with interest. I think this is the right word, and interest means a lot in the United

Nations. We have entered a good period. New hopes after the Moscow summit and its results, a new stage of disarmament and a conviction that it should be a constant, regular, and irreversible process, and also because we presented a very concrete version of the plan, which answered the questions put forward today by politicians and governments, and also by the nations of Europe.

Wozniak I think there is a possibility to include more nations in the disarmament process, and not only the two superpowers.

Orzechowski Yes, and there is a wider aspect of the issue, which played an important role in the work of the third special session. Today it becomes a common conviction, that however decisive a role in the disarmament process has been played by the two great powers, everybody is responsible and can and should take part in the process.

Wozniak In one of your press interviews you said that the third disarmament session could bring better results than expected. Do you have a solid ground for such optimism?

Orzechowski The optimism has been based on some real premises. First, the second disarmament session ended in failure, and this was due to the international situation and relations between the two superpowers. Today the situation is different, and there is a different climate between the superpowers.

There are real disarmament steps, and there is the will of both powers to continue the process. This has had its impact at the third session, and it resulted in various initiatives put forward not only by European states, but also by nonaligned countries, by countries of Asia, Africa, and South America. This also confirms a thesis, that in conditions of detente and in a climate of confidence between both powers, the role of small and medium states also increases. We are in good position as our initiative seems to be best prepared and shaped after a year of work.

Orzechowski Submits PPR Statement to CSCE
*LD1506184188 Warsaw PAP in English
1630 GMT 15 Jun 88*

[Text] Warsaw, June 15—As reported by the government spokesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marian Orzechowski handed a statement by the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in central Europe to the representatives of the CSCE states.

Excerpts of the statement:

The Government of the Polish People's Republic has, with due attention, taken note of and carefully studied the views, presented in the rejoinders of governments and the pronouncements of their representatives as well

as during bilateral working contacts, concerning the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in central Europe as contained in the memorandum of July 17 1987.

The Polish Government notes with satisfaction the emergence of a climate propitious for new undertakings in disarmament and confidence building in Europe. This climate is particularly linked to the conclusion of the Soviet-American Treaty on Eliminating Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates the validity of its proposals presented in the memorandum and covering the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Polish People's Republic, together with their territorial waters and airspace.

The Polish Government confirms its interest in the withdrawal and/or reduction, in the aforementioned zone, of mutually agreed types and quantities of nuclear weapons.

All types of nuclear weapons would be the subject to the agreed measures, [word indistinct] they are not the subject to [as received] other agreements. More specifically, these measures could cover, for example, missiles of up to 500 kilometers range, nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear artillery and any type of nuclear charges.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is in favour of initiating separate negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-capable means of delivery, and subsequently on eliminating such weapons.

Moreover, it believes it would be expedient, until concrete disarmament measures are implemented, for the interested states to undertake an obligation not to increase the present level of nuclear armaments in central Europe, not to compensate the weapons subject to reductions and not to introduce new types of such weapons.

Poland's proposal gradually to withdraw and/or reduce specific, mutually agreed types and quantities of conventional weapons is founded on the belief that the implementation of the agreed measures should be based on the principle of reciprocity and should lead to the removal of disproportions and asymmetries in given types of weapons, that is, to the attainment of such potentials which would ensure, in the opinion of the parties concerned, mutually acceptable military stability on a proportionally lower level.

An elimination of the possibility of undertaking offensive operations, including first and foremost the possibility of surprise attack by any party, would (?be an) important element of such stability. These could be reached by substantially reducing offensive components of military potentials, while maintaining forces adequate for effective defence.

The government of the Polish People's Republic envisages transformation of military potentials into those of a strictly defensive nature as a set of measures having a political, doctrinal, and technical character.

In this context the possibility of (?removing) asymmetries (?disproportions should) be considered, for example by means of equivalent (?solutions) under which the parties concerned would simultaneously decrease the quantities of various, [words indistinct] types of (?weaponry).

Of particular importance in removing the sources of instability and in mutual recognition of the strictly defensive nature of military potential would [words indistinct] the quantities of weapons mutually recognized as offensive, in the first place those which could be used for surprise attack. In particular this concerns missiles, tactical strike aircraft, tanks and other armoured combat vehicles, armed helicopters, long-range artillery, including rocket artillery.

The withdrawal and/or reduction of weapons could lead to the establishment of a zone of dispersed armaments, in which mutually agreed number of units of equivalent combat force, roughly comparable quantities of weapons and state of readiness would be deployed at an appropriate distance from the line of contact.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic, while confirming the importance of reaching agreement of effective confidence- and security-building measures and the mechanisms for the strict verification of compliance with the undertaken commitments, feels that these could play a meaningful part in eliminating threats, preventing the possibility of a surprise attack and dissipating mutual distrust.

The composition of confidence-building measures could also comprise exchanges of military information. This purpose would also be served by establishing a system of "hot lines" between the highest state authorities and military high commands and also through the extension of contacts among representatives of armed forces.

On its part the Polish Government reiterates its readiness to accept, on a reciprocal basis, far reaching methods of control indispensable to verify the full implementation of the endeavours envisaged by the plan.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic in its memorandum which referred first of all to central Europe, envisaged the possibility of parallel and staged

negotiations of disarmament and stabilizing measures in the whole of Europe. The plan proposed here is a solution corresponding to the security requirements of central Europe but remaining in a strict relationship with the situation, security requirements and solutions on an all-European scale.

While presenting this statement, the government of the Polish People's Republic yet again stresses its readiness to cooperate in the further development of the proposals contained in the plan with all those interested governments who are guided by a desire to strengthen security and peace in Europe.

ROMANIA

Need for Chemical Weapons Ban Reiterated
AU1506120688 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1053 GMT 15 Jun 88

[“A Definite Ban on Chemical Weapons”—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 15/06/1988—Giving pride of place to the imperative of nuclear disarmament, as a “priority of priorities,” the ten-point proposals advanced by Romania at the current UN General Assembly special session also highlight the need for the concomitant adoption of tangible, effective measures covering other areas as well among which distinguishing itself through its importance is the definite and complete liquidation of chemical weapons, reads a commentary in SCINTEIA. Drawing attention on the fact that chemical weapons are, alongside the nuclear armament, the most dreadful means of mass destruction, the newspaper writes: Today it is unanimously acknowledged that from the point of view of their destructive capacity, the chemical weapons, more particularly their so-called binary variant, are very close to nuclear ones, exceeding by far the killing potential of the conventional warfare. On the other hand, they are cheaper than the nuclear ones and their manufacture less complicated which explains the growing number of the states possessing chemical weapons.

These tendencies of proliferation of chemical warfare manifest in conditions of open urgings from certain Western circles to “fill in” the blank left following the liquidation of the intermediate and shorter range nuclear missiles. Official statements have been made in this respect in a number of NATO countries meant to “justify” the recrudescence of chemical arming, accompanied by tangible measures along this line.

Setting precisely from such realities, from the concern generated in the broadest circles of world opinion by such a course, Romania, inspired by the wish that all states be guaranteed security and stability, war threat lessened and disarmanent achieved, proposes at the current UN General Assembly special session—in close connection with tangible steps towards reducing and

liquidating nuclear weapons—the carrying through of measures and actions which, reiterating the principle of banning the use of chemical arms, should stipulate the cessation of the manufacture of any type of suchlike weapons and the elimination of the existing ones. Setting from the fact that toxic gases are used in some parts of the world with regional conflicts, with all the consequences resulting from this, SCINTEIA writes: Of special importance would be, as Romania proposes, that until all chemical weapons are destroyed states should pledge not to resort to like weapons under any circumstances.

The newspaper opines that chemical disarmament could be speeded up by the creation of zones free of chemical arms in various parts of the world—similar to denuclearized zones or extended ones to cover this type of arms as well. Romania's and Bulgaria's initiative is well known concerning the creation of such a chemical-free-zone in the Balkans, as are other proposals like that of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding the setting up of a similar zone in central Europe. UN's support to such steps, as Romania's new proposals stipulate, would meet a widely cherished desideratum and tangibly back negotiations under way on the convention on banning and eliminating chemical weapons.

Imposing itself as a most stringent demand, the complete and definite liquidation of chemical weapons, a fully attainable goal in conditions in which states manifest political will, would undoubtedly go down as a major contribution to the efforts for disarmament, for a lasting security in the world, in harmony with all people's interests and aspirations, the newspaper concludes.

YUGOSLAVIA

Loncar Addresses UN Assembly
AU1506090988 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
3 Jun 88 p 7

[TANJUG report on speech by Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, at the UN General Assembly special session on disarmament in New York on 2 June: “The Vicious Circle With an Exit”]

[Text] United Nations, 2 Jun—“Distrust and rivalries of all kinds have encouraged the arms race, just as a constant accumulation and improvement of increasingly destructive arms has inevitably increased fear and multiplied the divisions in international relations. This has been a vicious circle, but not one without an exit. Without defeatism and without considering it utopian, Yugoslavia has therefore incessantly endeavored for the disarmament process and has incessantly worked toward strengthening confidence and understanding among all the countries, regardless of ideological, political, economic, and other barriers,” Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, said at the beginning of his speech at the third special session of the UN General

Assembly on disarmament, in New York. He added that international security appears as a component of and as a result of the democratization of international relations, "whose fundamental value is represented by the equality of all countries in world affairs."

Loncar pointed out the special role, obligations, and responsibility of the great powers in the field of disarmament, but he also pointed out the constant contention of the SFRY that the necessary conditions be created so that the United Nations, "as the protagonist and interpreter of the interests of the entire international community, should be an active and irreplaceable factor in this process."

The Yugoslav foreign minister indicated how important it was to stop the arms race and to begin the process of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, "but also all other disarmament, with adequate and inevitable bilateral and multilateral verification, and constantly pointing out that peace and security may get the necessary stability and permanence only if efforts will be invested to reduce and overcome dangerous discrepancies in the course of economic and technological development." Loncar said that Yugoslavia is working toward establishing general security to the benefit of the entire international community, and as a contribution to strengthening regional and national security, believing that the right to peace and life belong to all equally.

Speaking about current positive trends in the world, the relaxation of tension in the relations among the big powers, and the beginning of a dialogue on many important questions, especially in the field of disarmament and on the solving of some hotbeds of crisis, Loncar stressed that the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Reagan in Moscow, as well as the agreements reached earlier and those that are yet expected, deserve the full tribute of the entire international community. These agreements are encouraging and they clearly show that a new orientation is gaining sway in international relations, and this should be in the interest of all, the strong and the weak, the developed and the developing countries.

The Yugoslav foreign minister drew attention to the fact that the nonaligned countries have continuously made a significant contribution to the disarmament process, and he pointed out that nobody can have a monopoly over international peace and security. Budimir Loncar pointed out that the extraordinary meeting of the Coordination Bureau of the Nonaligned Countries that has just concluded in Havana is another confirmation of the importance that the nonaligned countries attach to disarmament.

Welcoming the "historic agreements on the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons and the agreement in principle on reducing strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent," Loncar expressed his hope and expectation that other, even wider and more significant agreements will follow.

He then pointed out the contribution by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania to the efforts to stop the arms race, and the significance of their proposal to strengthen the UN role in connection with the verification of future agreements in this field.

Loncar particularly stressed "Yugoslavia's vital interest" in starting and implementing the process of disarmament. He said that the advancement of cooperation of all the countries on the basis of equality and interdependence is a current necessity, and that the demands for a democratization of the disarmament negotiations on a universal plane are becoming the imperative of the time.

It is necessary, Loncar added, that priority should continuously be given to the efforts to eliminate the sources of tension, such as: ideological, political, and other confrontations; striving for supremacy; and inequality in international political and economic relations. He said that an active and peaceful coexistence and cooperation of all states should prevail over the policy of the use of force or the threat of force, and over divisions and various aspects of interference in internal affairs of sovereign states.

Loncar particularly stressed that it was indispensable that the United Nations should intensify its activities so that its central role would be enhanced as much as possible, and that it should bear its share of responsibility in the field of disarmament, in keeping with the UN Charter.

Pointing out that nuclear arms have priority in disarmament negotiations, Loncar appealed for the urgent conclusion of an agreement on comprehensively banning nuclear weapons tests. He also indicated the need for "enhancing the regime of nonproliferation and for a respective treaty, bearing in mind the legitimate interests of the nonnuclear states in the peaceful use of nuclear energy," as well as for the urgent conclusion of a convention imposing a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Loncar asked that work should continue in working out an agreement banning other mass destruction weapons, and in preventing the militarization of space.

During his examination of the disarmament process, the Yugoslav foreign affairs secretary drew attention to the need to offer new encouragement to the positive experiences of the CSCE and the Stockholm conference on confidence-building and security measures and on disarmament in Europe.

"It is also important that the measures of confidence and limitation of military activities should expand to naval regions, especially where the fleets of the nuclear powers are present, as in the Mediterranean," Loncar added.

The SFRY foreign minister remarked that the disarmament process is of tremendous importance for developing countries, "for the funds released through disarmament measures would be positively reflected in their overall development, especially economic development."

"We believe that proceeding from the final document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament, this session should provide an assessment of development in the past period, point out the essential problems of the present time, and speed up a comprehensive dialogue, turning it into an incessant process of negotiation," Budimir Loncar said.

Yugoslav Proposals

He stressed that, bearing in mind the state of international relations, the agreements reached in the field of disarmament and arms control, the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations, and the special role played by the disarmament conference, Yugoslavia believes that this session should direct the efforts of the international community in the immediate future in the following directions, which he listed:

First, a further reduction of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons, in which other nuclear powers should join, and an implementation of the signed agreements as soon as possible. Furthermore, "considering the shift in the emphasis of the arms race from quantity to quality," an agreement on a comprehensive ban of nuclear arms tests in all the communities should be concluded soonest, and the use of other mass destruction weapons should be forbidden and these weapons destroyed. As an immediate task, a convention on a comprehensive ban on, and destruction of, chemical weapons should be concluded.

Loncar also indicated the need for reaching an agreement on the exclusive use of new technological discoveries for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the whole of mankind.

Yugoslavia proposes, concluded Loncar, that the following also be included in the decisions which will be taken by this session:

—The convening of an international conference in 1989, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the signing of a convention on the total banning of chemical weapons;

—A call to all nuclear powers to reach an agreement on a moratorium on nuclear testing, or for them to intro-

duce one separately, beginning on 5 August 1988—the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water—until an agreement is reached on a total ban on testing;

—A call to all states of the world to unilaterally reduce their conventional arms and armed forces by 10 percent by 1990, which Yugoslavia has already done, as a sign of the readiness of all countries to participate in the process of disarmament.

LCY Evaluates Meeting

*LD1206131288 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1222 GMT 12 Jun 88*

[Text] Berlin, June 12 (TANJUG)—Assessments about improvements in the general climate in East-West relations were entirely confirmed at a conference in Potsdam last week of public figures from most countries which participate in the CSCE.

This view was presented by Vasil Tupurkovski, member of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), towards the end of the three-day conference in Potsdam which had been organized by the New York Institute for Security Studies in the East and the West in cooperation with the German Democratic Republic as the host.

In Tupurkovski's view, the conference showed that what now existed was "vigorous communication in the political and scientific domain along the East-West direction." At the same time this was an opportunity also to verify the readiness for launching possible fresh initiatives.

Tupurkovski told TANJUG's correspondent that the Potsdam meeting also showed the bipolar character in the development of East-West relations. The democratization within international relations, however, opens up more space also for proposals by subjects in international life other than only those encompassed by the notion of East-West, Tupurkovski said.

He added that Yugoslavia should be "much more present in Europe" through emphasizing its nonaligned orientation and wider-spread engagement. This presence, he said, should be displayed not only within the CSCE processes and regular foreign political activities, but also through the participation in the other streams of political, scientific and cultural dialogues. One such opportunity was the meeting in Potsdam, said he.

Vinogradov Examines U.S.-Japanese Defense Ties in Wake of INF Treaty

18010096z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 88 pp 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA international columnist, in the Military-Political Review section: "Japan-U.S.: The Well-Trodden Road of Militarization," first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] A Pilgrimage Abroad—Tokyo Supports the American "Initiative"—From An Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier to Real Aircraft Carriers"

Leaders of the Japanese Government opened the new year's "political season" with a series of visits to the United States. Both Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Uno and Prime Minister N. Takeshita have completed their pilgrimage across the ocean, and now Director General, Japan Defense Agency Ts. Kawara is being sent there. This is to be expected, for Tokyo invariably sees its relationship with Washington as the "corner-stone" of the Land of the Rising Sun's foreign policy.

In light of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, the discussion of the world strategic military situation in the world, to include the situation in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean area in light of the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting, was at the center of the negotiations in Washington. The signing of the U.S.-USSR treaty on eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles created some major repercussions in Japan. Many influential political figures, mass anti-war active organizations and large sectors of society considered this agreement an historic event in post-war history.

It is apparent that Japanese leadership has expressed its support for the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles. However, as the TOKYO SHIMBUN newspaper shows, hidden behind this is a guarded attitude toward the results of Soviet-American summit meeting. The unofficial review of the world situation in 1987 and the perspective for its development in 1988 as was prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifically states that, "one should not develop an optimistic, pacifistic attitude" such as was prevalent after the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles was concluded. The SANKEY SHIMBUN newspaper states that the Japanese Foreign Ministry feels that a "profound atmosphere of peace will be a minus for the West" and in that article they stressed the necessity of "increasing the solidarity of the Western camp" was stressed in that article.

And it was precisely this political baggage that accompanied Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister to Washington. They clearly differed with the declarative statements about the adherence to disarmament which they do not accept. As is obvious from press

reports, tete-a-tete talks in Washington gave no hint of Tokyo's readiness to repudiate its part in the arms race. All of the talks were held in the spirit of the former course toward confrontation with the socialist world. Japan's military budget for the upcoming fiscal year which begins 1 April in that country and that was approved on the eve of N. Takeshita's departure abroad could not but make the American Administration happy. Its growth is envisioned at 5.2 percent and at the same time there is a 10 percent increase planned for Japanese expenditures on the maintenance of American bases and forces in Japan, bringing that total to 120.3 billion yen.

Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci praised Tokyo for the high growth rate of its military expenditures. But he also demanded more. I will explain exactly what happened. A new abbreviation appeared in the pages of American newspapers and on the lips of television commentators as early as late last year. That abbreviation was "STI" which expands to "balanced technological initiative." What is the essence of this latest American "initiative"? It turned out that this is an extensive program to create fundamentally new types of non-nuclear weapons with increased accuracy and destructive force. The television news company CBS indicated that with the help of these weapons, the Pentagon hopes to "close the gaps" which, as the Pentagon suggests, will create the realization of the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles.

And as has already been reported, that same week the special commission on developing recommendations for long-term U.S. strategy presented President R. Reagan with the fruits of its labors—a report entitled "Differentiated Restraint." This report discussed the need to reorient U.S. military strategy and it pushed its recommendation that the U.S. train for military operations using "highly accurate non-nuclear weapons" and specifically cruise missiles whose creation became possible as a result of the development of computer technology and micro-electronics. All of this is to provide the United States "overwhelming superiority on the battlefield." This is essentially the "balanced technological initiative"!

It is clear the the U.S. does not plan to carry out its dangerous plans alone. It intends to bring its primary allies into the realization of those plans and Japan is being assigned one of the leading roles. This is more than just distributing the financial load of the new, very expensive American "initiative." According to the creators of STI, the powerful Japanese scientific and technical potential is practically irreplaceable in the creation of the latest types of weapons such as: automated airplanes, robot tanks, radar that will automatically direct missiles and torpedoes, and computers for automated systems to control combat operations.

Thus, during his visit to the U.S. Prime Minister N. Takeshita gave a positive answer to the possibility of Japan taking part in the American "initiative," but

Japan Defense Agency Director General Ts. Kawar openly stated that the decision to take part in STI is a matter for the very near future. A representative delegation of Pentagon experts is already in Japan. They are involved in the preliminary selection of technology suitable for the development of new non-nuclear weapons. For this reason the delegation is visiting factories and scientific research laboratories in the Japanese electronic and machine-building corporations.

And at the same time the creators of the notorious Strategic Defense Initiative are "getting their hands" on Japanese scientific and technological ideas. Tokyo signed an agreement on the conditions for taking part in the American Star Wars Program last summer. And now, in order to urge the Japanese, Washington is proposing that Tokyo take part in the development of an "anti-ballistic system for the theater of combat operations." And they are trying to entice Tokyo with promises that such a system would allow them to create an "anti-ballistic defense net" in the airspace around Japan. They envision the creation of a computer-controlled radar system with new air defense missiles and electromagnetic cannons able to, so they say, to destroy sea-based intermediate and shorter range missiles. The authors of this recommendation are also not hiding the fact that, as an Asiatic type of SDI, this new system would become a critical supplement to the American Star Wars Program or even an integral part of it.

Just as in the case of STI, statesmen from the Japan Defense Agency all but used both hands to vote for Japan's participation in this new project. The fact is that in Tokyo the future for disarmament is not convenient for those circles who are building a policy based on maintaining tension in the world. They are clearly trying to reduce the importance of the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles in improving the international situation. For example this same Japan Defense Agency Director General Ts. Kawara maintains that "the military situation has not changed" in Asia. And he comes to one simple conclusion from this: Japan must continue to go at full speed to realize its five-year militaristic program. And so that it is more convincing to the Japanese, they are again being intimidated by the "perfidy of the Russians" and by fabrications about the increased "Soviet military presence" around Japan.

Recent events clearly confirm that influential circles at the highest echelons of Japanese power intend to hold their previous militaristic positions, refuse to correct their military policy and continue to think along the lines of old stereotypes even after the historic signing of the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Ballistic Missiles. The government has agreed to allocate enormous funds to accomplish a whole "set" of military programs. For example, 15 billion yen is being spent simply to equip a center for tracking submarines. They plan to spend enormous sums such as that for the development of a new generation of support fighter, to

purchase the super-modern Inzhis firing system for ships and to construct powerful over-the-horizon radar sites. And without any long explanation here it is obvious that Japanese ruling circles are undertaking a "major leap" in military construction which will elevate the country's military potential to a significantly higher level.

But even this is not enough for them. The IOMIURY newspaper initially told its readers about a certain secret Japanese Naval plan to get an aircraft carrier into its inventory. And then Naval Chief of Staff Admiral S. Khigasiyama himself confirmed the Japanese admirals' "urgent desire." According to information from IOMIURY they have already selected the type aircraft carrier that they want. It is the same model as the British Invincible which has a water displacement of up to 16,000 tons and can carry eight to ten Sea Harrier VTOL [vertical take-off and landing] aircraft. The inclusion of new aircraft carriers into the Japanese naval inventory had to be included in the new program for expanded militaristic training which covers the period 1991-1995. And the statement by the Japanese admirals that they need the aircraft for purely "defensive reasons" can hardly confuse anyone. The same IOMIURY stresses that there is nothing preventing these ships from being used to conduct offensive operations.

In his day former Prime Minister Nakasone promised his ally across the ocean that he would turn Japan into an unsinkable "aircraft carrier." And he later led the country down the well-trodden road of militarization. His successors have decided not to turn away from this dangerous route. They planned to reinforce the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" with real aircraft carriers. And Tokyo cannot but bring very serious dangers to Japan's neighbors with this policy. The Pyongyang newspaper MINCHZHU CHOSON writes, "The expansion of armed forces and weapons that Japan is carrying out under the guise of 'defense' and its increased military alliance with the U.S. is further increasing tension in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean area." And in a commentary devoted to the increase in Japan's military appropriations the Indonesian ANTARA Agency correctly reminds us that peace and security cannot be maintained by expanding military power.

The Tokyo leadership is increasingly stressing its desire to have a more active role in the international association, one that is comparable to Japan's position as the second economic power in the Capitalist world. But as facts show, they see this "active role" as nothing but strengthening the might of its armed forces and expanding its military alliance with the United States. And this in no way fits the interests of the Country of the Rising Sun or its neighbors.

Disarmament Will Not Defuse Threat From Capitalist Aggression

18010324z Moscow AGITATOR in Russian
No 4, Feb 88 pp 45-48

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Chernyshev: "Capitalism Without Militarism?" Passage in italics as published]

[Text] In a speech dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Great October, Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, reflecting on the prospects for the formation of an all-encompassing system of international security under conditions of disarmament, poses difficult questions on which the future of civilization depends. Can capitalism adapt to the conditions of a nuclear-free and disarmed world? In the current phase of world development, at a new level of mutual dependency and the integral nature of the world, is an influence possible on imperialism that would block the most dangerous manifestations of it? Can the range of destructive action of the egocentric and narrow class features of the capitalist system be limited? Can capitalism function and develop economically without militarism?

It seems to me that a positive answer to these questions is hardly realistic. The nature of imperialism does not change—it was and remains aggressive and militaristic. Moreover, too many forces in the West have a vested interest in the arms race: the monopolies producing the arms, the generals, the state bureaucracy, the ideological apparatus and militarized science, all combined in the powerful military-industrial complex. Or am I incorrect?—N. Plisko (Moscow).

Unfortunately, there are grounds for pessimistic forecasts, and many of them. In recent decades the militarization of capitalist society has increased steadily, and militarism is being turned more and more into a destructive force developing according to its own intrinsic logic and its own intrinsic laws and, moreover, dictating this logic and these laws to mankind. The military-industrial complex has acquired a certain independence in the West, and it has sometimes even come out with some success against the broader and more long-term interests of the ruling class overall.

The situation does not look insoluble nonetheless.

One: Notwithstanding its reactionary nature, adherence to the "policy of force," reliance on military ways of achieving military and political aims and egotistical approach to world politics, imperialism can react to changing objective circumstances. A clear example of this is the coalition between the United States, England and many other capitalist states and the Soviet Union against German fascism and Japanese militarism in World War II.

"Whereas in the past an alliance of socialist and capitalist states was possible in the face of the fascist threat," declared Comrade M.S. Gorbachev in the speech "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues," "is there really any certain lesson that follows from this for the present, when the whole world has come to be faced with the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the necessity of ensuring the security of nuclear power and surmounting the ecological danger? All of these are completely real and terrible things requiring not only an awareness of them, but a search for practical solutions as well."

Another fact is the changing nature of the struggle among the imperialist powers for the economic and political division and partitioning of the world. This struggle is manifested in our time in different forms than it was at the beginning of the century: wars among the leading capitalist states are highly unlikely. The lessons of the last world war and, most important, the fear of weakening oneself before the other social system—socialism—are playing a decisive role herein. The resolution of inter-imperialist contradictions has today been transformed into harsh technological and economic competition.

An awareness is also growing in the West of the fact that capitalism had to pay a high price with major social upheavals for the world wars it unleashed. After the first, revolutionary processes were rapidly developed and the socialist revolution triumphed in Russia. World War II demonstrated even more clearly the crisis of the very institution of war as an instrument of policy. Conceived as a "crusade" against the Soviet state, this war ultimately led to the popular and worldwide historical movement against fascism and its total defeat, while in a number of countries popular-democratic revolutions were successful and the collapse of the colonial empires accelerated.

Two: Antagonism towards socialism doubtless remains one of the defining traits of the policies of imperialism. The fight against the new order has been conditioned first and foremost by the capitalist instinct of self-preservation. Under contemporary conditions, however, when an effort to destroy socialism militarily would inevitably entail the destruction of capitalist society, the self-preservation instinct takes on new substance.

The total force of the munitions exploded during World War II is roughly equal to 2.5 million tons of TNT. The power of the first American atomic bomb that incinerated Hiroshima was 13,000 tons. Today the power of the 50,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the countries on the planet is equivalent to 13 billion tons of TNT. This is 5,200 World War IIs and a million Hiroshimas. Scientists have calculated that just one twentieth of the nuclear arsenals of the two great powers is sufficient to inflict irreparable harm on each other. And taking into account the fires that would arise after the explosions, less than one percent of the accumulated nuclear arms

would be required for the "guaranteed annihilation" of any large major country. But this cuts both ways. Anyone who resolves to launch a first strike would doom himself to a tortuous death, and not just from an answering strike, but from the consequences of detonating one's own warheads. The spread of radiation and the impact of "nuclear winter" would completely destroy life on Earth.

Wars fought using conventional weapons are also unacceptable for certain regions. For example, in Europe, highly developed on a technological plane and with a large quantity of nuclear power plants, chemical plants, reserves of petroleum products, buried toxic wastes and the like, even a "conventional" war would be totally destructive and ruinous for every living thing.

This means that if a head-on (or even regional) clash of capitalism and socialism is fraught with catastrophe, the self-preservation instinct should operate against militarism: contemporary war is just as destructive overall for the bourgeoisie as for other classes of society, and it is just as suicidal for capitalism as for socialism. It is for that reason that many leaders of the capitalist world are beginning to realize that super-armament is not identical to security, and already a significant portion of the bourgeoisie is beginning to consider peaceful co-existence as an essential condition for the physical survival of capitalism and its historical fate.

A clash itself with the real possibility of self-destruction cannot help but foster growth in the capitalist countries in intra-political differentiation on issues of war and peace and the arms race. This relates to the ruling circles as well, where there have appeared, and probably will strengthen, realistically thinking forces and, perhaps, the proportionate share of militarist subsegments will decline in the process of devising foreign-policy solutions.

Three: The arms race does not meet the interests of the greater portion of the ruling class today from an economic viewpoint. It is only enriching an inconsiderable and narrow group of monopoly capital. The overwhelming majority of corporations either receive just insignificant crumbs of the military profits or remain outside the "military economy" altogether.

In the United States, for example, the Pentagon's military orders are filled by 20,000 major contractor companies and 100,000 subcontractor firms. There are roughly 14 million firms in the country overall (not including agricultural production). Consequently, less than one percent of the overall number of companies works for the Defense Department. Just a small number of gigantic specialized corporations that comprise the foundation of the military-industrial complex, however, play a leading role among them. Some 65-70 percent of the annual overall value of Pentagon orders has fallen to their share in recent decades, including about 50 percent to the largest and up to 35 percent to the first ten.

Many people have become involved in the military sphere, but not an overwhelming portion of the able-bodied population. Some 2.1 million people were working directly in military industry and one million were employed in various types of services for the military sector in the United States in 1981. Aside from this, three million Americans were in actual military service or were working under voluntary hire. The overall size of the workforce in the United States that year was 110.3 million people. This means that just 5.4 percent of the aggregate workforce of the country was "fed" directly from the militarist "fields." The overwhelming majority of the workers had no objective vested interest in the arms race.

Four: An ever larger portion of the ruling class of the capitalist countries is beginning to realize the negative consequences for itself of militarization—a rise in inflation and budget deficits, reductions in economic growth and the number of jobs, declines in production efficiency etc.

Take, for example, the United States. From 1946 through 1986 inclusive, its total military spending has been 3.4 trillion dollars, and moreover in the six years of the Reagan administration it has reached 1.5 trillion. First and foremost due to this factor, the rate of economic growth in the United States in the 1980s has proven to be somewhat lower (an average of 2.5 percent a year) than in the 1960s (4.3) and even in the 1970s (3.1), earlier felt to be the worst over the whole postwar period. Labor productivity—one of the most important indicators typifying the vitality of economic systems—grew an average of just 0.7 percent in 1980-84 and 0.3 in 1985-86, while, for example, this indicator was 3.2 percent in 1960-64.

The competitiveness of American industrial goods in the international market has declined sharply, and the U.S. trade deficit for 1981-86 was about 600 billion dollars. Distinctive "records" have been set by the Reagan administration in the realm of budget deficits—it jumped from 58.5 billion dollars in 1981 to 221 billion in 1987—as well as the realm of national debt, which has surpassed 2.3 trillion dollars. Whence it is clear how potentially explosive the situation is. The serious disorder of state finances and the whole credit and monetary system overall, strengthening considerably the instability of American capitalism and weakening its international economic positions, is evident.

If such economic policies continue to be brought to life, alarmed American economists warn, by the year 2000 the national debt of the United States will reach 13 trillion dollars, while interest payments on it alone will total 1.5 trillion dollars.

Five: History shows that a capitalist economy can develop without militarization. The minimal military spending in a number of Western states after World War

II has allowed them to achieve rapid economic development. Data on the economy of the "three centers"—the United States, Western Europe and Japan—is instructive in this regard.

At the same time as the United States has continuously expanded the arms race, diverting ever greater funding to it, the Western European states and Japan have rehabilitated their economies while simultaneously accomplishing their reconstruction. They put relatively large amounts of budget allocations at the time into financing capital investment in the civil-production sector, the creation of modern industrial capacity, raising product market competitiveness etc. All of this also predetermined their higher economic growth rates. Whereas the average annual growth rate of production was 4.5 percent in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, it reached 7 percent in West Germany and Italy and even 14 percent in Japan.

The differing levels of militarization of the economies had an effect on the rapid change in the correlation of economic forces. Whereas the United States' share of aggregate industrial production was 64.5 percent in 1948, by 1970 it had declined to 49.6 percent. The share of Western Europe grew from 34.1 to 39.3 percent over this period, and Japan's went from 1.4 to 11.1 percent.

The militarization of the economy narrows the investment base for the development of the civil sectors, and the interests of the monopolies clash first and foremost with those sectors in world markets. The withdrawal of ever greater material, financial and labor resources for military purposes cannot help but be a drag on the normal development of the economies of the capitalist states. And this is beginning to alarm a large portion of the ruling class in the United States more and more strongly.

All of the above testifies to the obvious trend of a steady narrowing of the social base of militarism and that war, the arms race and the unrestrained militarization of the economy have ceased to meet the overall class interests of the bourgeoisie. This has made it possible to pose the question of the possible reversibility of the militarization of the economy even in those capitalist countries where it has been seriously developed. The problem of converting military production into civilian is naturally not at all a simple one, but evidently a realistic solution could be found.

The overall change in world public opinion in favor of disarmament has exceedingly great significance in this process. Contemporary capitalism will not reject militarism voluntarily. Economic and political realities, the fight of broad public circles for peace and disarmament and the constructive policies of the socialist countries, however, could push it that way.

Definite shifts have been noted. An historic agreement to eliminate two classes of missiles—intermediate- and short-range—was concluded at the Soviet-American summit. Also attracting attention is another instance. For the first time in recent years, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, F. Carlucci, was ordered to reduce the projected fiscal 1989 military budget that had already been prepared by his predecessor, C. Weinberger, by 33 billion dollars. According to his orders, the Navy should decrease spending by almost 12 billion dollars, the Air Force by 10.5 and the Army by 9. The MX and Midgetman missile programs, new aircraft carriers and new combat helicopters are proposed for reduction or elimination. All of this is still just planning, but it is symptomatic in its own way.

Nonetheless the leading capitalist countries, including the United States, are still far from the demilitarization of their policies. The continuation of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, the results of which are proposed for utilization not only for the militarization of space and its reinforcement with space nuclear weapons, but also for the creation of fundamentally new prototypes of conventional weapons, represents a particular danger.

The leading circles of NATO, and first and foremost Great Britain and France, in no way wish to perceive the idea of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, and they are continuing to improve their own nuclear arsenals. The leadership of those countries, as well as the NATO generals, are considering plans for the nuclear "up-arming" of Western Europe after the elimination of American medium- and short-range missiles.

A communique was adopted at the December 1987 session of the NATO Council in which its participants came out in favor of an activation of collaboration between the Atlantic partners in the cause of incarnating extensive programs for the creation and deployment of more efficient types of "classical weaponry." Washington advanced a so-called "balanced technological initiative," which envisages the joint development of new types of conventional weapons by the Western countries. The U.S. administration is trying to draw both the Western European NATO countries and Japan into participating in this program.

The U.S. concept of "air-ground battle" and the NATO concept of "second-echelon strikes" (the Rogers plan) rely on the creation and utilization of new types of non-nuclear weapons with qualitatively increased destructive potential approaching the features of low-powered nuclear weapons. The Rogers plan directly assumes the surprise unleashing of combat action in concert by the ground forces, air forces and navies using all of the latest types of armed struggle at great depth for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage to enemy troops and achieving an overwhelming superiority over him along with a decisive offensive to seize his territory.

And this concept has not only not been abrogated at NATO, but is rather being materially reinforced more and more in the form of the arms and means of armed struggle that are coming in.

The old manner of thinking is nonetheless quite alive, and the most reactionary and militarist circles in the United States, Western Europe and Japan have no intention of renouncing it. There is an extremely serious struggle ahead with the opponents of disarmament and with those who do not conceive of peace without mountains of arms or without the opportunity of obtaining profits from the arms race, who dream of dictating their will to other countries and peoples. The world is still just at the beginning of the path to demilitarization.

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Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Now Operational
*PM1706153188 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN
in English No 9, May 88 p 4*

[Text] On April 1, 1988, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre set up in Moscow under a Soviet-American accord of September 15, 1987 went operational.

The Moscow centre and its counterpart in Washington have been fitted out with identical facsimile communication facilities based on Soviet and American satellites. Numerous test and live communication sessions have established their high efficiency beyond doubt. Each centre gets into communication with the other every two hours.

The staff of the national centre was formed as the side setting it saw fit to ensure its normal functioning. The centre is manned round the clock.

At this stage the centres will be used to transmit notifications of ballistic missile launches if they are carried out beyond national territory in the direction of the other side, and of launches posing danger to shipping or air traffic. The American side has already transmitted several such notifications. No notifications of the kind have come so far from the Soviet side, as the USSR has not yet made a single missile launch with tabled characteristics.

The agreement contains a provision, according to which the list of notifications transmitted through the centres can be changed by agreement between the parties.

Following the ratification and coming into effect of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the centres will intensify exchanges and diversify information concerning its implementation progress and appropriate inspections.

The value of the nuclear risk reduction centres will grow many times over after the signing of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons between the USSR and the USA.

U.S. Dodges Biological Convention Commitments
*LD1606155988 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN
in English No 9, May 88 pp 8-10*

[“The Military Bulletin’s Own Information”: “The U.S. and France Avoid Meeting Commitments Under the Final Declaration of the Second Conference of Signatories to the Biological Convention”]

[Text] A conference of scientific and technical experts from the countries which put their signatures to the Biological Convention was held in April 1987 in Geneva. The meeting worked out the conditions and procedure for exchanges of information on all laboratories having the highest level of protection (P-4) and working with agents of especially dangerous diseases and on laboratories with P-3 protection level specialising in studying and developing means of protection and prevention against hostile uses of bacteriological agents and toxins. Initial information was to be submitted by October 15, 1987, and, subsequent information, on a yearly basis, by April 15.

The Soviet Union has submitted detailed information on all of its 16 research institutes having P-4 and P-3 laboratories, including the institutes functioning under the Ministry of Defence (See MILITARY BULLETIN issue No 21 (27), October 1987), and in April 1988, it confirmed information forwarded earlier and supplied additional data.

What kind of information was presented by the United States? Of the six laboratories given, only two are said to be financed by the US Defense Department. According to the US press, there are quite a few microbiological and genetic engineering P-4 laboratories working on Pentagon contracts. But they are not in the list. The United States has supplied no information on any laboratory in the commercial sector of the pharmaceutical and microbiological industry. The question arises: To what extent does the US meet the commitment that exchanges of information should cover all research centres and laboratories, whether they belong to the private sector or the public sector of the economy or within its jurisdiction, wherever they may be located?

The United States has not reported on the Baker biological laboratory functioning as part of the Dugway Test Site, Utah. The laboratory was set up to ensure bacteriological and toxin weapons tests. It has a special P-4 chamber worth 5,400,000 dollars. Allegations that it is meant to test respirators hold no water because such tests do not require the highest level of protection.

The official documents submitted by the United States contain no information on the two Navy Army Medical Research Units (NAMRU-2 and NAMRU-3) engaged in studying agents of exotic diseases in the Far East and the Middle East. Nor do they contain any information on the Medical Research Institute of the US Armed Forces in Bangkok. It is engaged, however, in studying tsutsugamushi disease (Japanese river fever) and other dangerous tropical diseases.

There are quite a few French research organisations working with particularly dangerous agents and having laboratories with P-4 and P-3 protection level. No information pertaining to the Convention had been received from France by the agreed deadline, however. According to data available, the Pasteur Institute in Paris is engaged in work on the genetics of plague agents, which requires the maximum protection level. This equally holds true of the Tropical Medical Centre, Marseilles, engaged in studying the Lassa, Marburg and Ebola viruses.

CSCE Delegate on Shevardnadze UN Proposals
*LD1406133688 Moscow TASS in English
1010 GMT 14 Jun 88*

[Text] Vienna June 14 TASS—A Soviet delegation at the Vienna meeting has informed participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the proposals of the USSR in the sphere of disarmament and consolidation of security that were set forth by Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, in New York at the third special disarmament session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation who addressed the Vienna meeting, pointed out that the new Soviet proposals, especially the concept of bringing down the levels of military potentials in Europe, were directly connected with the problem of European security and disarmament.

Speaking about the process of working out a final document of the Vienna meeting of countries—participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as a mandate of new talks on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, the Soviet representative expressed concern over the attempts of delegations of NATO countries to hamper the coordination of military problems connected with security. He described as non-constructive and inveterate the stands of delegations of the NATO countries on a number of key European security problems.

The Soviet delegation reaffirmed its readiness for vigorous and constructive work aimed at completing as soon as possible the drawing up of a final document of the Vienna meeting and a mandate of future talks on the

reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. It urged Western countries to make reciprocal steps and to quest for mutually acceptable agreements.

'Working Document' Submitted to UN Disarmament Session

*LD1406205888 Moscow TASS in English
1748 GMT 14 Jun 88*

[Text] New York June 14 TASS—The delegations of Bulgaria, Mongolia, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic called the attention of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament to the need to enlist world public opinion in support of disarmament.

They submitted a working document to the special session today. In the document they urged the United Nations member countries to promote the ensurance of the circulation of objective information on all aspects of the arms race, to check the circulation of false and tendentious materials on armaments, to avoid implanting "the enemy image" and refrain from campaigns against the United Nations.

In the opinion of the authors of the document, the information activity of the United Nations member countries should promote in every way the realisation by the world public of the danger inherent in all the aspects of the arms race, the threat of war as a whole and of nuclear war in particular.

Karpov Interviewed on Geneva Arms Talks
*LD1406133188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Jun 88 Morning Edition p 5*

[Interview with V.P. Karpov, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, by own correspondent A. Shalnev under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Interview": "V. Karpov: United States Is Not Yet Ready"; date of interview not given—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] New York—if Washington made the appropriate political decision, the problems currently holding up the formulation of the treaty on a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear arms could be settled. However, the United States is not yet ready to make such a decision. This is the opinion of V.P. Karpov, chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry Administration and head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. I talked with him during a recess at the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament.

Shalnev How realistic is the prospect of a new agreement being concluded before the end of the current President's term of office?

Karpov President Reagan has said since his return from Moscow that he is prepared to have another summit if such a possibility arises. We are also prepared, provided there is an agreement. In the United States itself, the situation is nonetheless uncertain. There is no certainty that the administration is now capable of adopting a definitive decision on a particular course of action—whether to conclude an agreement or not. Clearly, the decision will be made in light of the further development of the election campaign. If it looks as though the Democrats are going to win the election, Reagan's freedom of action is narrowed, as it were: He will have to weigh up how the Democrats will view the treaty he has signed. If the scales tilt in favor of Bush, there could well be more vigorous action from the President—to support his successor.

Shalnev May we not see the following scenario: The President will do everything he can to ensure that Bush wins, and as one step toward ensuring such a victory, he will conclude a new agreement with the Soviet Union?

Karpov This also sounds logical, although it cannot be ruled out that it would be difficult to do this. Why? Because the President's decision could be seen as a desperate gesture, as purely an election ploy, with all the ensuing consequences, namely: An entirely unnecessary political struggle might break out around this very important and serious cause. This is a factor we must bear in mind.

Shalnev What are the technical difficulties regarding the conclusion of a treaty? How great are they, and to what extent are they surmountable in the time that remains before Reagan's departure from the White House?

Karpov Difficulties exist. Many, it is true, were resolved during the talks. However, two major groups of problems remain. The first is observance of the ABM Treaty. Agreement in principle was reached on this issue during the Washington summit, but this agreement must be expressed juridically, in treaty form. However, we seem unable to resolve this with the Americans, although Secretary of State Shultz has promised more than once during his meetings with E.A. Shevardnadze that this would be done. However, at delegation level in Geneva, the U.S. side is working in a diametrically opposed direction.

This is the most problematic question for the United States: If an agreement is signed, it will in practice be necessary to renounce SDI in the form in which it was proposed by the President in March 1983. However, the President cannot officially renounce SDI since his political reputation rides on this program. The Americans obviously do not yet know how to get out of this situation, although, in my opinion, there is a way out. It lies in the observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed and ratified in 1972.

The second group of problems concerns air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. Neither the Americans nor we have any doubts about the need to limit cruise missiles. But how are they to be limited? The Americans have far more strategic bombers than we have. The Americans would like to exclude a number of these bombers—between 200 and 300, according to some estimates—from the framework of the restrictions and equip them with formally non-nuclear long-range cruise missiles. Each such aircraft can be equipped with 10-20 cruise missiles. Technology is improving, and the replacement of non-nuclear equipment with nuclear equipment or vice versa will probably not represent a major task in the future. The Soviet side believes that any bomber, irrespective of whether it is equipped with nuclear or conventional missiles, should be included in the 1,600 delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear charges which the United States and the Soviet Union would be allowed to have under the treaty. Our position is this: If a bomber is equipped with long-range nuclear cruise missiles then, first, the bomber must be included in the 1,600 delivery vehicles, and, second, each missile must be included in the 6,000 nuclear charges which each side would be allowed to have. When it comes to cruise or ballistic missiles with a range of up to 600 km or free-fall bombs, each bomber must be included in the 1,600 delivery vehicles and also, as one unit, in the 6,000 charges.

There are no disagreements on this score between us and the Americans. However, the Americans want to introduce yet another category—heavy bombers equipped with long-range non-nuclear cruise missiles—and not count this category anywhere; they do not want to count either the missiles or the delivery vehicles. This would be a double standard, and ultimately a situation might arise where, in addition to the 6,000 nuclear charges, the United States would have a reserve which could be used when the need arose to deploy [razmeshcheniye] several thousand additional nuclear charges. We believe that anything that goes beyond the agreed framework—1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 charges—must be destroyed: aircraft, missiles, and submarines.

Now about sea-launched cruise missiles: Here, too, the United States is looking for a channel to sidestep the treaty being drafted. So far it has agreed only in principle that it is necessary to limit sea-launched cruise missiles. It has not lifted a finger to turn this accord into a concrete treaty provision. The United States is rejecting all our proposals, claiming that, in its view, the verification system is ineffective. Asked what would be an effective system, they reply: "We do not know; our position on this has not been formulated." The only solution the Americans regard as possible is the following: The USSR and the United States should issue unilateral statements defining their plans for, say, the next 5 years, on sea-launched cruise missiles, saying, for instance, that by 1995, perhaps, the United States intends to deploy such-and-such a number of nuclear cruise missiles.

Shalnev Are these charges to be included in the 6,000?

Karpov No, according to the Americans, this is to be over and above the 6,000. The United States refuses to accept anything else. So no one would know how many such missiles were really deployed. Therefore, the treaty on a 50-percent cut would turn into fiction. It would apply only to air-launched cruise missiles, submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, and land-based ICBM's. But at sea it would be possible to deploy as many missiles as you like wherever you like. And so the question arises: Is the United States ready for a real limitation of its strategic arsenal?

Shalnev What is your view?

Karpov At this stage, it is not yet ready. A political decision is needed. If the White House makes such a decision, an agreement will be possible. References to the absence of an effective verification system on sea-launched cruise missiles are a diversionary maneuver. We have proposed a verification system whereby cruise missiles would essentially be monitored [kontrolirovatsya] throughout their lifespan, so to speak: Monitoring by the other side would begin as soon as a cruise missile leaves the factory gate. The missiles' itinerary is known. They pass through the point where the charge—nuclear or conventional—is fitted, and then the missile is placed on a submarine or a surface ship. There, too, there is verification. Any deviation from this itinerary would be prohibited. We are also proposing that restrictions should be placed on the number and type of surface ships and submarines on which the missiles can be placed. If just one cruise missile were detected on another ship, it would be a violation of the treaty with all the ensuing consequences. Furthermore: Inspections on ships and submarines could be carried out at any time, at the first demand.

Shalnev What was the Americans' reaction to these proposals?

Karpov They rejected them. They said that U.S. sailors would never agree to the presence of Russian inspectors on their submarines.

Shalnev How does a situation where our inspectors inspect a missile plant on U.S. territory differ from a situation where they inspect a submarine?

Karpov Well, the answer is probably obvious. If there is a political decision, the "insurmountable difficulties" which are currently being raised will disappear. The visits by our inspectors will be authorized. We, for our part, are ready for this kind of verification by the Americans on our side.

Shalnev In view of this adamant U.S. stance, how realistic was it for our side to put forward a series of

proposals on the limitation of the activities of navies, as E.A. Shevardnadze has done at the current UN General Assembly special session on disarmament?

Karpov Not just the United States and the Soviet Union have navies, although the U.S. Navy is the biggest, of course. The threat inherent in naval arms is growing. This is borne out by the Persian Gulf, for instance. We believe that there are questions on which it is possible to reach agreement right now—this applies specifically to the question of the limitation of naval activities in areas through which the busiest trade lanes pass. It is important to open a serious discussion. This is not just our view. Many other countries share it. Proposals to limit naval activities have also come from Sweden and other states.

Shalnev Only two presidential candidates remain: Bush and Dukakis. I can imagine that people in Moscow are attentively following the development of the foreign policy platforms of these two contenders. On the basis of what is already known about them, which course, in your opinion, will events take?

Karpov I believe that when it comes to key questions of relations with the Soviet Union, continuity of policy is largely assured. If a Republican administration retains the White House, this continuity will be immediate. If a Democratic administration wins, the White House will possibly take some time to define its line. Every new administration wants to add something of its own.

Shalnev Does this mean that you believe that there will be a certain hiatus?

Karpov I would not rule this out. I do not believe, however, that the hiatus would last long since the process has already been initiated and a good basis for accords already exists.

Shalnev There is a successful Broadway show at the moment called "The Walk in the Woods" which in a part-allegorical, part-realistic form describes how the Geneva talks were conducted in the early eighties. A show is a show, but as far as I can remember, neither Washington nor Moscow has so far confirmed officially that such a walk in the woods did take place and that during this walk a Soviet and a U.S. diplomat exchanged highly interesting proposals on ways to reduce nuclear arms in Europe.

Karpov Well, the walk did take place, of course. No one is denying this, not even the people who went on this walk—Paul Nitze and Yuliy Kvitsinskiy. However, both claim that the conversation during this walk did not go the way the other side describes it. The conversation was tentative, along the lines: "What would happen if we tried the following option..."—with no commitments made. Simply, possible options for a solution were discussed.

Shalnev Suppose we turn the clock back by 5 years. Could the idea which was expressed during that walk and ultimately rejected have served as a fillip to progress at the Geneva talks at the time?

Karpov Well, you know, it is difficult to say now. The time simply was not right then. We occupied a stance which was squarely opposed to the siting of U.S. missiles in Europe. The Americans said bluntly that they would not give up their decision but were prepared to continue to negotiate. So we slammed the door shut, and it was probably futile to do so. There was no need to slam the door. Ultimately even then, there were elements in the U.S. stance which were subsequently used to elaborate an agreement. We should have used them and brought nearer a solution.

Shalnev Are you referring to the zero option?

Karpov Yes. We later merely complemented it with the accord on shorter-range missiles. But basically we adopted that option. [Karpov ends]

As we said goodbye, it occurred to me that a book—were one to be written—about the difficulties which we encountered on our way to the treaty which came into force on 1 June after the exchange of instruments of ratification during the Soviet-American summit in Moscow would probably be a bestseller.

Obukhov Criticizes SDI Chemical Laser Project
LD1706112888 Moscow TASS in English
1054 GMT 17 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow June 17 TASS—"The report that a component of the Alpha chemical laser, intended for the SDI programme, took place [as received] in the U.S., is evidence that the American side is preparing to deploy arms systems in space," Ambassador at Large Aleksey Obukhov, the Soviet representative at the strategic offensive weapons group at the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, said today.

Work in this direction, conducted in the U.S., he said in a TASS interview, creates unfavourable conditions for preparing the draft treaty on a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The conclusion of this treaty is possible only if the ABM Treaty is preserved in the form it was agreed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington. "It is impossible to limit strategic offensive weapons on earth and at the same time to engage in preparations for extending the arms race into outer space. This is an irreconcilable contradiction," commented Aleksey Obukhov

Obukhov Marks SALT, Disarmament 'Milestones'
LD2006102388 Moscow TASS in English
0957 GMT 20 Jun 88

[“The Difficult Milestones of Disarmament”—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 20 TASS—"SALT-2 is an important milestone on the way towards disarmament, but the treaty on strategic offensive arms, on which Soviet and American experts are working now, has qualitatively different characteristics—it can open up an era of a real cut in the strategic offensive weapons on the basis of far-reaching mutual control measures," said Alexey Obukhov, ambassador at large, who represents the USSR in the group on the strategic offensive arms at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. "Time and tide wait for no man—the arms race may outrun the efforts by the participants in the talks. This shall not be allowed," the Soviet expert noted in talking with TASS diplomatic correspondent Vadim Biryukov.

The veteran of the Soviet-American talks, who participated in drafting the SALT-2 Treaty, which was signed in June 1979 as a result of an effort of seven years, believes that albeit that document was not ratified by Washington it restrained for a certain time a growth of the number of the delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads. It was only in December 1986 that the United States unilaterally went outside the framework of the treaty and has exceeded the limit by 31 heavy bombers by now.

The SALT-2 Treaty provided for control only with the use of the national-technical means of control. Now a ramified inspection system has been added to that. Despite that, the sides have so far failed to reach agreement on the central component of the treaty on the limitation of strategic arms—control over sea-based cruise missiles. It is believed in the United States that such a control is impossible and proposed that the sides only exchange statements of intent. One cannot help drawing the conclusion that they overseas wish to evade a cut in their potential of sea-based cruise missiles. One cannot help remembering the phrase said by Ambassador Paul Nitze way back in 1983: We will besiege the Soviet Union on all sides with long-range cruise missiles.

The Soviet Union holds a fundamentally different stand: "We favour the introduction of a whole system of control over the sea-based cruise missiles—observation of the facilities for the production of them, the places where they are loaded into the naval ships, where they are fitted out with nuclear warheads, inspection in any naval ship, and at last, long-distance control through flying over naval ships," Alexey Obukhov said.

Any agreement is a result of efforts by the two sides, the more so of such a scale as the treaty on strategic offensive arms. It calls for cooperation and practical preparedness to respect each other's mutual security interests and it also calls for a political decision on disarmament. "The signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms is impossible without a well-controlled limitation of sea-based cruise missiles, since in absence of a reliable control system the U.S. side will preserve a channel for bypassing the treaty on strategic offensive arms," Alexey Obukhov believes.

Reactions to Kampelman Statement

Karpov 'Amazed' at Kampelman Announcement on Treaty

LD2106123388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1035 GMT 21 Jun 88

[“Urgent: Max Kampelman’s Strange Discovery”—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Jun (TASS)—In addition to the U.S. President’s optimistic utterances to the effect that signing a Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons is still possible this year, skeptical voices are being heard more and more frequently from the other side of the ocean. Attempts are being made to depict the matter in such a way that blame for the emergence of new obstacles on the road to a treaty on strategic offensive weapons will fall on the Soviet side.

“I was amazed at the statement by Max Kampelman, aide to the U.S. State Department, that the Soviet Union has allegedly changed its stance put forward at the Washington summit, and is only now insisting on solving the problem of sea-based cruise missiles as an essential condition of concluding a treaty on strategic offensive weapons,” Viktor Karpov, head of the directorate on problems of arms limitation and disarmament of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said today in an interview with TASS diplomatic correspondent Vadim Biryukov.

Max Kampelman’s assertion can indeed be called a “discovery.” The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union raised the question of the need to resolve the problem of sea-based cruise missiles at the very start of the talks on nuclear and space weapons, while the U.S. side tried to avoid this resolution. In October 1986 in Reykjavik, the United States agreed to conduct a joint search for a solution to this problem. At the summit in Washington, the sides “agreed and undertook to establish maximum quantities of such missiles and to carry out a search for mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification to implement such restrictions.” That is what is said, word for word, in the joint statement on the results of the Washington summit.

“Without resolving the problem of sea-based cruise missiles, it is impossible to conclude a treaty on strategic offensive weapons because, while reducing the number of other types of delivery vehicles to 1,600 items and the overall number of nuclear strategic offensive weapons in the Soviet and U.S. arsenals to 6,000 items, we cannot permit these limits at sea to be circumvented by the deployment of hundreds, if not thousands, of nuclear tipped sea-based cruise missiles,” said Viktor Karpov. “If such a thing is permitted, then the treaty on strategic offensive weapons would be fiction: incidentally, fiction that would scarcely get through confirmation in the U.S. Congress.”

Bogachev on Kampelman Remarks

LD2106151488 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 21 Jun 88

[Text] Moscow, 21 June—Vladimir Bogachev, TASS observer on military matters, writes:

The head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, Max Kampelman, has actually confirmed that the United States rejects a number of formerly agreed conditions for the signing of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

In an interview for journalists on the ‘Worldnet’ television network, Kampelman insisted on Washington’s right to carry out any kind of ABM tests, including those which are unambiguously prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, during the Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington, the sides pledged themselves to observe this treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

The head of the U.S. delegation described as ‘propagandist’ a report by the Congressional Bureau of Technological Research, and also a project by a group of Pentagon experts, in which the conclusion is reached that the ‘Star Wars’ program will not ensure any kind of reliable defense for the United States and will only lead to the undermining of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Kampelman assured the journalists that the United States allegedly has “no intention of rejecting the ABM Treaty.” However, in doing so, he insisted on the U.S. Administration’s right to interpret the treaty as it sees fit, depending on the progress of work to militarize space.

Responding to questions from correspondents, the U.S. diplomat remarked that a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons can be signed only in the event that the sides, once again in violation of the obligations accepted at the summit, reject any kind of limitations on sea-based cruise missiles. Washington’s main argument here consists in the fact that the bilateral admittance of Soviet and U.S. inspectors onto naval vessels to verify [proverka] the relevant agreement, is “unacceptable” to the United States.

In his interview, Kampelman finally dispelled the myth of the U.S. side’s adherence to the idea of an “all-embracing and effective verification [proverka] of the observance of the agreements.” Moreover, he once again demonstrated the unwillingness of the administration in Washington to conclude a just agreement with the USSR on reducing the arsenals of the more dangerous nuclear weapons systems with a range of more than 5,500 km.

Attention is drawn to the fact that while verbally proclaiming the need for the separate resolution of questions on reducing various categories of weapons, Washington’s official representatives have now unexpectedly begun to link the problem of strategic nuclear systems with a preliminary unilateral reduction of Soviet conventional forces in Europe.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Fischer, Genscher Hold Talks at Potsdam

*LD1106131888 Hamburg DPA in German
1206 GMT 11 Jun 88*

[Text] Potsdam, 11 Jun (ADN)—The foreign ministers of the GDR and the FRG, Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, met on Saturday at Potsdam for talks. At the nub of the exchange of views were those issues which had also been discussed intensively at the Potsdam meeting of the IEWSS [Institute for East-West Security Studies] as well as issues of the work of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting.

Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher expressed their encouragement at the increasing positive international trends as shown by the coming into force of the INF Treaty and the other results of the Moscow summit. They stressed the interest of their states in accepting no hiatus in the efforts for disarmament, and backed the speedy conclusion of the treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

Oskar Fischer referred to the efforts of the GDR to promote trust, detente, and disarmament, and emphasized its interest in proceeding from zero solution to zero solution for nuclear weapons. The two ministers stressed the desire of their states for a speedy and substantial conclusion to the Vienna meeting. They agreed in assessing the proposal submitted by the Warsaw Pact states for a concluding document as a basis on which negotiations can be conducted.

Oskar Fischer and Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed the possibility of a regular exchange of views in order to get to know and understand the international positions of their states, and agreed to continue this dialogue.

Genscher Speaks on East-West Relations

Holds News Conference

LD1106172388 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1542 GMT 11 Jun 88

[Text] Potsdam, 11 Jun (ADN)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the international press in Potsdam on Saturday that the exchange of views with GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer on GDR territory was normal and useful. "It would have been difficult to understand if I, as part of my participation in the conference in Potsdam, had not met him", he said in reply to a question. The talks dealt with the negotiations of the CSCE states in Vienna. "We were both agreed that the paper submitted by the neutral and nonaligned states represents a suitable basis for further negotiations," Genscher said. The consultations of disarmament representatives of the governments of the two German states, which started some years ago, have proved themselves and should be continued.

Asked about the Berlin meeting on nuclear-free zones, Genscher affirmed that an FDP delegation led by Uwe Ronneburger, deputy chairman of the Bundestag group, would attend. Although his party rejects regional concepts, it nevertheless welcomes the opportunity of being able to explain its position at the meeting in Berlin.

Meets With Fischer

*LD1106131888 Hamburg DPA in German
1206 GMT 11 Jun 88*

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Defense Minister Views Upcoming U.S. Visit

*LD1706111788 Hamburg DPA in German
0602 GMT 17 Jun 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz has called for the Soviet Union to produce specific and exactly formulated proposals for conventional disarmament. In an interview with DPA, Scholz said on Friday in Bonn that such a step would then be carefully examined by the NATO alliance. In Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's recently outlined plans for disarmament in three phases in the conventional sector, Scholz sees "signs which possibly signal an important change of attitude in the Soviet leadership".

During his 3-day visit to Washington, where he is arriving on Sunday, Scholz also intends to discuss this topic with the U.S. Government. Moscow's admission of

conventional superiority over the West is judged by Scholz as an "encouraging sign" for disarmament talks. Stability on a lower level of armed forces is a demand that has been raised by NATO for years. Scholz stressed that the Soviet Union is apparently now examining this objective of the Western alliance.

During his talks in the U.S. capital with his U.S. colleagues, Frank Carlucci and other government representatives, as well as senators, Scholz intends to clarify the particular pressures on the citizens of the Federal Republic in the field of security, as a country where foreign troops are stationed.

With respect to the demands for greater European contributions to the NATO alliance raised by leading U.S. politicians, Scholz said that the constantly used words "burden sharing" did not go far enough. One should

rather talk of "sharing responsibility" in the West's joint security, which requires the best possible "equal contributions" from individual partners in the alliance in their respective situations.

The discussions in this area should not "be limited to the purely financial aspects". There is the matter of contributions as an expression of solidarity with the alliance partners—these contributions overall can be regarded as giving equivalent value. Scholz is confident that NATO will reach solutions, which for all concerned, "will be sufficiently acceptable and will continue to guarantee the alliance's defense capability". During his first visit to Washington, Scholz also intends to discuss the strategic prospects after the agreement on the scrapping of medium-range missiles and other NATO issues. Scholz said that his journey signals the continuation of joint, and even closer, ties with the United States.

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